concurring in. part and dissenting in part.
While concurring fully with Division 1 of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with the judgment of reversal in Division 2 and the non-resolution of the issues discussed in Division 3.
1. The trial court did give an erroneous jury charge on good character. However, in Cook v. State, 256 Ga. 808, 811-812 (353 SE2d 333) (1987), the Supreme Court held that even though the same erroneous jury charge on good character had been given, reversal was inappropriate where “[vjiewing the charge as a whole and the evidence presented to the jury, ... it is highly probable that the error in the charge as given did not contribute to the verdict.” In order to apply this “highly probable” test, this court must examine the evidence and set forth the facts of the case, as is done in most other written opinions, even though that evidence is particularly lurid.
The evidence in this case, which the majority opinion declines to discuss, showed that on the evening of April 12, 1985, Booth went into the bedroom of his twelve-year-old daughter, pulled down her shorts, unbuttoned and pulled down his overalls, and then had sexual intercourse with her. Two days later, Booth again went into his daughter’s bedroom, locked the door, pulled his and her pants down, and had sexual intercourse. Booth’s other daughter, who was eleven years old, heard her sister screaming, tried unsuccessfully to get into the bedroom, and finally climbed a ladder, looked into the bedroom *346window and saw her father having intercourse with her sister. Three days after that, on April 17, 1985, Booth found both daughters in the bathroom preparing to go to school, and he pulled up both girls’ blouses and bras and placed his mouth on their breasts. The above evidence, given by the victimized children, was corroborated by the physical and pelvic examinations performed by a physician later that day, after one of the children reported the molestation to her school teacher. As in some cases a “battered-wife/battered-husband syndrome” may be demonstrated, Johnson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 154 (354 SE2d 858) (1987), the instant case points out a “battered-child syndrome” of mental and physical abuse, as well as incest and child molestation.
I have no hesitation whatsoever in concluding that the evidence of guilt in the instant case was so overwhelming that the erroneous jury charge could not possibly have contributed to the verdict. This application of the “highly probable” test does not invade the jury’s functions of weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. The whole point of the “highly probable” analysis, in fact, is that the error under consideration did not affect the jury in its performance of those functions. The majority opinion is wrong in reversing Booth’s conviction and I dissent.
2. Concerning the trial court’s denial of Booth’s motions to have the State pay for a medical examination of Booth for venereal disease and for an airline ticket for an out-of-state witness, all that needs to be said is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. Baxter v. State, 254 Ga. 538 (2) (331 SE2d 561) (1985).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this opinion. Judge Beasley joins in this opinion except for concurring in the judgment only as to Division 2.