(concurring specially)-
I concur with the result of the majority’s opinion, which affirms the court of appeals’ holding, but respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis, which finds that admission of gang-related expert testimony was error. I would not only affirm the conviction, but also apply the court of appeals’ analysis on gang-related expert testimony.
The appellant was charged with a conspiracy to commit a controlled substance crime in the first degree for the benefit of a gang and for the commission of a controlled substance crime in the third degree for the benefit of a gang.1 The legislature passed this legislation as a part of an effort to target the growth of gang-related criminal activity. Under these statutes, the state has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was criminal activity committed for the benefit of a gang. Proving this necessarily involves proof of this behavior and that it occurred for the “benefit of a gang.” Proving this element may undoubtedly be prejudicial. However, the question unanswered by the majority opinion is: how can the state *889prove this essential element, if not through expert testimony?
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s use of the gang testimony offered by special investigator Scott Jenkins of the Minnesota Gang Strike Task Force (MGSF). The court of appeals pointed out that the appellant challenged the use of this testimony based on:
the witness’s methodology; that is, the set of observations and conclusions making up the ten-point gang criteria on which the witness relied in giving his opinion that De Shay [sic] and others were gang members. This does not concern the facts or data on which the witness relied; the phrase “facts or data” in this context refers to the facts in the particular case in which the witness is testifying and that the witness has accepted as true in giving his opinion. Facts or data are to be distinguished from the methodology the witness applied in giving his opinion.
State v. DeShay, 645 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Minn.App.2002) (emphasis in original).
The court of appeals concluded that “there is an ample showing of the reliability of the ten-point gang criteria, sufficient to allow an expert to utilize them in forming an opinion on whether an individual is a member of a gang. The criteria were authorized by the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 299A.64, subd. 2(b) (2000).” Id. at 192. The court noted that law enforcement experts in the field rely on the gang identification criteria, that it is common practice for experts in a number of other jurisdictions to rely on similar gang criteria, and that this type of criteria is the type relied upon by experts in the field. Id.
The court of appeals also pointed out that the evidence of gang criteria was offered to prove an element of the offense; that the crime was for the benefit of a gang and “[i]n fact, DeShay does not assert that the criteria are being used as character evidence; instead, he attacks them as being an improper basis for an expert opinion.” Id. at 193. The court of appeals concluded that because most of these criteria “are primarily elements of self-identification for people who have an interest in being identified with a group,” this focus is “on a much narrower group of persons” than the “external criteria” we addressed in the drug courier profile case of State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 546-48 (Minn.1994). Id.
The appellant also raised an equal protection argument relating to Minn.Stat. § 609.229, but conceded that if this court affirmed the court of appeals’ holding in State v. Frazier, 631 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn.App.2001), that holding would be dispositive of this issue. We affirmed the court of appeals on the equal protection argument, but on different grounds. See State v. Frazier, 649 N.W.2d 828, 836-37 (Minn.2002). Our holding in Frazier was based, in part, upon the appellant’s failure to present information from any source which would enable us to evaluate whether the MGSF criteria are reliable indicators of gang membership. Id. at 835. In fact, we stated that “[b]ecause neither party presented any analysis of the data or expert testimony, we lack an adequate record to evaluate whether section 609.222 creates a race-based classification in practice.” Id. at 836. We further explained that “[w]hat we do require, however, is a factual record that permits us to evaluate the reliability and validity of both the data and the data analysis.” Id.
In this case, we are again confronted with an equal protection argument with a similarly deficient record. There is no analysis of the data, no expert or rebuttal testimony, and no cross-examination challenging the reliability and validity of the evidence presented. Notwithstanding this *890lack of a record and the absence of a motion in limine or appropriate and/or timely objection to this testimony, the majority opinion concludes that to admit such expert testimony was error. Based on some general concerns about the helpfulness of the ten criteria that was developed by the gang strike task force and because the expert’s testimony “was, for the most part, duplicative” of other testimony, the majority opinion concludes that this testimony was of “little real assistance to the jury in evaluating the evidence.” The majority further adds that the jury did not need extensive expert assistance to enlighten them as indicia of gang membership and that expert testimony was neither helpful nor meaningful. I agree that “first-hand knowledge testimony is how the state can and should go about proving the essential elements of this crime,” but that is not necessarily the best or only way to do so. Expert testimony may be helpful or necessary in this type of case. The majority may be opening the door to more gang-related Spreigl-type evidence in the process. Finally, the majority, notwithstanding its concerns, concludes that this error “was harmless because, in light of the other witnesses’ testimony, there was no reasonable possibility that Jenkins’ testimony substantially influenced the guilty verdict.” Although no record had been presented to sustain any constitutional challenge to this statute or this evidence, the majority makes a policy-based ruling that may effectively exclude expert testimony on gangs.
The appellant in this case was charged with a crime that benefited the “Black Gangsters,” also known as the “New Breed Disciples,” the “Breed,” the “New Breed,” or the “Trey Ls.” Now, even though there was no constitutional basis to challenge this statute or this testimony in this record, the majority excludes it on an eviden-tiary basis, which typically rests within the sound discretion of the district court and which we do not reverse absent clear error. State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn.1995).
