(dissenting). I agree with the majority that great deference should be accorded to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that “the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause” on the basis of the facts of this case. Ante at *449448. Instead, I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Five years ago, this Court addressed thoroughly what comprises a sufficient affidavit for a search warrant. As we explained in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 166-171; 538 NW2d 380 (1995):
The Michigan Constitution provides that a search warrant may issue only on a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
“The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” [Const 1963, art 1, § 11.]
Implementing this constitutional mandate, MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(f)(1) and MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) require that probable cause be shown in the form of an affidavit presented to a magistrate who will decide whether to issue a warrant on the basis of the affidavit’s contents.
“When an affidavit is made on oath to a magistrate authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases, and the affidavit establishes grounds for issuing a warrant pursuant to this act, the magistrate, if he or she is satisfied that there is probable cause for the search, shall issue a warrant to search the house, building, or other location or place where the property or thing to be searched for and seized is situated.” [MCL 780.651(1); MSA 28.1259(1)(1) (emphasis added).]
“The magistrate’s findings of reasonable or probable cause shall be based on all the facts related within the affidavit made before him or her.” [MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) (emphasis added).]
When reviewing courts assess a magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause to search existed, such courts apply the standard of review set forth in People v Russo, 439 Mich 584; 487 NW2d 698 (1992). The standard instructs review*450ing courts that “a search warrant and the underlying affidavit are to be read in a common-sense and realistic manner.” Id. at 604. Reviewing courts must also pay deference to a magistrate’s determination that probable cause existed. This deference “requires the reviewing court to ask only whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding of probable cause.” Id. at 603, quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 236; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
When reviewing courts apply the standard from Russo, they must specifically focus on facts and circumstances that support the magistrate’s probable cause determination. Reviewing courts may consider only those facts that were presented to the magistrate. Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 112; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). Moreover, reviewing courts must ensure that the magistrate’s decision is based on actual facts—not merely the conclusions of the affiant. One of the main purposes of the warrant application procedure is to have a neutral and detached magistrate determine whether probable cause exists. This purpose cannot be achieved if the magistrate simply adopts unsupported conclusions of the affiant. Accordingly, at a minimum, a sufficient affidavit must present facts and circumstances on which a magistrate can rely to make an independent probable cause determination.
These concepts are well established throughout Michigan case law. In People v Effelberg, 220 Mich 528, 531; 190 NW 727 (1922), we explained:
“It was not for [the affiant] but for the magistrate to determine whether there was probable cause to justify issuing the search warrant. His statements are his conclusions and have no more force than if expressly stated on information and belief. Affiant should have stated to the magistrate on oath or affirmation the facts and circumstances, if any were known to him, which induced the beliefs and the conclusions stated.”
Similarly, in People v Rosborough, 387 Mich 183, 199; 195 NW2d 255 (1972), we emphasized:
“ ‘The affidavit must contain facts within the knowledge of the affiant, as distinguished from mere conclusions or *451belief. An affidavit made on information and belief is not sufficient. The affidavit should clearly set forth the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the person making it, which constitute the grounds of the application. The facts should be stated by distinct averments, and must be such as in law would make out a cause of complaint. It is not for the affiant to draw his own inferences. He must state matters which justify the drawing of them.'" [Quoting 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 868, p 1129. (Emphasis in original.) Accord People v Sherbine, 421 Mich 502, 511, n 16; 364 NW2d 658 (1984); People v Warner, 221 Mich 657, 659; 192 NW 566 (1923); People v Knopka, 220 Mich 540, 544; 190 NW 731 (1922); People v Landt, 188 Mich App 234, 241; 469 NW2d 37 (1991), rev’d on other grounds 439 Mich 870; 475 NW2d 825 (1991); People v Zoder, 15 Mich App 118; 166 NW2d 289 (1968).]3
In Zoder, the Court of Appeals explained that a magistrate abdicates his judicial function regarding search warrants when he only accepts the affiant’s conclusory statements:
“The vice of stating a ‘mere conclusion’ and in failing to state the underlying circumstances upon which the conclusion is based is that without a statement of underlying circumstances the magistrate must accept the inferences drawn by the affiant rather than make his own independent evaluation.” [Zoder at 121.]
When presented with affidavits that wholly consist of the affiant’s unjustified assertions or inferences, Michigan reviewing courts have consistently held that the affidavit is fatally deficient because it could not provide any basis to *452support a magistrate’s conclusion that there was probable cause to search. See Sherbine, Rosborough, Knopka, Effelberg, Landt, and Zoder.
In order to give great deference to a magistrate, a reviewing court necessarily must examine the facts that were presented in the affidavit. In this case, as the majority recognizes, only two facts were presented to support the warrant: coin envelopes were observed and defendant suggested that he would “take care of” the officer, if the officer returned in the company of someone known to the defendant.
