concurring:
I concur with the majority in the result. I would disagree, however, with footnote 1. I would hold that Goodson was not lawfully armed at the time he shot and killed the victim; and, therefore, he was not entitled to a charge of accident.
In State v. McCaskill, 300 S.C. 256, 387 S.E. (2d) 268 (1990), we held that a person armed in self-defense is in lawful possession of a weapon. Goodson attempts to bring himself under McCaskill, supra by claiming that he was still lawfully armed in self-defense when he shot and killed Hemingway.
In McCaskill, the defendant was armed in self-defense when the gun accidentally discharged killing the victim. The self-defense component in McCaskill related solely to the defendant’s lawful act of arming herself. McCaskill was in her home and she had been threatened by the victim. In sharp contrast, Goodson was in a bar where he claims to have legally armed himself against another person who threatened him with a pool stick. The incident which gave rise to Goodson’s claim of self-defense ended as the alleged aggressor retreated. Goodson was then led outside of the bar by the bar owner where the shooting occurred.
Unlike McCaskill, who could lawfully possess the weapon in her own home, Goodson unlawfully possessed the weapon *282when he carried it on his person. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-23-20 (1985). Assuming the incident inside the bar gave rise to a self-defense claim sufficient to render Goodson’s act of arming himself lawful, any lawfulness in Goodson’s being armed ended when he was no longer threatened.
I agree with the majority in footnote 1 to the extent it states that the unlawful act must be the proximate cause of the injury before the defendant’s defense of accident is defeated. The unlawful possession of a firearm alone may not in all cases be the proximate cause of the injury. See generally, Wayne R. Lafave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 79 (1972). But, where, as here, the defendant unlawfully possesses a firearm, has been drinking heavily all day, and kills the bar owner with the unlawful firearm, the unlawful possession of the firearm is a proximate cause of the injury. See State v. Badgett, 87 S.C. 543, 70 S.E. 301 (1911); State v. Tucker, 86 S.C. 211, 68 S.E. 523 (1910); State v. Gilliam, 66 S.C. 419, 45 S.E. 6 (1903).