dissenting.
The majority in this case is reading the AEDPA statute unlawfully to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). Here, as I shall explain below, the majority is using the AEDPA statute as a license to overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its lineal progeny developed by the Warren-Brennan Court four decades ago to outlaw coerced confessions that abridge the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The capital defendant invoked both his right to silence and counsel to no avail before he was then enticed to confess.
I. Summary
Police officers on June 27, 1991, confronted petitioner Roderick Davie six times within a 5-1/2 hour period between his arrest at 8:30 A.M. that morning and his confession around 2:00 P.M. that afternoon. At none of these confrontations was he willing to sign a waiver of his rights to silence and a lawyer. The time between the confrontation was in sequence 30 minutes, 45 minutes, 2 hours and 2 hours. At the first confrontation, when he was arrested, Davie was given his Miranda warnings but he did not confess. At the second confrontation at 9:05 A.M., Davie was again informed of his rights and asked to sign a waiver form. He refused, saying he “didn’t want to” waive his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of a lawyer.1 At 9:59 A.M., police confronted Davie a third time and informed him of these rights yet again, to which he declined again to sign the waiver form and stated unequivocally that he did not “wish to make a statement.” Two hours later, at 12:15 P.M., a new team of police interrogators confronted Davie a fourth time and read him his Miranda rights. He again exercised his right to silence and counsel by refusing to sign the waiver form, after which he was asked a number of questions to which he finally answered that he had “nothing to tell” the police. The fifth confrontation occurred 1-1/2 hours later when police sent a detective as a photographer to take pictures of Da-vie in his cell (rather than at the booking desk). A conversation ensued between the detective and Davie, and Davie asked if he *325could talk to a police officer. The sixth confrontation immediately followed in which Davie again refused to sign the waiver form but asked the officer how the news media had obtained particular information. Davie initiated the conversation only to ask a question. Instead of answering Davie’s questions, the officer turned the question around and began to interrogate Davie again. In answer to this interrogation at the sixth encounter, Davie then briefly confessed to the murders (“I went there and shot them up.”). At that time, the officer again advised Davie of his Miranda rights and Davie gave a full, detailed, taped confession. The consistent, express refusal each time to sign the waiver of these two fundamental rights at the request of the police officers should have put the officers on notice that their persistent requests for a formal, pen-to-paper relinquishment of these rights would cause a reasonable person to believe that his signature was necessary in order to make a “knowing and intelligent waiver of fundamental rights,” as required by Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (in order for a constitutional right to be “properly waived” the accused must act “competently and intelligently).
The jury returned a death verdict on March 19, 1992, which was upheld on direct appeal on December 27, 1995, in an unreported opinion by the Ohio Court of Appeals and then by the Ohio Supreme Court on November 26, 1997, State of Ohio v. Davie, 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245. The Ohio Supreme Court held the confession admissible because Davie’s earlier multiple exercises of his right to remain silent “did not preclude a later interrogation by other officers” within two hours because Davie “initiated the conversation himself.” 686 N.E.2d at 257. In the fifth confrontation, Davie had only asked a question of the police photographer who was sent to his cell and then of another officer in the sixth encounter that immediately followed. The police did not “scrupulously honor” his previous exercise of his rights when they again began to ask him questions rather than simply reply to his question. Such police conduct violated the Miranda standard against “persisting in repeated efforts to wear down resistance and make him change his mind,” after exercising his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by refusing to execute the waiver form four times since 8:30 A.M. that morning and expressly stating three times that he did not want to give a statement.
II. The Facts Respecting the Interrogations and the Confession
Petitioner Roderick Davie was employed by Veterinary Companies of America, a pet food and supplies distributor in Warren, Ohio, as a warehouse worker until he was fired in April of 1991. On the morning of June 27, 1991, Davie arrived at the company warehouse and within minutes shot William Everett and John Coleman, two truck drivers with the company, and assaulted Tracey Jefferys, a secretary at the company. Coleman and Jefferys died at the scene, but Everett survived despite being shot multiple times.
