dissenting.
The majority’s decision in this case is premised on a factual finding which the board did not make and which the evidence of record does not necessarily warrant — namely, that the claimant was treated for “alcoholism.” Additionally, even if the claimant was treated for “alcoholism,” it does not necessarily follow that the expense of her alcohol detoxification treatment must be disallowed pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-1 (4), for she did not seek to have her alcohol abuse problem, however it is characterized, treated as a separate “ ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ by accident arising out of and in the course of [her] employment.”
*577The claimant sustained the disabling back injury on which this claim is based on February 18,1984. She returned to work on July 11, 1984, after undergoing a lumbar laminectomy, but was again forced to discontinue work on November 16, 1984, due to increasing low back pain attributable to the injury. In May of 1987, while continuing to receive temporary total disability benefits for the back injury, she presented herself for treatment at the Atlanta Pain Control Center. However, as a prerequisite to beginning that treatment, she was first required to undergo a two-week period of alcohol detoxification at the Georgia Baptist Medical Center. According to the medical evidence, her diagnosis at that time was “not one of chronic alcohol addiction but acute alcohol abuse secondary to depression . . . and pain. . . .”
OCGA § 34-9-1 (4) specifies that “[a]lcoholism or disabilities attributable thereto shall not be deemed to be ‘injury’ or ‘personal injury’ by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” The evidence of record in this case does not establish beyond dispute that the claimant was treated for “alcoholism,” and the board certainly made no such finding. Moreover, regardless of the terminology used to characterize the claimant’s alcohol abuse problem, she clearly did not seek to have that problem treated as a separate injury or even as a separate disability arising from her employment. Rather, she was merely seeking to recover the expense of her detoxification treatment as a medical expense arising from her back injury.
Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-200 (a), the employer is required to “furnish the employee entitled to benefits under this chapter compensation for costs of such medical, surgical, and hospital care and other treatment, items, and services which are prescribed by a licensed physician, . . . which in the judgment of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation shall be reasonably required and appear likely to effect a cure, give relief, or restore the employee to suitable employment.” The board has expressly determined in this case that the claimant’s alcohol abuse problem was directly attributable to her back injury and has impliedly determined that the detoxification treatment which she received was reasonably necessary to afford her relief from the pain she was experiencing as a result of that injury, and thereby to restore her to suitable employment. The evidence of record supports both these determinations. In accordance with the oft stated principle that the Workers’ Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to effecutate its humane objectives (see, e.g., U. S. Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 379 (231 SE2d 792) (1976)), I would therefore affirm the order of the superior court sustaining the board’s award in this case. Accord North Ga. Tech. &c. School v. Boatwright, 144 Ga. App. 66 (240 SE2d 563) (1977). See also 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 13.21, p. 3-422, n. 93.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and *578Judge Benham join in this dissent.
Decided March 14, 1988 Rehearing denied March 29, 1988 H. Clifton Woodson, for appellant. James E. Greene, for appellee.