(dissenting):
I dissent. The conviction should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the disputed evidence. I believe that the trial court improperly denied appellant’s suppression motion because the State failed to prove either sufficient exigency to justify the warrantless entry of appellant’s residence or the unavailability of a telephone warrant. Unlike the majority, I think the facts as they appear in the officers’ version support this conclusion, and I therefore reject the majority’s assertion that reversal would require adoption of appellant’s interpretation of events.
As the majority points out, the parties in this case failed to analyze the Utah Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In State v. Earl, we stated:
We have not considered separate state constitutional standards, even though we are aware that other states are relying with increasing frequency on an analysis of the provisions of their own constitutions to expand constitutional protection beyond that mandated by the United States Supreme Court_ It is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional questions.
716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986). The parties’ only reference to Utah Constitution article 1, section 14 appears on page six of appellant’s brief where, in a footnote, he quotes the Utah constitutional provision and simply states, without analysis or citation to supporting case law, that the Utah Constitution provides the same protection as the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the parties failed to discuss any separate boundaries for the state constitutional provision, we restrict our analysis to the protections granted under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1087 n. 2 (Utah 1986).
This case, however, presents an example of the need for state constitutional analysis independent of federal constitutional analysis. The cases cited in footnotes one and two of this opinion illustrate the confusion in the federal system on the issue of when the potential destruction of evidence justifies a warrantless search. Had the parties properly briefed the state constitutional question, we might have avoided traveling the tortuous paths paved by the federal courts in this area.
The majority begins its analysis by pointing out that this Court views the trial court’s determination of a search’s validity with a presumption of correctness. While this may accurately define the scope of review, I think the Court should also bear in mind both the well-established principle that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and the policy considerations that have shaped that principle. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, *127088 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 717-18 (Utah 1983); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1983); State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981) (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result). This is not a case requiring a review of the trial court’s determination of the validity of a search based on a warrant, and we should not grant the same degree of deference to the trial court as we would in warrant cases because those searches already have a presumption of validity when they are challenged in the trial court.
The per se unreasonableness of warrant-less searches stems from the preference for prior, neutral review of circumstances justifying an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area in lieu of permitting “the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” to make such a determination. E.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3304, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); see also Harris, 671 P.2d at 180. The plain intent of this requirement is to remove the temptation from police officers to rationalize entry where the circumstances do not objectively justify it. When the search in question involves an intrusion into a person’s private residence, the search warrant requirement becomes especially important because both the United States and Utah constitutions specifically prohibit unreasonable intrusions into a person’s home. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 748, 104 S.Ct. at 2096.
The United States Supreme Court, federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, and this Court have all recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. The courts have held, however, that “only in ‘a few specifically established and well-delineated’ situations ... may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny.” Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). See also Harris, 671 P.2d at 178. One such exception arises where the delay required to obtain a warrant endangers the preservation of the evidence. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. The prosecution bears the burden of proof to show that the circumstances of a particular case justify a warrantless search and seizure. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50, 104 S.Ct. at 2097-98.
The United States Supreme Court has not definitively stated the circumstances under which the federal constitution permits a warrantless search to prevent the potential destruction or removal of evidence,1 and the federal circuit courts have adopted a variety of standards.2 As I view *1271them, the circumstances facing the officers in this case did not permit the warrantless search and seizure under any of the standards.
In this case, the trial judge apparently adopted Officer Brown’s version of what transpired, although he also relied heavily on appellant’s appearance in the window to justify the warrantless search. In his memorandum decision, the trial judge stated that Glaser’s statements alone could not justify the warrantless entry, but that her statements, combined with the officer’s observation of appellant in the window, supported the entry.3
*1272It also appears that the trial judge relied on the totality of the facts known by the officers at the time they entered appellant’s residence in making his determination that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. The majority upholds the trial court’s weighing of all the facts known to the officers at the time of entry and therefore holds that the trial court did not erroneously conclude that sufficient exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry or that the officers created the final exigency on which the trial court relied in making its determination. I would reject this approach and adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974), because it is a more realistic means of reviewing police conduct during war-rantless searches. In Rosselli, the court “appraisefd] the agents’ conduct during the entire period after they had a right to obtain a warrant and not merely from the moment when they knocked at the front door.” Id. at 630.4
The officers in Rosselli followed Allen Anderson and watched him deliver a cardboard box to the defendant’s apartment. They then followed Anderson to another apartment and observed Anderson carry another box into the second apartment. The officers entered the second apartment, arrested all but one of the occupants, and discovered that the cardboard box contained marijuana. After arresting the occupants of the second apartment and finding two more boxes of marijuana in Anderson’s trunk, the officers decided to return to the defendant’s apartment. On the way, Anderson told the officers that the box delivered to the defendant’s apartment also contained marijuana. Instead of obtaining a search warrant, the officers went directly to the defendant’s apartment, knocked on the door, and entered when they heard shuffling noises and a voice say, “Don’t open the door for anybody.”