Around 8:30 A.M. that morning, authorities received a phone call from Dwayne Thomas, known as “Styx,” indicating that he had information about the murders at the Veterinary Companies of America. Thomas, known as an informant to local authorities, indicated that he was with the perpetrator, Davie. The police found Da-vie at home, where he was first advised of his Miranda rights but did not waive those rights. He was arrested and brought directly to an interview at the police station for interrogation.
*326A few minutes later, at about 9:05 A.M., Lieutenant Blevins and Detective Hill read Davie his rights and gave him a Warren Police Department form with the heading “YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” at the top followed by the standard Miranda warning broken down line-by-line with space to initial that he understood each right. The section labeled “WAIVER OF RIGHTS” states:
I have read this statement of my Constitutional Rights, and understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a Lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I an [sic] doing. No promises of threats have been used against me. I, therefore, waive my rights and agree to make a statement.
(J.A. at 2017.) Davie initialed the lines on the standard form saying he understood his rights. He refused to initial the waiver portion of the form and told Blevins and Hill “he didn’t want to” sign the form or talk. (J.A. at 688. Testimony of Lt. Blevins.) An officer wrote on the form that Davie “Refused to sign” the form. (J.A. at 2017.) The record does not indicate who wrote it. Lieutenant Blevins performed an atomic absorption analysis on Davie’s hands looking for the presence of gunpowder. The officers did not attempt to question Davie further but told him they would return later to question him about the same crime.
At 9:59 A.M., less than an hour later, Blevins and Hill confronted Davie a third time in the interview room to question him about the murders. They informed Davie that they were going to record the interview. They again read Davie his rights and asked him if he understood them. He replied yes. Despite Davie’s refusal to waive his rights, the officers began to question him, first asking him if he knew why he was “down here.” Davie answered no. Nevertheless, as if he had never asserted his Miranda rights, the officers told him that they were investigating a shooting on Main Street that occurred earlier that morning and asked him if he had any knowledge of it. Davie responded that he remembered “some things,” including that he “had a gun earlier.”
Blevins then acknowledged on the tape that he was aware that Davie had not waived his rights. But the following exchange occurred:
Blevins: Do you not wish to make a statement or anything at this time.
Davie: Doesn’t matter to me.
Blevins: I heard you refuse.
Davie: I didn’t refuse you said I didn’t have to if I didn’t want to.
Blevins: [D]o you wish to make a statement yes or no.
Davie: No statement.
Blevins: You wish not to make a statement.
Davie: Right.
Blevins: Okay that’s fine ... this interview is now completed....
(J.A. at 2018-20, partial transcript of taped interview with Davie at 9:59 on June 27, 1991.)
At the suppression hearing Blevins testified that when he returned to the interview room at 9:59 A.M., he had “forgotten” that Davie refused to waive his rights less than an hour earlier. (J.A. at 717.) Blevins’ testimony was unequivocal: “If [Davie] wasn’t going to initial it [the waiver portion of the form], then I wasn’t going to talk to him.... I believe that he should initial that ... to give a statement.” When asked if he believed he had to have an express waiver, he answered, “That’s correct.” (J.A. at 697, 724-25.) The trial court suppressed the statements made by Davie at the 9:59 interview.
*327At the suppression hearing, Blevins also testified that at the conclusion of the 9:59 A.M. interview, he conferred with Detective Sines about Davie’s failure to sign the waiver portion of the form. Blevins did not play the tape for Sines, but Blevins specifically and unequivocally testified that he told Sines that the interview was terminated because Davie refused to sign the waiver of rights and because Davie expressly stated that he did not wish to make a statement. (J.A. at 726.) After the 9:59 A.M. interview, the first team of investigators ceased interacting with Da-vie, having never obtained a confession or waiver. Detective Sines then replaced Blevins and Hill and commenced a fourth effort to get Davie to confess.
