dissenting: In this appeal from an order of adoption brought by the adoptee’s natural mother (L.H.), the principal and dispositive issue raised is whether the trial court erroneously refused to entertain L.H.’s attempted attack upon the validity of her written consent acknowledged before an associate district judge, that is, a “judge of a court of record” (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. *23259-2102[c]). The foundation of the attempted attack has been L.H.’s assertion that her consent to adoption as expressed in the written consent was not freely and voluntarily given. In essence, the trial court held that the written consent, executed by L.H. and acknowledged by her before a judge of a court of record, was not subject to impeachment on the ground that the expressed consent to adoption was not freely and voluntarily given. The majority chooses to reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing. I dissent.
A description of the procedural context out of which this appeal arises is of some interest. The prospective adoptive parents (the Thompsons) filed a petition for adoption of L.H.’s minor child and with it they filed L.H.’s written consent. In response to the petition, L.H. filed a verified answer. In it, L.H. alleged in relevant part that
“[her written] consent is invalid and of no legal force or [effect] ....
“[D]uring the term of her pregnancy ... in a conversation with David A. Grainger, M.D., . . . the subject of adoption was discussed with [Dr. Grainger] by [L.H.] . . . and [Dr. Grainger] was advised that [L.H.] desired to offer said child for adoption .... [L.H.] met with Thomas L. Toepfer and ... he advised her of her legal rights relative to the proceedings and legality of consenting to the adoption of her natural child to a third person ....
“[A]t approximately 12:00 a.m., on April 1,1986, [L.H.] was place[d] on a drug for the purpose of inducement of labor, the exact kind of drug being unknown to [L.H.], and that as a result thereof she delivered said child at 11:52 a.m., on the same day, at St. Anthonys Hospital. . . . [D]uring the luncheon hour at St. Anthonys Hospital, before she had fully recovered from the surgery, . . . Toepfer and the Honorable Tom Scott appeared in her room for the purpose of asking her to sign the consent for adoption .... [T]hat conduct in and of itself under the circumstances existing at said time and place . . . should be considered as a . . . factor for vacating the consent to adopt . . . executed by [L.H.] for the reason that she had not fully recovered from the effects of medication and stress.”
Paragraph 9 of the petition recited that “[ajttached hereto, marked Exhibit B and made a part hereof by reference, is a complete written genetic, medical and social history of the child.” (See K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2278a[a][l]). Within that exhibit this appears:
“INDICATE BELOW YOUR REASONS FOR MAKING A PLACEMENT PLAN FOR YOUR CHILD:
“I am only 18 years old and not ready for a child so, therefore I’m trying to do *233the best thing that I know of. It’s not that I don’t want this baby, it’s that I want the best for it.”
L.H.’s response to paragraph 9 of the petition, as it appears in her answer, is this: “[L.H.] admits that Exhibit B in part is back[g]round information which she furnished to hospital staff relative to her family back[g]round.” Her answer includes no denial of the content of the incorporated statements appearing in the exhibit.
Reacting to L.H.’s answer, the Thompsons filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” asking for “an order summarily dismissing the prayer of [L.H.] to revoke her consent to the adoption” for the reason that L.H.’s written consent, acknowledged before a judge of a court of record, is irrevocable by operation of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c). (No one else having done so, I will not address the question whether it would have been better for the Thompsons to have presented their “Motion for Summary Judgment” as a motion under K.S.A. 60-212(f) for an order striking from L.H.’s answer its allegations, with reference to the purported invalidity and lack of legal force and effect of her written consent, on the ground those allegations constituted an insufficient defense.)
Twenty-one days after the Thompsons’ motion was filed, it was heard by the district court without objection. The court had before it only the pleadings and briefs of the parties. There was no discovery record before it; there were no depositions, no answers to interrogatories, no responses to admissions requests, no affidavits, and no statements of uncontroverted contentions of fact as called for by Rule 141, 235 Kan. cx. After hearing argument by counsel, the district court orally found and ruled:
“[T]he legislature has spoken . . . and they have apparently decided that if consent to adoptions are acknowledged before a Judge of a Court of Record, that vitiates any pressure that might have been put on the mother. . . .
“. . . I cannot find [K.S.A. 59-2102(c)] unconstitutional and I cannot judge Judge Scott’s conduct.
“I therefore find that the consent is irrevocable, and the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.”
The journal entry memorializing the district court’s ruling recites that
“the court finds that the consent to adoption signed by [L.H.] on April 1, 1986[,] *234at St. Anthony Hospital of Hays, Kansas, in front of Associate District Judge Tom Scott is irrevocable under [K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c)] and hereby orders that the answer of [L.H.] filed to the petition in this matter be dismissed.”
