dissenting in part.
In primary reliance on Dunaway v. City of Marietta, 251 Ga. 727 (308 SE2d 823) (1983) the majority strikes down the Atlanta ordinance transferring to the DOT parklands to be used as rights-of-way for the Presidential Parkway. The ordinance is struck down, because Council President Arrington presided over the council meeting while the ordinance was under consideration, and, at the time, Arrington was a subcontractor on Shepherd’s contract with the DOT for the grading and paving of the parkway.
In Dunaway, we dealt with a situation in which the chairman of a city planning commission presided over a meeting at which a certain application for rezoning was initially considered, and the application for rezoning was filed by a corporation of which the chairman was an officer. The chairman did not vote on the rezoning application, and he testified that he disclosed his relationship to the rezoning applicant to other council members with whom he spoke. The complainant charged that the chairman lobbied council members to rezone the property. We held that an issue of fact was raised as to whether the chairman’s conflict of interest tainted the approval of the rezoning application. Thus, the conflict of interest in Dunaway was egregious. The conflict of interest in this case is attenuated and indirect. Therefore, on its facts Dunaway is readily distinguishable from this case.
Nonetheless, there is a line of cases in which the governing body of a municipality contracted with one of its members for the rendition of services for, or the sale of goods to, the municipality. Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759 (189 SE 842) (1937); Montgomery v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534 (134 SE 152) (1926); Mayor &c. of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878). In these cases, it was held that the contract was absolutely void as against public policy, even though the council member with whom the municipality contracted did not vote for the contract, exercise his influence in procuring members of the council to vote for its approval, and although it was free from fraud.
Here, the Atlanta City Council did not contract with one of its members. Rather, the council enacted an ordinance swapping properties with a state executive agency, with the agency using the property thus obtained as rights-of-way for a parkway on which the council president was, but no longer is, a subcontractor. In addition, the city council was under a statutory duty to assist the DOT in procuring the rights-of-way for the parkway. OCGA § 32-3-3 (e). To this extent, the previously cited cases are distinguishable from this case.
These cases do strongly condemn a municipal contract awarded by the municipal council to one of its members. However, all of the cases nonetheless held that the complainants in equity could not have *320those contracts declared void unless they restored the contracting party to the position occupied prior to entry into the contract, where the contracting party had changed his position and expended money in reliance on the contract. It is a combination of this universal principle and the doctrine of laches which, in essence, constitutes the basis for the superior court’s denial of equitable relief here.
Decided April 23, 1985 — Rehearings denied May 9, 1985 and May 10, 1985. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, James P. Googe, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Marion 0. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Charles M. Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Beverly B. Martin, Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellants (case no. 42126). Richard N. Hubert, Orr & Edwards, W. Fred Orr II, for appellees. Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David H. Flint, Lynn C. Stewart, for appellants (case no. 42127). Richard N. Hubert, for appellees. Richard N. Hubert, Orr & Edwards, W. Fred Orr II, Ferguson & Dorn, Sally A. Dorn, for appellants (case no. 42191). Marva Jones Brooks, Kendric E. Smith, Overtis Hicks Coop-wood, for appellees. Alston & Bird, Sidney 0. Smith, Jr., Anne S. Rampacek, Ches*321nut & Livingston, J. David Chesnut, amici curiae.*320The majority holds that since the DOT knew that Arrington was a subcontractor on the parkway project, it was not an innocent party entitled to rely on the apparent validity of the land-transfer ordinance. However, this ordinance, which authorized and accompanied the deed transferring the land to the DOT, expressly stated that Arrington abstained from voting on the ordinance. The majority opines that the Atlanta City Council “is now free to take such action as it sees fit in the future relative to the possible disposition of the lands, subject, of course, to lawful procedures.” Apparently, under the majority’s view, if Arrington had abstained from presiding over the council meeting while the ordinance was under consideration, as well as from voting, the ordinance would be valid. Under the venerable principle that it is presumed that public officials will faithfully discharge their duties in compliance with law, Truluck v. Peeples, 1 Ga. 1 (1846), it would seem that the DOT was not on constructive notice that the council president would fail to perform his duty, which, as held in the majority opinion, was for him to have abstained from presiding over the council meeting as well as from voting.
I therefore respectfully dissent.