Detective Sines testified at the suppression hearing that Lieutenant Blevins and Detective Hill informed him that Davie refused to initial the waiver portion of the form. Contrary to Blevins’ clear testimony that Blevins explicitly told Sines that Davie had expressly refused to talk, Sines testified that he “did not remember” hearing that Davie had expressly stated that he did not want to make a statement. Sines also testified that he made no effort to review the tape of the 9:59 A.M. interview. (J.A. at 790.)
Detective Sines testified that he called Trumbull County Prosecutor Dennis Watkins for advice about how to get Davie to talk to the police. Sines testified that he was not “aware” that Davie had said at the 9:59 A.M. interview that he did not want to make a statement, and so Sines did not tell the prosecutor that Davie had stated a few minutes earlier that he did not want to talk. Sines testified that “[Watkins’] advice to me was as long as he [Davie] did not demand an attorney present at the time, and as long as he acknowledged that he understands his Constitutional rights, that he could talk with him, as long as he volunteered or would talk with us.” (J.A. at 740.) Despite Davie’s refusal to waive his right to a lawyer and his declaration to the police that he did not want to talk, Sines interpreted this advice as allowing the police to interrogate Davie once again. (J.A. at 793.)
Detective Sines, accompanied by Detective Vingle, then went down to the jail area about 12:15 P.M. for a fourth interrogation of Davie. Again, both Sines and Vingle denied that they knew that Davie had verbally refused to make a statement at the 9:59 A.M. interview, and they acknowledged that they had not reviewed the tape from that interview. (J.A. at 871.) They testified that they only knew Davie had refused to sign the waiver portion of the form. Consequently, two hours after Da-vie first refused to waive the assistance of counsel or talk, the police again proceeded to interrogate Davie. Davie, who agreed to the officer’s request that he speak with them, was advised that the interview was going to be taped. The 12:15 P.M. interview started with Sines saying, “I’m Detective Sines and Detective Vingle and we will advise you of your rights, we want to talk to you a little bit. If you have something to tell us, we’ll listen to you. If you have nothing to tell us then we’ll go from there okay.” Vingle says, “Okay Rod before we ask you any questions you might understand your rights. Do you understand that right?” Although it is not clear what “right” Vingle was referring to, Da-vie answered “Yes.” Vingle then proceeded to read the entire Miranda warning and the waiver portion of the form aloud. Da-vie indicated that he understood both. The officers did not inform Davie that if he did not want to talk the interview would cease; instead they said, “If you have nothing to tell us then we’ll go from there okay.” They showed Davie a new copy of the Warren Police Department form with the waiver of constitutional rights that Da-*328vie had previously declined to sign. The form is timed at 12:15 P.M. and signed by Officers Vingle and Sines. (J.A. at 2021.) The following exchange occurred:
Sines: Do you want to sign your name here that you understand that?
Davie: Well, I’m not signing the waiver of rights. I didn’t sign it earlier.
Sines: Okay, okay. You can take it, go ahead. He didn’t sign it.
Vingle: Would you be willing to agree to answer some of our questions if we ask you some, you know you?
Davie: Yes.
Detective Vingle proceeded to ask Davie general questions about his employment history, before returning to the issue of the waiver.
Sines: Roderick on this rights sheet that you signed, you acknowledged that you understood your rights there, but you didn’t want to uh initial the waiver of rights, okay, is that correct?
Davie: Right.
Sines: Okay being as though you did that do you have any objections to talking to us anyhow.
Davie: No I don’t.
Sines then asked what happened at the Veterinary Companies of America that morning. Davie responded “I don’t remember anything.” Davie, in response to further questioning, stated that he did not remember being at the Veterinary Companies of America that morning, but that he knew he had his gun with him that morning. He described the gun and said that he always carried his gun. After more conversation and offers to get him a soft drink and a cigarette, the officers asked Davie about a gun that Sines had with him. Davie stated, “Just like I told you, I don’t remember anything. I remember waking up this morning and everything is a blank.” When asked if he remembered being at the Veterinary Companies of America that morning, Davie again responded, “No I don’t. If I was it’s a total blank to me.”
