dissenting.
While I agree with much of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with the majority’s construction of the confidentiality provisions contained in OCGA § 48-5-314 (a) (1). This statute does not, as stated in the majority opinion, allow “personnel authorized by appropriate tax administrators to access materials otherwise protected as confidential thereunder.” In reality, the statute provides that confidential materials “shall not be subject to inspection by any person other than authorized personnel of appropriate tax administrators.” Id. In short, the statute permits access to confidential materials by a limited group of public officials and employees. In my view, the majority opinion is incorrect in holding that the confidential materials may be distrib*457uted to an independent contractor who is generally beyond the control and supervision of the “appropriate tax administrators.”
The issue in the present case is further clouded by the references in the majority opinion to the sharing of information between county boards of tax assessors and various political subdivisions of the state under OCGA § 48-5-298 (b). The information which may be exchanged under that provision is limited to that which a board could contract to obtain under OCGA § 48-5-298 (a) and is not the same as the confidential materials identified under OCGA § 48-5-314 (a) (1).
Further ambiguity enters this case through the use of the term “audit.” This is a familiar and broad term, but too broad for precise communication relating to the circumstances in the case sub judice. Eckerd Corporation has filed its personal property tax return and paid its taxes for the years in question. Despite some slip of the tongue or faulty logic on the part of the Board’s counsel which suggested otherwise during the argument of the contempt motion, the superior court has concluded that this case deals exclusively with a search for unreturned property as opposed to an attempt to reassess those properties upon which taxes have already been paid. Under Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Parsons, 260 Ga. 824 (401 SE2d 4), the Fayette County Board of Tax Assessors is clearly authorized, subject to the approval of the county governing authority, to contract with a third party to conduct such a search. But there is undoubtedly no express authority for providing confidential materials to a third party independent contractor. Nor do I agree with the majority opinion that such an authority to distribute confidential materials “necessarily follows” the authority to contract for the search for unreported property.
The legislature is the proper body to weigh the utility of conveying confidential materials to independent third parties against the harm which may result to a business from overly broad distribution of its confidential financial data and proprietary business information. Since the legislature has carefully restricted access to confidential materials submitted to the county board of tax assessors, I am reluctant to unduly expand the distribution of this information. In the absence of any evidence on the issue, the majority opinion assumes access to the confidential materials is essential to the performance of an independent third party’s contract to search for unreported property. This does not appear to be self-evident to me. Such speculation only emphasizes the hazards of deviating from a strict construction of this statute. I would hold that the furnishing of confidential materials obtained from Eckerd Corporation to Mendola & Associates would be a violation of OCGA § 48-5-314 (a) (1). (Any further distribution of the confidential materials by Mendola & Associates may also be prohibited by the statutory scheme.) Since the purpose of the subpoena at *458issue is to obtain confidential materials to be distributed in this inappropriate manner, the subpoena should have been quashed.
Decided February 8, 1996 Reconsideration denied March 6, 1996 Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, Timothy J. Peaden, for appellant. McNally, Fox & Cameron, Dennis A. Davenport, for appellee.Consequently, I would hold the trial court erred and the case sub judice should be reversed.