dissenting, in part:
When we review a sentence, “we first consider whether the district court committed significant procedural error, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Zavala v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2491, 171 L.Ed.2d 780 (2008). The district court commits “significant procedural error” by “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” or by “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Carter asked the district court to impose a sentence below the range suggested by the sentencing guidelines. In his request, he raised “specific, nonfrivolous argument[s] tethered to[ ] relevant § 3553(a) factor[s].” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Yet, in imposing sentence, the court gave no indication that it had heard Carter’s arguments and imposed sentence with almost no explanation. I believe that the district court erred in failing to address Carter’s arguments, failing adequately to consider the § 3553(a) factors, and failing adequately to explain the sentence that was imposed. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Discussion section of the majority opinion.
The majority cites a lengthy passage from the sentencing hearing to support its conclusion; however, this passage does not reveal that the district court adequately addressed Carter’s arguments and the § 3553 factors. It was apparent to government counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney Elizabeth R. Yang, that the court’s explanation was insufficient, as indicated by the fact that, even after the court gave the statement quoted by the majority, Ms. Yang proceeded to ask the court a series of questions designed to address the inadequacy of the court’s statement:
Ms. Yang: And with regard to the court’s denial of the downward departure request respecting criminal history category, has the court recognized that it has discretion to depart on this ground but chooses not to exercise that discretion?
The Court: You mean the 20 days.
Ms. Yang: No, the criminal history category, the over-representation.
The Court: What did you say?
Ms. Yang: Does the court recognize that it has discretion to depart based on over-representation of criminal history but chooses not to exercise it’s[sic] discretion?
The Court: Yes.
Ms. Yang: And finally with regard to the sentence the court has imposed including the guideline calculations, the advisory guideline calculations and the mandatory minimum, has the court found that this sentence is reasonable taking into account all the factors and the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553a?
*1123The Court: Yes. I found my sentence to be reasonable.
Tr. of 4/11/05 Sentencing Hr’g at 26-27.
Carter asked the court to apply the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 360 months — a sentence already many times longer than those of his coconspirators.1 He argued that his criminal history category was overrepresented. He received one criminal history point for a conviction for possession of narcotics and one criminal history point for a conviction for giving a false identity to a police officer when he was stopped for driving without his lights on. He received an additional two points because he was on diversion for the narcotics offense and on probation for the false identity offense when he committed the instant offense. Carter asked the court to exercise its discretion and impose a below-guidelines sentence, taking into consideration his difficult childhood, his family situation and his young children, and the rehabilitative effect of what would be, under the statutory minimum, thirty years in prison.
Rather than addressing any of Carter’s arguments, the court applied the guidelines sentence, stating that the guidelines had “adequately taken into consideration [Carter’s] actions and criminal history,” and that the “lengthy sentence is sufficiently punitive and hopefully will deter against any further criminal activity.” This rote recitation of a few of the § 3553 factors does not begin to constitute “an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Moreover, the court’s simple affirmative responses to the government’s pointed questions regarding Carter’s arguments do not provide a record that “makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the district court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97; see also Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465 (emphasizing that, in determining the merits of the arguments by prosecution and defense that the guidelines sentence should not apply, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply”). Here, however, the district court presumed the guideline range was reasonable and failed to make any individualized assessment.
“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468. Yet, the district court did not give any reason for rejecting Carter’s arguments regarding his sentence. Unlike cases in which we have found that the district court adequately considered the defendant’s specific “history and characteristics,” the court did not “consider how the sentencing factors apply to [Carter] and determine whether an indi*1124vidualized sentence [was] warranted.” United States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.2006); see, e.g., United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that the district court adequately “considered the evidence and arguments of the defendant” where the district court referred to numerous subsections of § 3553(a), and, “at various points in the sentencing hearing, the district court explicitly noted that it had considered [the defendant’s] arguments”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 957, — L.Ed.2d — (2009).