The tape was turned off for three minutes at 12:27 P.M. Both Vingle and Sines testified that they left the room, but neither could remember what they talked about outside the room. The officers then returned and resumed the questioning.
Sines: Okay, one, one more time, this is for the record Roderick, um, you don’t remember anything after you got up and watched t.v. until Carl [Blevins] came [to arrest you]?
Davie: No I don’t.
Sines: You don’t have nothing else to say about what we’re talking about? I’m in the blue about the picture.
Davie: I mean I can’t really, you know tell you anything now I don’t know anything about.
Sines: Okay, okay you have nothing to tell us at this time about what we’re asking you about?
Davie: No.
Sines concluded the interview at 12:35 P.M. The above statement was admitted at Davie’s capital trial.
At 2:00 P.M., another encounter began when Detective Massucci was sent to take pictures of Davie in his cell. Davie asked if he could make a phone call. Massucci said yes, and when Davie returned he told Massucci he wanted to talk to Detective Vingle. Massucci found Vingle and told him Davie wanted to see him. Vingle went down to the jail, and took Davie into the jailer’s room to ask him what he wanted. Vingle testified that Davie wanted to know how the news media got so much information about him and his girlfriend. Vingle said he had no control over what the news media gathered. Then Davie asked him “What did Styx tell you?” Instead of an*329swering, Vingle asked, “What did you tell Styx?” Davie replied, “I went there and shot them up.” Vingle testified that he then told Davie that they needed to go upstairs to the interrogation room, where Davie would be formally advised of his rights again. Davie agreed, and Vingle took him upstairs. (J.A. at 866-67.) The following exchange occurred:
Sines: Roderick I understand you want to talk to us some more.
Davie: There’s not much to talk about. I mean, I done it.
Vingle: Well, wait a minute, before we get into that Roderick I’m going to readvise you, okay.
Davie: I can understand all that.
[Davie is readvised of his rights and states that he understands his rights. Vingle then reads the waiver portion of the form and asks Davie if he understands that. Davie answers “Right.”]
Vingle: Do you want to acknowledge this that you have been given your rights again? Do you understand this one too, do you want to initial that one?
Davie: It don’t matter, do it.
Sines: Any particular reason why, you just don’t want to initial that part?
Davie: Right.
Sines: Are you still willing to talk to us? Davie: Right.
Sines: Okay.
Vingle: Okay, this has been building up?
Davie: I don’t know, I just flipped out this morning.
Vingle: Tell us what happened, tell us.
Davie: I mean, it’s evident what happened.
Sines: We have an idea what happened but we would like to hear it from you what happened, just to verify what we got.
Davie: I went down to the VCA and shot ‘em up.
Davie then proceeded to talk more about the murders and what he did after he left the scene. After about 15 minutes, Davie refused to talk further. He told the officers to type up his statement off the tape because he did not want to go through the confession again. (J.A. at 2074.) After the tape was transcribed, Davie signed or initialed each page of the transcribed statement at the bottom. (J.A. at 2052-2062.) Davie’s initials acknowledged that he understood his constitutional rights, but he once again refused to sign or initial the waiver portion of the form regarding his right to a lawyer and to remain silent. (J.A. at 2051.)
Davie’s counsel, appointed afterward, moved to suppress all the statements he made to police. The trial court held that there were no statements to suppress from the encounters at 8:30 A.M. or 9:05 A.M. and that the statement given at 9:59 A.M. must be suppressed because the government had not shown that Davie waived his right to remain silent. The statements from the 12:15 P.M. and 2:00 P.M. interviews were admitted because the trial court found that Davie had waived his rights by asking Vingle the question about “Styx.” The two confessions were admitted, and Davie was convicted and received the death penalty. The District Court simply concluded that the Ohio Supreme Court did not apply Supreme Court law in a way that was either “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 291 F.Supp. at 597.
III. The Miranda and Mosley Rights Are Well-Established and Were Abridged in This Case
The purpose of the Miranda decision was to safeguard the long-recognized right *330against “the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings”:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added).
