concurring specially.
Unlike the majority, I do not believe the impoundment of Howard’s car was reasonable. In Gaston v. State,2 the defendant argued impoundment was unreasonable because the arresting officers could have called his aunt to pick up the car rather than having it towed. This Court disagreed, concluding “that impoundment was reasonable because it was after 2:00 a.m. and the car was in the roadway.”3 Here, however, there is no evidence that the Corvette was blocking the roadway. Rather, the evidence shows that the car was on the side of the road. And there were several people present at the scene who arguably could have driven the car.4 Thus, I find this case distinguishable from Gaston.
In addition, I am troubled by the sheriff’s policy of impounding all cars. According to the deputy who testified, he “made the decision to have [the car] towed because [that is the department’s written] policy.” The deputy further testified that the department has “a policy that states anytime [they] tow a vehicle for impound, [they] have to do an inventory on it.” In my view, such policy, which precludes any inquiry into the reasonableness of the impoundment, violates the Fourth Amendment.5
Nonetheless, I agree with the result reached by the majority. As noted in the majority opinion, the search of the car was permitted as an incident of Howard’s arrest.6 And, given this independent basis for the search, I agree that the trial court erred in granting Howard’s motions to suppress.
257 Ga. App. 480 (571 SE2d 477) (2002).
Id. at 483 (2).
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, there is no evidence that the car was not drive-able. The deputy described the damage to the car as “minor,” and he admittedly did not ask whether the car could be driven.
See State v. Sims, 240 Ga. App. 391, 393 (523 SE2d 619) (1999) (department policy requiring officers to “secure any residence with an open door” would violate Fourth Amendment principles).
See Vega v. State, 236 Ga. App. 319, 320 (512 SE2d 65) (1999).