At the suppression hearing, the government argued that sufficient exigent circumstances supported the warrantless search for two reasons. First, the occupant of the second apartment whom the officers had not arrested could have warned the defendant that the police were on their way. The court dismissed this contention summarily by stating that the police could have easily prevented a warning to the defendant by leaving one of the officers with the unar-rested person.
Second, the government argued that the sounds heard at the door of the defendant’s apartment justified the warrantless entry. The court rejected this argument as well. Although the circumstances viewed at the time of the entry would have likely supported a finding of sufficient exigent circumstances, the court analyzed the existence of exigency in light of the progression of events. The court held that the officers could have avoided the exigency created by their appearance at the defendant’s door by obtaining a search warrant prior to approaching the defendant’s residence, and they could not excuse their failure to do so by unnecessarily alerting the defendant to their presence.5
In this case, the trial judge did not determine when the officers had sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant; however, a justice of the peace could have reasonably determined that the officers had sufficient probable cause for a search warrant when they first observed defendant Ken Cricks leaving the Ashe residence.6
*1273At that time, the officers knew the following: (1) Glaser had arranged to sell a total of four ounces of cocaine to Officer Brown; (2) she had indicated from the beginning of the negotiations that the cocaine was in Park City;7 (3) moments after she agreed to supply Officer Brown with an ounce for testing, surveillance officers, who were also aware of the negotiations with Officer Brown, observed her talking to Ken Cricks; and (4) the surveillance officers then followed Ken Cricks to appellant’s residence. Even though five officers had accompanied Officer Brown to Park City and even though the Chief of Police of Park City had joined them, the officers failed to send someone to obtain a warrant at that time. Instead, the officers waited until after the arrests of Cricks and Glaser to discuss obtaining a warrant and then proceeded to appellant’s residence after deciding that the exigencies of the situation did not permit seeking a warrant. Once there, they saw appellant in the upstairs window of his house, decided that he had become alerted to their presence, and determined that the exigency of the circumstances justified a warrantless entry of the house. As in Ros-selli, the officers’ own conduct in this case created the final exigent circumstance necessary to validate the warrantless search; therefore, they cannot rely on seeing appellant in the window to support their contention that the exigencies of the situation required a warrantless entry. See Rossel-li, 506 F.2d at 630.8
Absent the appearance of appellant in the window, the officers had only Glaser’s statement on which to rely in determining the necessity of a warrantless entry. Glaser, however, made this statement approximately thirty to forty minutes after the officers first saw Cricks leaving appellant’s residence.9
Officer Brown testified that in his experience, it generally took one to two hours to obtain a search warrant; however, he also testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not consider the availability of a telephone search warrant as he was unfamiliar with the process necessary to obtain such a warrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4(2) (1982). The purpose of the telephone warrant is to permit officers to obtain a search *1274warrant in less time than it would have taken to obtain a warrant in person and thereby facilitate the process in situations where time is of the essence.10 Furthermore, the officers failed to consult the Park City Chief of Police about the time necessary to obtain any kind of search warrant in Park City, even though he was present during the discussion of the availability of a warrant.
This case does not involve a situation where someone could have warned Ashe about the impending search. See United States v. Rossetti, 506 F.2d at 630; cf. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir.1973). The officers had taken appellant’s only two confederates into custody.
The majority cites United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.1976), and People v. Williams, 200 Colo. 187, 613 P.2d 879 (1980), as sufficiently factually similar to control this case. In those cases, however, the events leading to the warrantless searches and seizures arose too quickly and unexpectedly for the officers to have prepared for them. In United States v. Delguyd, officers waited for Delguyd at his home. When he arrived, a neighbor signaled to Delguyd, who drove off quickly and led the police on a high-speed chase that ended at the defendant’s residence. Once there, police arrested Delguyd. Police already had information linking the defendant and Delguyd to the same criminal activity, and they observed someone in the defendant’s house watching Delguyd’s arrest. In People v. Williams, the transactions occurred outside the defendant’s residence, where the defendant could view the events as they transpired. Moreover, the officers did not know the location of the residence until they followed the courier there.
Unlike the cases discussed above, the officers in this case had some advance notice of the location of the residence they subsequently searched. No one led them there unexpectedly in a situation that would immediately alert the occupants of the officers’ presence.
Furthermore, we are not bound by the majority’s interpretation of the facts in Delguyd and Williams. Neither of these courts’ rulings is controlling, and the cases have value only for the purpose of comparing different treatments of varying fact situations.
For the reasons stated above, I would hold that the State failed to prove circumstances sufficiently exigent to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness of the warrantless search. I do not suggest that it is clear on the record that the officers had ample time to obtain a search warrant, but rather emphasize that the facts in this case do not support a conclusion that exigency excused the officers’ failure to seek one.