Among the important protections established by Miranda is the “right to cut off questioning,” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, which serves as an essential check on “the coercive pressures of the custodial setting” by enabling the suspect to “control the time at which questioning occurs, the subject discussed, and the duration of the interrogation,” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 96, 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975). This right is a “critical safeguard” of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment privileges, Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, and requires the police immediately to cease interrogating a suspect if he “indicates in any manner, at any time ... during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100-02, 96 S.Ct. 321. The rule requiring termination of questioning upon an accused’s invocation of his right to silence prevents police from “persisting in repeated efforts to wear down [the accused’s] resistance and make him change his mind.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Almost a decade after Miranda, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106, 96 S.Ct. 321 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained after a person in police custody has decided to remain silent and not answer questions depends upon whether his or her right to cut off questioning was “scrupulously honored” by police. 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321. The rationale underlying the “scrupulously honored” rule in Mosley is the same as that in Miranda: it is necessary because custodial interrogation by its very nature subtly compels individuals to incriminate themselves. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (concluding that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely”); Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321 (requirement that police cease questioning after right to silence is invoked “counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting”).
In Mosley, the Supreme Court considered and severely limited when police could attempt further questioning of a suspect who had previously asserted his right to remain silent. Mosley was arrested on robbery charges and advised of his Miranda rights. After invoking his right to remain silent, the arresting officer placed him in a detention cell. Approximately two hours later, another officer came to interview the defendant about an unrelated homicide. He gave the suspect another set of Miranda warnings, and during the course of the subsequent interrogation, Mosley made incriminating statements. In reviewing the case in light of Miranda, the Court concluded that Mosley’s invocation of his right to remain silent had been *331“scrupulously honored” because “[1] the police ... immediately ceased the interrogation, [2] resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time, and [a] the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and [b] restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Miranda cannot “sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent” because such a reading could im-permissibly create “a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation.” Id. at 102-03, 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). The decisive fact allowing new interrogation in Mosley was the fact that the accused was questioned about an entirely different crime. That crucial fact justifying the new interrogation is not present in Davie’s case. He was repeatedly questioned about the same crime.
In Mosley the Court explained that its mandate that “interrogation must cease” after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent does not always permanently prevent the police form resuming questioning. However, neither does the phrase mean— as occurred in this case — that questioning can resume after a short “time out” or that police may try again (and again) to get the suspect to talk to them or make a statement about the same criminal event. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. 321. To allow questioning on the same subject to resume after only a brief period would “clearly frustrate the purpose of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.” Id.
IV. The “Presumption Against Waiver” of the Fifth Amendment Right to Silence and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has set a high standard of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, a standard requiring that courts should “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). “The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great” to demonstrate a valid waiver, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), and “[d]oubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). Where “the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602.
Miranda holds that the defendant may waive the rights conveyed in the warnings “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The inquiry has two distinct dimensions:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal *332both an uncoerced choice and the level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (emphasis added); see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Merely asking the accused whether he understands his rights does not satisfy the duties of an interrogating officer or make admissible any statement of the accused. Miranda requires the interrogating officer to go further and make sure that the accused, knowing his rights, voluntarily relinquishes them. See United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1985).
If the custodial suspect’s right to remain silent has not been “scrupulously honored” throughout the custody, there generally cannot be any subsequent finding of waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that under “Mosley, a court need determine specifically whether there has been a voluntary waiver only after the government has carried its burden of showing that it complied with [all of] the required procedures”) (emphasis added); Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023, 1028-31 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that under Mosley, the government failed to demonstrate a valid waiver when police did not “scrupulously honor” the suspect’s invocation of his right to remain silent by reinterrogating him about the same crime).