Some seventeen days later, the district court entered a Decree of Adoption, within which it is said:
“3. Both the natural mother and natural father executed ‘Consent to Adoption’ forms in the presence of Tom Scott, Associate District Judge.
“4. [L.H.] filed an action [sic] in this court in an attempt to revoke her consent', but this court . . . held that the consent was irrevocable.
“5. The consent of both [natural parents] is effective to permit the adoption of [the adoptee].
“6. No notice of this hearing was required because both natural parents have consented to the adoption ....
“11. No valid cause is shown why the child should not be adopted by the petitioners.”
Again, when the trial court rejected L.H.’s attempted attack by “dismissal” of her answer, there was no evidentiary matter before it other than that resulting from L.H.’s answering admissions to allegations in the Thompsons’ petition.
Despite the majority’s reference(s) to “void” and “voidable,” as I see it the parties and the majority have drawn no operative distinction between revocation of consent and invalidity of consent because the consent was not freely and voluntarily given. I perceive there is a distinction, but I will not now pursue that subject. Instead, I join the parties and majority in approaching the present case as if the question at hand is whether a consent to adoption given in writing and acknowledged before a judge of a court of record may be revoked prior to final decree of adoption on the ground that it was not freely and voluntarily given.
The majority opinion states that L.H. argues that her written consent is revocable because neither the consent form nor the judge before whom it was acknowledged sufficiently explained to her its consequences. While this argument may appear, obliquely if not directly, in L.H.’s appellate brief, the record on appeal does not reveal that it was an argument presented to the trial court. Moreover, I do not see that argument within the allegations made by L.H. in her answer.
In discussing construction of statutes in pari materia, the majority refers to, and places some reliance upon, the 1968 *235publication of a comment by a then state senator. That comment affords no help. The statutory provisions with which we are concerned are those appearing in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c); they are the product of 1982 legislative action. Furthermore, if the position is taken that in substance we are dealing with 1968 legislation, it remains that statements of legislators after enactment of legislation are not valid legislative history. Hall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 475, 480, 661 P.2d 402, rev. denied 233 Kan. 1091 (1983). Be that as it may, I agree with the majority that the argument is unavailing to L.H. for the reason that there is no allegation by her that the judge failed to give her a proper and adequate explanation.
Once again, let us examine K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102 wherein there are set forth the statutory provisions that are the subject of this litigation. The pertinent text of the statute is as follows:
“(a) Before any minor child is adopted, consent to the adoption must be given byL
“(1) The living parents of the child;
“(c) Consent in all cases shall be in writing and shall be acknowledged before the judge of a court of record or before an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments. If consent is acknowledged before a judge of a court of record, the consent shall be irrevocable. If consent has been given in writing and has been filed of record in the district court, the consent may be revoked, but only if, prior to final decree of adoption, the consenting party alleges and proves that the consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The burden of proving that the consent was not freely and voluntarily given shall rest with the consenting party.”
In In re Adoption of J.G., 10 Kan. App. 2d 483, 484, 702 P.2d 1385, rev. denied 238 Kan. 877 (1985), we found “it clear from the plain language of [K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c)]” that filing of record in the district court is a prerequisite to the irrevocability of a freely and voluntarily given written consent acknowledged before “an officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.”
The majority posits possible worst-case scenarios, but nowhere in its opinion does it find K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c) to be ambiguous, that is, that there are two or more interpretations of the statute that can be fairly made. In re Appeal of Angle, 11 Kan. App. 2d 62, 66, 713 P.2d 962, rev. denied 239 Kan. 627 *236(1986); Sterling Drilling Co. v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 9 Kan. App. 2d 108, 109, 673 P.2d 456, rev. denied 234 Kan. 1078 (1984). Absent statutory ambiguity, it is our lot and obligation to give effect to the legislature’s plain words. We must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. In re Adoption of J.G., 10 Kan. App. 2d at 484; Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 9 Kan. App. 2d 49, 51, 670 P.2d 1369, rev. denied 234 Kan. 1076 (1983).
“ ‘Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the legislative intent therein expressed rather than make a determination of what the law should or should not be. Thus, no room is left for statutory construction. [Citations omitted.]’ ” (Emphasis added.) In re Mary P., 237 Kan. 456, 459, 701 P.2d 681 (1985).
