specially concurring:
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the Supreme Court held that when a search warrant is based on a disclosure of criminal activity by a confidential informant, the supporting affidavit must set forth facts permitting the judicial officer to determine (1) whether the informant had a basis for his allegation that criminal activity has occurred or will occur at a particular place, and (2) whether the informant is credible and his information reliable. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 33 at 114-15 (1985). The rigid requirements of Aguilar and Spinelli have been modified by the Supreme Court in favor of a more flexible case-by-case analysis of whether “the totality of circumstances” supports a finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). In People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904 (Colo.1986), we followed Illinois v. Gates and applied the “totality of the circumstances” test.1 However, the informant’s “veracity” and “basis *838of knowledge” are still important factors in making the “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. See also People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d at 909 (Lohr, J., concurring).
The majority overly emphasizes the importance and significance of basing the determination of probable cause in this case upon the informant’s statements to a police officer two months before the issuance of the warrant that the defendants were “engaged” in selling methamphetamine and were moving controlled substances between the Bryant Street and Yale Avenue residences. In my view, these statements do not support the issuance of the search warrant. The affidavit provides no basis upon which a judicial officer could determine the informant’s “basis of knowledge” for asserting that the defendants were engaged in the sale of methamphetamine in November 1985. The informant’s statements, even under the “totality of the circumstances” test, lend little, if any, support to a probable cause determination.
However, I concur because other allegations contained in the affidavit support the issuance of the warrant. In the seventy-two hour period before the affiant applied for the warrant,2 the informant observed what he believed from personal experience to be a quantity of methamphetamine at the Yale Avenue residence. The informant’s information was corroborated by the affiant’s observations for a month preceding the warrant’s issuance that there was a pattern of foot traffic at the Yale Avenue residence consistent with the sale of controlled substances from that location. The informant’s personal observation of methamphetamine at the place to be searched demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge, and his declaration against penal interest enhances his credibility and the veracity of his allegations. See People v. Stark, 691 P.2d 334, 337-38 (Colo.1984) (an informant’s personal observations establish the basis of his knowledge, and his declarations against penal interest establish his credibility); People v. Villiard, 679 P.2d 593 (Colo.1984) (a first-time informant’s reliability is substantiated by his declarations against penal interest and by police surveillance which corroborated some of his information). Although the affidavit in this case was not ideal, or a model to be followed, the information set forth in the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband would be found at the Yale Avenue location.3
. Pannebaker presented a far stronger case to support probable cause. In Pannebaker, the police officers independently verified much of the informant's information, and police surveillance established that the informant’s information was not stale.
. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the date “1/6/86,” as set forth in the affidavit, must be read as "1/2/86."
. This is- a close case that demonstrates the necessity for determining search and seizure issues on the particular facts of each case. See People v. Bauer, 191 Colo. 331, 552 P.2d 512 (1976).