Interpreting Miranda, the Supreme Court said in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (a case in which the accused told his police interrogator that he did not want to talk or waive his right to a lawyer): “an accused’s post-request responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” This principle has been followed in many cases. A suspect’s claim that the police violated his right to silence by continuing to question him is not negated by the fact that the suspect answered additional questions after the police failed to “scrupulously honor” his request to cease questioning him. Police may not use “post-request” responses “to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity” of the initial request. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 154-55 (3d Cir.1998) (the police command to Tyler to “tell the truth” after Tyler invoked his right to remain silent is the “antithesis” of scrupulously honoring his right to remain silent); United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304-05 (2d Cir.1996) (stating that “once a suspect has unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent whether in the form of refusing to answer questions or asking that an ongoing interrogation be terminated, his request must be scrupulously honored”) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the fact that Davie may have continued to answer questions after verbally expressing his wish not to make a statement does not constitute a waiver. This is as it should be; otherwise police could disregard a defendant’s invocation of his rights in the hope that subsequent interrogation would “cast retrospective doubt” on the invocation of the right. See Judge Nelson’s clear opinion for the court in McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 518-19 (6th Cir.2001) (post-request responses after invocation of right to silence may not be used by the State as a waiver of rights because the continued questioning violates the requirement that the “exercise of the right be scrupulously honored”). See also LeFave, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g).
Such interrogation is prohibited where the suspect has clearly and unambiguously invoked his right to silence, as Davie had *333done numerous times in the previous several hours. “Although the context and nuances of a request to end questioning can create ambiguity, they cannot overcome a clear expression of the desire to remain silent.” United States v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir.2004). There is no nuance or ambiguity that could vary the unequivocal meaning of Davie’s refusal to sign the waiver and his repeated words to the police that morning: “no statement.” The only meaning that can be attributed to those words is that Davie wished to exercise his right to remain silent.
In this case, the State and the majority contend that Davie’s right to remain silent was “scrupulously honored” because (1) the investigator temporarily ceased questioning him about the case each time he asserted his Fifth Amendment right, and (2) then allowed a short time to pass before any reinterrogation, and (3) then gave him fresh sets of Miranda warnings before any reinterrogation. Specifically, they argue that the requirements of Mosley were met because when defendant indicated that he did not want to make a statement at the 9:59 A.M. interview, police ceased interrogation. They claim that Davie waived his right to remain silent during the 12:15 P.M. and 2:00 P.M. encounters when he answered their questions after he refused to waive his rights by signing the form.
This claim is mistaken because it assumes that the police may continue interrogation within a couple of hours after the accused had expressly refused to waive his rights at the 9:59 A.M. interview when Davie unequivocally refused to make a statement:
Blevins: [D]o you wish to make a statement yes or no.
Davie: No statement.
Blevins: You wish not to make a statement.
Davie: Right.
The 12:15 P.M. interview then began with Detective Sines of the new interrogation team saying to Davie, “I’m Detective Sines and Detective Vingle and we will advise you of your rights, we want to talk to you a little bit. If you have something to tell us, we’ll listen to you. If you have nothing to tell us then we’ll go from there okay.” Vingle says, “Okay Rod before we ask you any questions you might understand your rights. Do you understand that right.” Although it is not clear what “right” Vingle is inquiring about, Davie answers ‘Tes.” Vingle then read the Miranda warning and the waiver portion of the form aloud to Davie. Davie indicated verbally both times that he understood his rights. The officers did not in any way inform Davie that if he did not want to talk the interview would cease. Instead they improperly said “If you have nothing to tell us then we’ll go from there okay” — meaning as it turned out that if you do not waive your rights, we will question you anyway.
At the 12:15 interview, Davie again refused to sign the proffered waiver form: “Well I’m not signing the waiver of rights. I didn’t sign it earlier.” This reply told the officers that Davie thought that the refusal to sign the waiver form was all he had to do to protect himself from self-incrimination. The new detectives again tried to get him to sign the waiver form after asking a few general questions unrelated to the crime. The persistent pressure put upon Davie to sign the waiver form reinforced his belief that his rights were protected as long as he did not sign the waiver. He knew the detectives had tried time after time to get him to sign it. His refusal to sign meant that he had not waived his rights. The rambling 12:15 P.M. interrogation ends with Davie saying *334he doesn’t “remember” anything about what he did that morning, despite repeated attempts by the police to get him to talk about it. For the fourth time within less than four hours, Davie had refused to confess.
