dissenting.
As the majority recognizes, Taylor claims that he is entitled to compensation for consequential damages caused by the DOT’s inter*22ference with his right of access to the remainder of his property, which resulted from the condemnation. While I make no determination with respect to the merits of Taylor’s claim for consequential damages, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the claim was properly resolved by the trial court on motion in limine, and therefore I dissent.
In Division 4, the majority states that “[wjhether there is a compensable taking of an adjoining property owner’s easement of access to a public road is a question of law to be determined by the court.” I disagree. The Court of Appeals has specifically held that
[i]t is up to the trier of fact to decide if there has been substantial impairment [to a property owner’s right of access] and if so, the value. Whether a property owner has “reasonable access” to the property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was “substantially interfered with” are questions of fact to be decided by the jury. [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) Circle K General v. Dept. of Transp., 196 Ga. App. 616, 618 (396 SE2d 522) (1990) (cert. denied). The majority states that Circle K is “inapposite” because it “involves a taking of an easement of access as a matter of law.” Majority opinion, p. 19. That conclusion is not well-founded. A “taking of an easement of access” can occur when access is eliminated, see Dept. of Transp. v. Whitehead, 253 Ga. 150, 151 (317 SE2d 542) (1984), or when access is substantially interfered with, see Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114, 117 (97 SE2d 300) (1957). As the above quoted language demonstrates, Circle K holds that whether there has been “substantial interference” with a right of access, in other words “a taking of an easement of access,” is a question of fact for the jury. Therefore, the majority’s basis for distinguishing Circle K is inconsistent with the very language of that case.
For the holding in Division 4, the majority cites MARTA v. Fountain, 256 Ga. 732 (352 SE2d 781) (1987), an inverse condemnation case. In Fountain, this court stated that “[t]he issue of condemnation or not is ordinarily a question of law for the courts, and MARTA should have prevailed as a matter of law.” Id. at 734. Fountain relied for that statement on Piedmont Cotton Mills v. Ga. R. &c. Co., 131 Ga. 129, 134 (62 SE 52) (1908) and Atlantic R. &c. Co. v. Penny, 119 Ga. 479 (46 SE 665) (1903). Those cases involve a condemnee’s challenge to the necessity of the condemnation itself — whether the amount of land condemned was actually necessary to the public purpose being served — and in each case the court held that while a jury has the power to consider the amount of compensation, a challenge to the necessity of the condemnation must be made to a *23court with the power to grant equitable relief. In this case, however, Taylor does not challenge the necessity of the condemnation or the DOT’s authority to take the condemned property. Rather, Taylor argues that the DOT’s condemnation has had the effect of interfering with his right of access to his remaining property, and for that he should be compensated. The jury’s consideration of whether there was compensable interference with the right of access would relate only to its determination of the amount of compensation to which Taylor is entitled, which is not an “issue of condemnation or not,” as in Fountain, but a question of fact for the jury to resolve.
Furthermore, while a trial court has the power to find, as a matter of law, that the evidence is insufficient to support a claim, such a decision must be made on proper motion. It appears from the record that the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of consequential damages was based not on evidentiary grounds, but upon the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Taylor’s claim of compensable interference with his right of access. Thus, I believe that the trial court’s removing the issue of consequential damages from the jury in this fashion was error because
an asserted insufficiency in the condemnee’s evidence [of consequential damages] ... is not appropriately resolved on a motion in limine. A motion in limine determines the admissibility of evidence. A motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict would be the appropriate means by which to invoke a ruling as to the sufficiency of the condemnee’s evidence.
(Emphasis in original.) Buck’s Svc. Station v. Dept. of Transp., 191 Ga. App. 341 (1) (381 SE2d 516) (1989).3 See also Exxon Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 202 Ga. App. 43 (413 SE2d 238) (1991).
As the question of compensable interference with the right of access is one for the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence should not be determined on motion in limine, I would affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent. *24Decided February 28, 1994 Reconsideration denied March 18, 1994. Dwyer & White, J. Matthew Dwyer, Jr., Anne W. Sapp, for appellant. Ellenberg & Associates, Richard D. Ellenberg, Thomas A. Bowman, for appellee. Pursley, Howell, Lowery & Meeks, Charles N. Pursley, Jr., Jo Lanier Meeks, amicus curiae.In support of its position that a motion in limine was appropriate to determine whether the issue of substantial impairment should be taken from the jury, the DOT relied on Cann v. MARTA, 196 Ga. App. 495 (396 SE2d 515) (1990). However, the evidence precluded on motion in limine in Cann either was irrelevant, was related to an issue which had been waived, or was related to an issue which the trial court had the power to determine. The evidence precluded in this case, on the other hand, is relevant to the issue of substantial impairment, and that issue is specifically slated for jury determination, Circle K General v. Dept. of Transp., supra.