The majority comments that the officer inquired about heroin. However, a review of the affidavit demonstrates no such inquiry. The affidavit states that the officer went to the defendant’s address. When the defendant opened the door, he asked “what [the officer] wanted.” The officer replied, “one.” At that moment, the defendant produced “a large bundle of blue folded small coin envelopes wrapped in rubber-bands.” On the basis of these facts, the most immediate and reasonable inference to be drawn is that defendant believed that the officer made an offer to purchase a single coin envelope.
In People v Falconer,1 the Court of Appeals ruled that an officer’s suspicion that coin envelopes contained narcotics did not constitute probable cause. The officer relied solely on his suspicion in making an affidavit for a search warrant.
In this case, the defendant refused to sell anything to the undercover officer. There were no drugs observed either on the premises or in the coin enve*453lopes. Although the officer’s experience in narcotics demonstrated that drugs were often packaged in coin envelopes, he did not know that the coin envelopes he observed contained contraband. See Falconer. He suspected that the envelopes contained drugs. Such a suspicious belief is insufficient to warrant a probable cause finding. See Rosborough, 387 Mich 199.
In People v Head,2 the affiant was an experienced police officer assigned to a narcotics team. For approximately three months, he observed a building that was suspected to be a drug house. He swore that an unnamed cooperating person made two controlled buys at the house within the two weeks before issuance of the warrant. The second purchase had been within the previous forty-eight hours. The substance purchased was cocaine. Finally, in vouching for the reliability of the informant, the affiant asserted that the informant had made statements regarding drug involvement that were against the party’s penal interests.
I wrote that the facts showing controlled cocaine purchases in Head were sufficient to establish probable cause to permit the magistrate to issue a search warrant. However, the present case is distinguishable. Here, there were no facts indicating that the defendant’s house had been under surveillance. Moreover, there was no observance of drug transactions or of drugs of any kind. In Head, the magistrate had evidence of two concrete drug sales. In the present case, the magistrate had none.
In People v Rosborough, supra, a warrant was issued to search the defendant’s premises and seize *454gambling paraphernalia. The underlying affidavit was signed by a police officer who stated that he had seen various persons arrive at a location by automobile, enter the premises carrying brown paper bags, leave with the bags, and drive away. On the basis of these observations, the officer suspected that the location was a gambling house.3
We held that the search warrant was not properly supported by probable cause. In so holding, we stated that “[i]t is not for the affiant to draw his own inferences. He must state matters which justify the drawing of them.” 387 Mich 199.
In this case, the officer believed that contraband was contained inside the coin envelopes because he had seen similar envelopes in prior drug transactions. Analogous to the brown paper bags observed in Rosborough, the coin envelopes, without more, are not sufficient to support a probable cause determination.
In United States v Algie,4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced the issue whether (1) fifteen telephone calls made to a corporation from an apartment that the police knew to be *455used for gambling, (2) coupled with the officer’s belief that telephones were often used to make lay-off bets, constituted probable cause sufficient to issue a warrant to search the corporation. The evidence of the telephone calls was derived from a pen register.
The Sixth Circuit held that the evidence amounted only to a reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned that, although the apartment was a known location where illegal gambling took place, the corporation was not. It noted, also, that “no demonstrable illegal activities were observed at [the corporation].” Id. at 1042.
The court also took note that telephones were commonly used by bookmakers to make bets and exchange information. Nevertheless, it stated that the connection between an innocuous device such as a telephone and alleged or suspected criminal activity is simply insufficient. See id. at 1043.
It follows that coin envelopes, absent an observation of at least drug residue, coupled with a suspected drug transaction, are insufficient. Moreover, the affidavit itself demonstrates that the magistrate relied merely on the officer’s belief that the envelopes contained contraband and his own subjective, unexpressed intention to purchase narcotics. At most, the facts submitted by the officer rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. And, as the United States Supreme Court indicated, mere suspicion is insufficient to establish probable cause to search. See Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160, 175; 69 S Ct 1302; 93 L Ed 1879 (1949).
Accordingly, the evidence presented in the affidavit to the magistrate was such that a “reasonably cautious person could [not] have concluded that there *456was a ‘substantial basis’ for the finding of probable cause.” See Sloan, supra at 168.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion and analysis, I would affirm the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that probable cause determinations must be based on facts and circumstances:
“ ‘Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough.’ ” [Aguilar v Texas, supra at 112, quoting Nathanson v United States, 290 US 41, 47; 54 S Ct 11; 78 L Ed 159 (1933) (emphasis in original).]
76 Mich App 367; 256 NW2d 597 (1977).
211 Mich App 205; 535 NW2d 563 (1995).
In the affidavit, the officer concluded
“that from his observations of the people, packages and parcels in the manner described, and the use of the automobiles hereinbefore mentioned, that the persons aforementioned, whose names are unknown but whose persons are well known, have conspired to violate the gambling laws of the State of Michigan, and that they are operating an unlawful gambling enterprise and that the premises are used to collect, store and conceal memoranda of bets and other gambling paraphernalia . . . [387 Mich 197.]
Although the officer did not expressly say so, one reasonably could surmise that he made this conclusion on the basis of his past experience as an officer.
721 F2d 1039 (CA 6, 1983).