(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that Officer Steen had the right to inspect the open sections of Colosimo’s fishing boat and that Colosimo prevented Steen from doing so; therefore, Steen was justified in issuing Colosimo a citation for violating MinmStat. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3). But, unlike the majority, I would end the analysis at this point. The majority goes beyond what is necessary to decide this case when it holds that Steen had the right to inspect any “other conveyance” used by Colosimo to transport fish.
*19While the record is unclear as to why and how Colosimo’s boat came to a stop at the portage, once it did stop, Steen engaged in conversation with Colosimo, and Colosimo admitted to Steen that his party had been fishing and that the party had fish on board the boat. While the accounts vary as to exactly how Steen then phrased his request to inspect Colosimo’s boat, it is ■undisputed that Steen made numerous requests, all of which Colosimo adamantly refused. Accounts of the demeanor of the parties also vary, but one or the other or both of the men were concerned enough about any escalation in the standoff such that Steen, without making any attempt to look in the open sections of the boat, issued Colosimo a citation for violating Minn.Stat. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3). Colosi-mo then accepted the citation without further ado.
As a fisherman in an open boat who admitted he had been fishing, Colosimo had no reasonable expectation of privacy to the open sections of his boat even though having an officer look into those sections of the boat is intrusive to some degree. Colosimo improperly refused and hindered Steen when he prevented Steen from conducting an inspection of the open sections of the boat. Accordingly, Colosi-mo violated Minnesota law, and his conviction by the district court should be affirmed.
Affirming Colosimo’s conviction on this basis is sufficient to resolve the case before us. Nevertheless, the majority expands its holding to include any “other conveyance” used to transport fish. This overly broad holding is both unnecessary and inadvisable. Steen was prevented from getting anywhere close to an attempt to search any “other conveyance” used by Colosimo to transport fish, and we do not know what other conveyance, if any, Steen sought to inspect. In the context of the case we have before us today, it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty what other conveyances are subject to a search. Therefore, we should leave to another day the resolution of the question of what right, if any, a conservation officer has to inspect more than the open sections of a fisherman’s boat.