It is perfectly clear that the 2:00 P.M. encounter was not a request by Davie to reinitiate the interrogation. Therefore, the majority err when they simply concluded that any statements made by Davie after “reinitiating” contact with the police are admissible. The mere act of asking a police officer a question does not constitute a waiver of a previously invoked right to remain silent.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the 2:00 P.M. interrogation as “initiated” by Davie and therefore not worthy of further analysis, it seems obvious that once Davie invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the police were obligated to scrupulously honor the right he invoked whenever they interacted with him. That means that police should not have resumed any interrogation of Davie, either directly or indirectly, by any means without obtaining an unequivocal waiver from Davie. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Vingle’s indirect means of resuming the questioning by turning Davie’s question back to him was just the sort of improper contact that Mosley seeks to prevent.
Consistent with all the previous encounters, Davie again refused to sign the waiver form when the police asked him again for the waiver at 2:00 P.M. There is no basis for concluding that by asking Officer Vingle a question that Davie intended to waive his right to remain silent and his right to counsel or that he wanted to confess. The question that Davie asked did not override his earlier unequivocal statements concerning his desire not to make a statement and his deliberate refusal to sign the waiver portion of the form on all of the occasions in which he came in contact with the police.
The First Circuit has stated that the correct course of action would be for the police officer (if he plans to continue to interrogate) to inform the accused that the refusal to sign the waiver does not mean that his statements cannot be used against him. United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278, 1280 (1st Cir.1970). The court explained:
in the delicate area of advising one of his rights, where testimony is often conflicting, the act of refusing to sign a waiver is concrete and indisputable. When such an act occurs, followed by a willingness to talk, this is a signal of some quirk of reasoning which may simply be a dislike of affixing a signature to any document but which may be more. It may indicate a serious misunderstanding on the part of the accused. In such a succession of events, we wish to make it clear to the courts and prosecutors in this circuit that the burden of persuasion resting on the prosecution measurably increases.
Id. (emphasis added). Investigating officers should clearly inform the accused that his failure to sign the waiver does not prevent statements he makes from being used against him.
Likewise, in United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir.1984), Heldt stated that he understood his rights but did not wish to waive them. He refused to sign the waiver form and told police he did not wish to answer questions. The officer told him he did not need to sign the waiver form but asked him if he would be willing to answer questions anyway. The questioning continued for three hours. Heldt later moved to suppress the admissions he had given to police. Like the First Circuit in *335Van Dusen, the Ninth Circuit noted that it is the government’s burden to prove that a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver was given. The government failed to do so because the prisoner’s refusal to sign the waiver form cast “doubt” on any claim that he waived his Miranda rights. The Ninth Circuit suppressed the confession, holding that the government must clearly prove a “knowing and intelligent” waiver when the police continued questioning after a refusal to sign.
As in Heldt, Davie’s case requires suppression because the police persisted not only after a refusal to sign, but also because they persisted even after Davie expressly invoked his right to silence by refusing to talk.
I, therefore, dissent from the effort by my colleagues to bury Miranda under a mountain of AEDPA rhetoric. Until the Supreme Court overrules Miranda, we should follow it, no matter how much we prefer to side with the police against the liberties created by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
. The waiver of rights form that Davie refused to sign stated:
I have read this statement of my Constitutional Rights and understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a Lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I an [sic] doing. No promises or threats have been used against me. I therefore waive my rights and agree to make a statement.
Davie signed each constitutional right as the police officer read it to him, thereby indicating that he understood the right; but he refused to sign the waiver while stating verbally that he would not waive those rights, thereby conveying the message to the police that he understood his rights and was exercising his rights by refusing to waive them. He thus refused by these actions to waive his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of a lawyer.