“It has long been the rule in Kansas that in determining whether a statute is open to construction, or in construing a statute, ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning and courts are not justified in disregarding the unambiguous language. [Citations omitted.] Even a penal statute subject to strict construction should not be read so as to add that which is not readily found therein, or to read out what, as a matter of ordinary language, is in it. [Citation omitted.] In 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 194, it is stated:
“ ‘A statute is open to construction only where the language used therein requires interpretation or may be reasonably considered ambiguous. Thus, where no ambiguity appears, it has been presumed conclusively that the clear and explicit terms of a statute express the legislative intention. A plain and unambiguous statute is to be applied, and not interpreted, since such a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity.’ ” State v. Haug, 237 Kan. 390, 391-92, 699 P.2d 535 (1985).
“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a clear, unambiguous, constitutional statute is not subject to judicial construction.” State v. Haines, 238 Kan. 478, 479, 712 P.2d 1211 (1986).
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2101(c) is a plain and unambiguous legislative expression of its intent that:
1. a written consent to adoption acknowledged before a judge of a court of record is irrevocable;
2. a written consent to adoption acknowledged before an authorized officer other than a judge and filed of record in the district court is revocable only if, prior to the final decree of adoption, the consenting party alleges and proves the consent was not freely and voluntarily given; and
3. a written consent to adoption acknowledged before an authorized officer other than a judge is revocable at any time *237before it has been filed of record in the district court. (In re Adoption of J.G., 10 Kan. App. 2d at 485.)
By its decision in this case, the majority holds that a written consent to adoption acknowledged before a judge of a court of record and filed of record in the district court is revocable if, prior to the final decree of adoption, the consenting party alleges and proves the consent was not freely and voluntarily given. That is beyond and contrary to the statute.
On multiple occasions, our Supreme Court has alluded to the old adage that “harsh facts make bad law.” See Bowers v. Ottenad, 240 Kan. 208, 224, 729 P.2d 1103 (1986) (McFarland, J., dissenting); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 469, 693 P.2d 475 (1985) (McFarland, J., dissenting); Classen v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 228 Kan. 426, 438, 617 P.2d 1255 (1980) (Schroeder, C.J., concurring); Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 226 Kan. 1, 19, 596 P.2d 446 (1979) (McFarland, J., dissenting and concurring); Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218, 221, 380 P.2d 312 (1963) (Price, J., dissenting). By its reference to worst-case scenarios, the majority opinion proffers harsh facts not existent in the case before us and practices bad law in reaching the result it pronounces. In reaching its achieved end, the majority acts with assumed insight limited only by its conscience. I cannot join in that. It is not within our province to criticize either the wisdom or policy of legislative action, but our duty is to see that such commands are obeyed. State v. Applegate, 180 Kan. 186, 190, 303 P.2d 148 (1956); State v. Wilson, 42 Kan. 587, 599, 22 Pac. 622 (1889). If there is to be statutory change, that is up to the legislature in the exercise of its wisdom.
The majority opinion states, “This state has wisely determined that the natural mother should have an opportunity to rethink her decision after the child is born and she has had an opportunity, if she desires, to see and hold the child.” Regardless of its possible wisdom, I disagree that our state has made such a determination. The majority points to no authority. Elrod, KB A Kansas Family Law Handbook § 6.17 (1983), at subsection 3, observes that:
“Some states require a consent to adoption to be executed a few days after the birth of the child. The Uniform Adoption Act requires that consent to adoption must occur after birth. The purpose of this requirement is to allow the mother to *238rethink her decision after seeing and holding the baby. The Kansas statute is silent on the time.”
As previously stated, K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(a) provides that “[b]efore any minor child is adopted, consent to the adoption must be given by . . . In contrast, the Uniform Adoption Act § 7(a), 9 U.L.A. 31 (1979), provides that “[t]he required consent to adoption shall be executed at any time after the birth of the child and in the manner following . . . (Emphasis added.) Would an “opportunity to rethink” be available to both the mother and the father, or only to the mother? In In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan. 224, 624 P.2d 433 (1981), the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the question whether the written parental consent there involved was invalid because it was executed prior to the adoptee’s birth but, as I see it, implicit in the ordered remand with direction that the adoption be granted is a finding that a written consent to adoption executed and acknowledged prior to the adoptee’s birth is not necessarily invalid and insufficient to support an adoption.
From the language of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 59-2102(c), it is patent to me that, had it been the legislature’s intent to do so, not only could it have provided, but it would have provided, that a written consent acknowledged before a judge of a court of record is revocable upon the consenting party’s allegation and proof that its consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The legislature’s omission of such an “escape clause” or caveat is at least some indication that it was intended that there be no qualification to the statutorily directed irrevocability of written consents acknowledged before a judge of a court of record.
I would affirm.