dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the colloquy described herein during the State’s direct examination of defendant’s natural daughter resulted in “substantial and irreparable prejudice” to defendant’s case, and a mistrial should have been declared. See North Carolina General Statutes § 15A-1061 (1988). I believe the nature of these partial questions which the prosecutor asked were of such a prejudicial nature that they rose to the level of inadmissible evidence.
Our Supreme Court has stated:
“In appraising the effect of incompetent evidence once admitted and afterwards withdrawn, the Court will look to the nature of the evidence and its probable influence upon the minds of the jury in reaching a verdict. In some instances because of the serious character and gravity of the incompetent evidence and the obvious difficulty in erasing it from the mind, the Court has held to the opinion that a subsequent withdrawal did not cure the error. . . .” S. v. Strickland, 229 N.C. 201, 207, 49 S.E.2d 469, 473; S. v. Green, 251 N.C. 40, 46, 110 S.E.2d 609, 613, and cases cited. . . . Whether the prejudicial effect of such incompetent statements should be deemed cured by such instructions depends upon the nature of the evidence and the circumstances of the particular case.
State v. Aycoth, 270 N.C. 270, 272-73, 154 S.E.2d 59, 60-61 (1967). See also State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975).
In the instant case, the first two witnesses for the State were the alleged victims; these were the only witnesses testifying with personal knowledge of the alleged rapes. The next witnesses for the State were the pediatrician who examined the children, the alleged victims’ mother (who was formerly married to defendant) and defendant’s sister-in-law. Defendant was living with his sister-in-law and her husband (his brother) at the time of trial, and had done so since the reporting of the alleged incidents. Defendant’s sister-in-law testified, when asked about her reaction after *685the alleged victims’ mother came to her and told her about the allegations,
[t]o begin with, I didn’t believe the allegations. I told Debbie [the victims’ mother] when we left there, I said, . I have a lot of mixed emotions right now about what you have told me.” I didn’t feel like the children were in danger and neither did I feel that Debbie was in danger.
Q. Why is that?
A. Sir?
Q. Why is that?
A. Devon had lived in my home for a long time. He is not a person to be violent; he is not a person to even raise his voice; and he is certainly not a threat to anybody. He is very protective; he was protective of those children and of Mrs. Ballew, his wife, just like he is protective of me as his sister-in-law. Devon was raised and brought up to respect women.
The next witness for the State was defendant’s natural daughter. The State had not given notice that it intended to call defendant’s natural daughter as a witness, nor had the State provided defendant’s counsel with any statements that the witness had provided. After introductory questions establishing the witness as defendant’s twenty-two year old natural daughter, the following testimony in the presence of the jury resulted:
Q. [Prosecutor:] At the time you were twelve or thirteen years of age were you subjected to any—
MR. JAMES [defense counsel]: (Interrupting) — OBJECTION.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. [Prosecutor:] What, if anything—
THE COURT: (Interrupting) — Members of the jury, do not take any inference from the question or partial question that was asked by the district attorney in your jury deliberations.
Q. [Prosecutor:] What, if anything, did your father do to you—
Mr. JAMES [defense counsel]: (Interrupting) - OBJECTION.
*686Q. [Prosecutor:] (Continuing) — while you were living in the home—
The COURT: (Interrupting) — Sustained. Members of the jury, let me ask you to step to the jury room. Do not discuss the case.
After a voir dire hearing, the trial court properly ruled this evidence inadmissible. The prosecutor asked no further questions of defendant’s natural daughter and she was dismissed from the stand.
I believe the intent of the prosecutor to place this improper evidence before the jury was accomplished. The partial questions certainly intimated that the witness, defendant’s daughter, as a twelve or thirteen year old young girl, as were the alleged victims in the case sub judice, was subject to something her “father [did] to her,” i.e., sexual abuse. I acknowledge that the court, while the partial questions were being asked, promptly gave the jury instructions to not take any inference from the partial questions, excused the jury and admonished the prosecutor, and then repeated curative instructions upon the return of the jury. However, I believe that this testimony as heard by the jury was so prejudicial that it could not be cured. As a result, defendant was irreparably prejudiced.
I vote to reverse and award defendant a new trial.