(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority’s decision that Creech was entitled to neither a mistrial nor to a directed verdict and therefore concur in Parts I and II of the majority’s opinion. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold the trial court did not commit any error, certainly not any prejudicial error, in not conducting a suppression hearing.
The facts in this case bear strong resemblance to the facts found in United States v. Peoples, 748 F. (2d) 934 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S.Ct. 2143, 85 L.Ed. (2d) 500 (1985). There, a police officer walked into the room in which the defendant was being questioned by an FBI agent when the defendant apologized to the police officer for shooting at him. Despite the lack of a prior determination of voluntariness, the court upheld the admission of the police officer’s testimony regarding the incriminating apology because the police officer was not interrogating the defendant when he made the statement. Id. at 937.
Here, Creech made a spontaneous and unsolicited statement while under arrest. Creech made his statement during a conversation with Officer Gantt regarding the hazards of police duty. When officer Gantt commented about how some police officers view a scuffle between themselves and a citizen as an attempt by the citizen to grab the police officer’s gun, Creech stated he had attempted to grab the gun of the arresting officer, Bell. Then, Officer Gantt responded, “You ought not to say that,” to which Creech allegedly replied, “Well, I tell it like it is.”
*88Although Creech was under arrest, interrogation is a “measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed. (2d) 297, 307 (1980). Based upon the colloquy between Officer Gantt and Creech, it is apparent Officer Gantt was not interrogating Creech because he was not deliberately eliciting information from Creech. Peoples, 748 F. (2d) at 936.
Moreover, the error, if any, was harmless because there was sufficient evidence to support Creech’s conviction for aggravated assault and battery.
Assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature is the unlawful act of violent injury to another person accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the infliction of serious bodily injury or the resistance to lawful authority. State v. Brown, 269 S.C. 491, 238 S.E. (2d) 174 (1977) (citations omitted). Further, an assault and battery may be of an aggravated nature even though the person resisting arrest uses no deadly weapon or the officer suffers no actual bodily harm. Id. at 496, 238 S.E. (2d) at 176 (citations omitted).
Besides Creech’s statement, the State introduced the following testimony: (1) Officer Blackburn testified he saw Creech strike Officer Bell in the face; (2) Officer Stone testified he witnessed Creech strike Officer Bell and attempt to grab Officer Bell’s service revolver and he saw Creech break free from his restraints and strike Officer Stone in the eye; (3) Officer David Bazzle testified he saw Creech struggle with Officer Bell and attempt to grab Officer Bell’s revolver; (4) Gene Williams testified he saw Creech attempt to grab Officer Bell’s revolver; and (5) Officer Bell testified Creech struck him on his face and, in the ensuing struggle, Creech put his right hand on Officer Bell’s revolver.
Accordingly, I would affirm Creech’s conviction and sentence.