(dissenting) — The majority holds that Pauline Byrne cannot enforce certain liens on property awarded to her former husband, William Ackerlund, in a prior dissolution action. Instead, she must wait until Ackerlund chooses to sell the property, if he does, before she can recover the money due her pursuant to the terms of the decree. This decision is inconsistent and at odds with this court's prior *457decisions. I dissent.
Final Distribution of Property
At the time of divorce, the trial court is statutorily required to make a full and fair distribution of all property the divorcing couple brings to the court's attention. RCW 26.09.080. The court abuses its discretion if it does not make such a distribution. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 43 Wn.2d 629, 631, 262 P.2d 763 (1953). Moreover, the parties have the right to have their respective interests definitively determined, without need of further litigation. In re Marriage of Little, 96 Wn.2d 183, 194, 634 P.2d 498 (1981).
It is apparent that Byrne's and Ackerlund's interests in the incumbered property are indefinitely linked. Byrne cannot realize the amount she is owed until Ackerlund chooses to sell the property, and Ackerlund, of course, has no incentive to do so. Without some means of compelling the sale, Byrne has not had her interests fully and finally settled. I agree with the Court of Appeals that a definite time for Ackerlund to sell the property (or if he chooses, to pay Byrne the value of her liens) must be read into the agreement. Byrne v. Ackerlund, 44 Wn. App. 1, 5, 719 P.2d 1363, review granted, 107 Wn.2d 1001 (1986).
The majority, however, asserts that "a reasonable time for performance of an obligation may only be implied where the contract imposes a definite obligation but fails to provide a time for its performance." Majority, at 455. I agree. I disagree, however, with the majority's view that Ackerlund has no obligation whatsoever to sell the property. Obviously he must have that obligation, as otherwise the liens awarded to Byrne are worthless.
I recognize the majority's concern that a lien/title disposition of property may be preferable to a forced sale of the family home. Majority, at 450. I do not believe, however, that imposing a reasonable time on one spouse precludes this sort of arrangement. Rather, the spouses can agree to use a lien/title arrangement for a definite (or reasonable) amount of time, after which the title holding spouse must *458either sell the property or obtain financing to satisfy the other spouse's interest. In this way, future litigation is avoided, a more beneficial property division is obtained, and each spouse has a fair and definitive division of the property.
Conclusion
I therefore dissent to the majority opinion, which accomplishes none of these objectives. As a result of the majority opinion, the parties here (a) have not avoided litigation, (b) have not obtained a mutually beneficial division of their property, and (c) Byrne has not had a fair and definitive division of the property.
I would require Ackerlund to either sell the property or pay Byrne the fair market value of her liens. Only by this action can the parties have their interests definitively and finally resolved.
Durham, J., concurs with Dore, J.Reconsideration denied September 15, 1987.