dissenting:
I would affirm the family court’s decree.
Alimony
My first disagreement with the majority opinion is its sending the case back to the trial court “to determine a fair award” of alimony. In my view, the trial court acted well within its discretionary powers in deciding that the husband should not be required to make post-divorce support payments. I think that the record supports this decision and that this court should not be “second-guessing” the trial court.
There is evidence to support the conclusion that the wife has a number of professional and occupational skills and that she has an earning capacity of around $60,000.00 per year. There is a certain amount of conflict in the record as to the earning capacities of the parties; but as I see it, there is no basis for this court’s rejecting the trial court’s findings and judgment and concluding that there is such a “large gap[] ” in earning capacities of the parties that alimony is required as a matter of law.
The trial court made a specific finding that the wife would have “sufficient funds” with which to support herself. There is no reason for this court to reject that finding; and I see nothing in the record from which this court is obliged to conclude that the wife will be in need of additional “spousal support” from her former husband.
I agree with the majority that “[ajlimony is an equitable award serving to meet the post-marriage needs and rights of the former spouse”; but a trial court is in a much better position to examine and weigh the equities in these cases than is an appellate court.
“Battle of the Toy Soldiers”
My second disagreement with the majority opinion is that Í do not believe it necessary that we return this case to the trial court to renew the “Battle of the Toy Soldiers” between Ms. Shydler and her son. There are a number of reasons why we should leave the trial court’s judgment alone. One reason is that the trial judge was entitled to believe Mr. Shydler’s testimony that there were only a “few fragments” left of the toys and that Ms. Shydler was responsible for abusing and damaging “hundreds” of soldiers. The trial court could have concluded that, under these circumstances, there was next to nothing left to fight over and that Mr. Shydler should be awarded the surviving toy soldiers in trust for his son. The trial court’s judgment could be justified by recognizing that some of the toys belonged to the son and that some of the toys were concededly the separate property of Mr. Shydler. *202Whatever proportion of unbroken soldiers might be characterized as community property, I do not know; but the trial court would have been justified in concluding that the community property segment of the remaining “fragments” was of such little value that Ms. Shydler had no appreciable claim to this property.
Finally, as I will discuss later in this dissent, awarding the toys to the father in trust for the son was justified under NRS 125.150(4).
I have a difficult time understanding why this court would give serious attention to Ms. Shydler’s claim to her son’s toys; but, since it does, I will discuss the matter further.
Mr. Shydler’s Pretrial Memorandum states as one of four “issues presented,” the issue of “whether [Ms. Shydler] destroyed or concealed portions of the parties’ toy soldier and militaría collection during the pendency of this action.” If, of course, Ms. Shydler had during the pendency of this action actually destroyed or concealed this property, the trial court would have had compelling reasons for awarding this property to Mr. Shydler. Although there is no finding of malice or property destruction that would expressly support an unequal division of community property based on “compelling reasons,” I do believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record to justify an unequal division of whatever the community’s interest in the “fragments” might be. Further, as I have said, the toy soldiers that were left in Ms. Shydler’s custody during divorce proceedings were actually part community property, part Mr. Shydler’s separate property (collected since high school days) and part the son’s property. In awarding the toys to the father in trust for the son, the trial court was, to some extent, awarding property that already belonged to the father and son. It surprises me that Ms. Shydler would want to go back to court to engage in what looks to me like a rather petty and demeaning fight with her son over toy soldiers.
When asked to testify as to what remained of the toy collection after it was left in Ms. Shydler’s custody, Mr. Shydler testified that there were only “[a] few fragments.” He testified that the soldiers had been “severely abused and damaged” and that there were “literally hundreds of figures that had been broken and smashed and they were all piled and shoved in behind in the corner of the desk.”
Ms. Shydler denies smashing the soldiers and suggests that perhaps “the kids [might] have done some damage” — she did not “keep and eye on them.” She may not have kept an eye on them, but she does admit, while living in the parties’ home during the divorce proceedings, to putting up a sign on the garage that she was going to hold a “toy soldier and book sale.” She testified that she did not actually intend to sell the toysoldiers and that the “intention behind the sign” was only “[t]o make Tom worry about it.” This kind of malice might work to her disadvantage *203when she goes back to the trial court to make her claim of right to the “few fragments” that remain of her son’s toy soldier collection.
Finally, I believe that the trial court’s judgment is supported by NRS 125.150(4). This statute would permit the court to set apart community property (assuming that there is some community property interest in the soldiers) for the benefit of the child. Although the statute speaks of “support” of the child, I do not think that it is stretching the statute too far to say that making these toys available for the boy’s use is a form of support. In any event, the court did not abuse its discretion in doing what it did; and I would leave the family court decree in place.'
Grounds for denying alimony
Finally, I register my disapproval of the majority’s taking certain remarks of the trial judge out of context and concluding that the trial court denied alimony “on the grounds that Margaret had received a property award.” No such “grounds” were stated by the trial judge. I see this case as one more case in a series of cases in which this court seeks to “micro-manage” the work of the family courts.1
See, e.g., McDermott v. McDermott, 113 Nev. 1134, 946 P.2d 177 (1997) (Springer, J., dissenting); Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 946 P.2d 171 (1997) (Springer, J., dissenting).