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the use of this testimony was “clear error.” The majority opinion rejects this testimony on a lower standard than we have ever used in this type of analysis by holding that its admission was “error.” There was nothing clear about the error and there is no factual record that challenges the reliability and validity of both the data and the data analysis presented by this expert. Without declaring Minn.Stat. § 299A.64, subd. 2(b) (2002) unconstitutional, the majority has rendered this statute meaningless. Although the majority finds the error harmless in this case because the expert’s testimony was largely duplicative, the majority does not cite one case in Minnesota where we have held that it is a clear abuse of discretion for the district court to allow the introduction of cumulative evidence into the record or explain why cumulative evidence leads to a clear abuse of discretion. Minnesota Rules of Evidence 702 generally allows expert testimony if it will assist the jury in resolving factual questions presented. State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 195 (Minn.1997).
The fact that media coverage is replete with sensational stories of gang violence, both real and fictionalized through numerous televised sequences, makes the testimony of a reliable expert all the more essential. It not only adds precision and depth to a jury’s understanding of the way in which gangs actually operate, but it also removes some of the sensationalism and fiction that television viewers are constantly bombarded with. There is nothing in this record to establish that this expert testimony was “irrelevant, confusing or otherwise unhelpful.” State v. Miles, 585 *891N.W.2d 368, 371 (Minn.1998). Further, the majority fails to cite a single case where a court has concluded that expert gang testimony, although relevant, was otherwise inadmissible based on a conclusion that the jurors are sufficiently knowledgeable about the operation and characteristics of gangs such that an expert’s opinion would not be helpful and therefore inadmissible.2 The majority’s analysis is flawed in that it improperly conflates the determination that the expert’s testimony would not be helpful with the discussion relating to the possible cumulative nature of some aspects of this testimony. It is also unclear which part of Officer Jenkins’ testimony was admitted in clear error. The majority bolsters its arguments with a lengthy footnote citing a number of commentaries that were not part of the record or developed in the district court. This type of information should not be injected at this late stage in the proceedings to justify an otherwise untenable position. The majority also adds an unjustifiable caveat that characterizes this case as a “noncomplex drug conspiracy case.” Such labeling does nothing to advance the majority’s analysis and creates a new distinction among drug cases that will only cause confusion in the district courts as those courts attempt to apply the new rule of law on experts embodied in the majority’s decision.
Contrary to what the majority implies, most of Jenkins’ testimony was never objected to at trial. There were six hearsay objections. The first objection was responded to by a rephrasing of the question with no follow-up objection. There was also one foundation objection, which led to the court instructing counsel to provide additional foundation. This additional foundation was provided and there was no follow-up objection. Two additional foundation objections were made and overruled: one question related to the general nature of this particular gang and the other was “how does a person typically rank within inside a gang?” There was also an objection to nonresponsive testimony as being beyond the scope of the question, which was overruled, and a hearsay objection concerning the general nature of this particular gang. Other than that, Jenkins’ testimony came into the record without objection.
Similarly, the introduction of a number of gang-related exhibits were offered by the state and received in the record for illustrative purposes. Defense counsel specifically stated on the record that he had no objection to their introduction. These exhibits include Exhibit 9, which “outline[d] the Black Gangsters or New Breed Disciples; their representative symbols, their representative colors, and their general al[l]iance, whether folk or people.” Exhibit 10, which was “a copy of our State Gang Planner System, or State Gang Criteria System” — a list of the ten criteria that were used to objectively analyze and document gang membership. Finally, there were Exhibits 11, 12 and 13, introduced as a group, which were “charts documenting the ten-point criteria with the individual names of the parties that I just mentioned.” Any objection to this testimony was indisputably waived. After all of this evidence was in at the end of the testimony, defense counsel did state that he has one “continuing ongoing objection to this entire line of testimony.” This *892came in the record after 33 pages of trial testimony and receipt of the five exhibits identified above. A belated objection such as this has never before been used to create a basis to analyze otherwise unob-jected — to testimony already in the record. The two foundation objections that were made relating to a particular gang and the way one gets ranked within a gang should not be used by the majority to expand the objection to encompass everything else that this officer testified to. A continuing objection after the fact and after the evidence in the record can be a clever ploy to cover up possible mistakes by defense counsel, or an attempt to creatively expand the scope of the previous specific and limited objections. However, this court should not fall for such a ploy. We should base our decision on the record and by following precedent.
The majority also takes issue with the testimony of Officer Jenkins concerning the “whole myriad of different crimes” that street gangs were involved with. However, this testimony was also introduced into the record without any objection, as was the testimony concerning the division of gangs into a “people nation and a folk nation.” The majority does mention that “the district court overruled seven objections defense counsel made,” which is true but is only part of the story. The majority omits discussing the rehabilitative questioning that occurred in response, the lack of objection thereafter, and the limited nature of the two foundation objections.
Based on this record and the fact that gang and gang-related activities are an essential element of the state’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I would affirm the court of appeal’s analysis and allow such testimony.
. Minn.Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2002); Minn.Stat. § 152.023, subd. 1(1) (2002); Minn.Stat. § 152.096, subd. 1 (2002); and Minn.Stat. § 609.229, subd. 2 (2002).
. Interestingly, in the only federal district court case quoted by the majority as persuasive authority to support its holding, the court held permissible expert gang testimony relating to both the defendant’s gang membership and the manner in which the defendant's gang resolved disputes between members. United States v. Lombardozzi, 2003 WL 1907965 at *4, - F.Supp.2d - (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 2003).