I echo the concern that such deferential review has made appellate review of sentencing “an empty formality.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 607 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 878-79 (9th Cir.2009) (Tashima, J., dissenting); United States v. Ruff, 535 F.3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir.2008) (Gould, J., dissenting) (in the context of reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, stating that the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing sentencing decisions “is not a rubber stamp of all sentencing decision made by a district judge”).2 Carter’s prior offenses were minor and nonviolent, and his criminal history category was increased significantly based solely on his being on probation for the misdemeanor of giving false information when stopped for driving without his lights on.3 The 471-month sentence Carter received was much longer than the sentences received by the other participants in the robberies.4 The district court’s complete failure to acknowledge Carter’s arguments, and, based on its exchange with Ms. Yang, its failure even to have heard the arguments, do not “com-munieate[] that the parties’ arguments have been heard, and that a reasoned decision has been made.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. Section 3553 requires the court to state “the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), because “[c]onfidenee in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution,” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468. In my mind, the majority’s reliance on the district court’s cursory explanation for the harsh sentence imposed does not constitute “meaningful appellate review.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992.
*1125It is true that “when a defendant’s arguments are straightforward and uncomplicated, the district court does not abuse its discretion when it listens to the defendant’s arguments and then ‘simply [finds those] circumstances insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the Guidelines range.’ ” Stoterau, 524 F.3d at 999 (quoting Carty, 520 F.3d at 995) (alteration in original). However, the arguments regarding Carter’s criminal history are not straightforward and uncomplicated. Moreover, in Rita, from which this principle is taken, the district court asked numerous questions about all of the sentencing issues raised by the parties before giving its “brief but legally sufficient” statement of reasons for the sentence it imposed. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2469; see Joint Appendix, Vol. I, at 48-91, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (transcript of sentencing hearing); cf. United States v. Perez-Perez, 512 F.3d 514, 516-17 (9th Cir.2008) (finding the sentence reasonable where the district court expressly cited the defendant’s extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and “actively questioned and engaged the defense” during sentencing). Here, by contrast, the court did not acknowledge or address the arguments raised by Carter at all.
The nature of Carter’s prior offenses, the length of his sentence, and the district court’s failure to address any of the specific arguments raised by Carter, coupled with the minimal consideration of the § 3553(a) factors as applied to Carter, lead me to conclude that not only did the district court commit procedural error by failing adequately to consider the § 3553(a) factors, failing to make an individualized determination, and failing to consider the arguments raised by Carter, but that the sentence is not reasonable. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Part IV and the majority’s conclusion that Carter’s sentence was reasonable.
. The bulk of Carter’s sentence was due to the statutory mandatory minimum twenty-five year sentence for a subsequent conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C). This court has in the past urged Congress to reconsider the “harsh scheme of mandatory minimum sentences” imposed by § 924. United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113, 1118-22 (9th Cir.2006) (Reinhardt, J„ concurring in the judgment) (describing as “irrational, inhumane, and absurd” a 159-year sentence imposed on a mentally ill woman who had nothing to do with the firearm used in the robberies), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 938, 127 S.Ct. 2249, 167 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2007). Harris and Hungerford were decided under the mandatory sentencing regime; thus, the criticism was aimed at Congress’ decision to remove all discretion from the sentencing judge.
. Gall, Autery, and Ruff involved review of the reasonableness of a sentence, rather than the consideration of whether the district court committed procedural error.
. The harsh sentence and the district court’s failure to acknowledge Carter’s arguments stand in stark contrast to Ruff, in which a white collar criminal who embezzled more than half a million dollars from his employer received a sentence of one day of imprisonment, a sentence well below the guideline recommendation. The district court in Ruff relied, among other factors, on the defendant’s age and "his mental, financial and gambling problems.” Ruff, 535 F.3d at 1006 (Gould, J., dissenting). Carter surely raised personal problems at least as compelling as the defendant in Ruff. I agree with Judge Gould that we "ought to consider why it is that such light sentences are all too frequently handed out by district courts for white collar crimes.” Id.
.One of the § 3553(a) factors is "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities....” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The evidence indicates that O’Neal and Warren planned and recruited the participants for both robberies; O'Neal cooperated, and Warren pled, and they received sentences of 105 months and 41 months, respectively. The record also indicates that Edward Hector participated in both robberies, but, for unknown reasons, was charged in only one; he went to trial and received a sentence of 240 months. The other participants received sentences ranging from 125 months to 137 months. The only participant who received a sentence remotely close to Carter's was Koran Allen, who received a 319-month sentence, but Allen was a career offender with a long criminal history, including several violent offenses.