The State also failed to prove the unavailability of a telephone warrant. United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 286, 78 L.Ed.2d 263 (1983); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.1983); and United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139 (D.C.Cir.1981), all hold that in order to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless search the prosecution must prove that the officers could not have obtained a telephone warrant, as authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c)(2), before the evidence could be destroyed. Manfredi, 722 F.2d at 522; Berick, 710 F.2d at 1038; Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 589; McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1147. Although these cases deal with the availability of a federal telephone warrant, where a state statute also authorizes obtaining a state search warrant by telephone, it follows that the prosecution must also show that the officers could not have obtained such a warrant in order to demonstrate sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search. In this case, the prosecution failed to present any evidence about the availability *1275of a telephone warrant. Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden of proof, and the trial court erred in finding that the warrantless search did not violate the fourth amendment.
The courts in all four of the cases cited above found that there was no time for the officers to obtain a warrant by resorting to any procedure; therefore, the courts excused the government’s failure to introduce proof on the unavailability of a telephone warrant. Manfredi, 722 F.2d at 523; Berick, 710 F.2d at 1038-39; Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 589; McEachin, 670 F.2d at 1148. In Cuaron, the court held such a failure excusable where the “critical nature of the circumstances clearly prevented the effective use of any warrant procedure.” 700 F.2d at 589. In McEachin, the court held that the government must introduce proof of the unavailability of a telephone warrant unless “it is clear that the exigency in a ... case is so great that it precluded recourse to any warrant prodedure_” 670 F.2d at 1147.
The majority holds that the circumstances in this case prevented resorting to any warrant procedure; therefore, the State’s failure to prove unavailability of a telephone warrant does not require reversal. The majority bases this determination on the ground that the officers only had a few minutes after the arrest of Cricks and Glaser to get to appellant’s residence and prevent the destruction of evidence. As I have already discussed, I believe the proper starting point for reviewing the events is the time the officers first saw Cricks enter appellant’s house. This occurred thirty to forty minutes prior to Glaser’s arrest. While I agree with the majority that obtaining a telephone warrant requires adherence to several statutory procedures, I also think that the evidence does not clearly establish that the officers could not obtain a warrant before conducting their search. See State v. Lopez, 676 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1984) (after complying with all the statutory prerequisites, police officers obtained
a telephone warrant in twenty-four minutes).11
I also think that the majority’s holding is wrong from a policy standpoint for two reasons. First, not suppressing the evidence in this case will encourage law enforcement officers to wait until the last possible minute to seek a warrant and then excuse their failure to do so when the exigencies that arise during their delay require a warrantless entry. In this case, the officers did not consider obtaining a search warrant until after Glaser’s arrest. They did not alert Park City authorities that they may need a warrant, nor did they attempt to obtain a warrant when they followed Cricks to the Ashe residence, even though, according to their own testimony, they went to Park City to complete the sale of four ounces of cocaine which Glaser had told them was located there. Thus, failure to suppress the evidence in this case rewards the officers for their delay in obtaining a search warrant until the circumstances had evolved to a state of urgency, without ever requiring them to offer an excuse for the delay. I cannot agree with this position.
Second, the failure to suppress the evidence in this case rewards the officers for not seeking a telephone warrant. A telephone warrant balances the interests of prior, neutral authorization for a search and the need to conduct a search quickly in order to prevent destruction or removal of evidence. Two of the officers in this case testified that they did not attempt to obtain a telephone warrant because they did not feel “qualified” to do so, without offering any other excuse for the failure. Because I do not think the facts clearly show that they could not have obtained such a warrant, and because the purpose of telephone warrants is to expedite the warrant process in cases such as this, I would suppress the evidence. Failure to do so encourages continued ignorance of this important process.
In short, I think the majority improperly upholds the trial court’s refusal to sup*1276press the disputed evidence. The officers in this case made no attempt to obtain a search warrant. For the reasons discussed above, I do not think that the circumstances justified this failure.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J.. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court upheld the warrantless taking of a blood sample from a suspect eventually charged with driving under the influence. The Court justified the warrantless seizure of the evidence on the ground that "[t]he officer ... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.’ ” Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835. In Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970), however, the Court distinguished Schmerber on the ground that the evidence in Schmerber was "in the process of destruction," id. at 35, 90 S.Ct. at 1972, thus implying that Schmerber only permitted warrantless searches where the officer knew that the evidence was actually in the process of destruction. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(a), at 655 (2d ed. 1987). The circuit courts, however, have generally rejected the rigid standard implied in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 267-68 (3rd Cir. 1973); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5(b), at 658 (2d ed. 1987); and cases cited in footnote 2.
. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir.1984) ("exigent circumstance doctrine applies only when the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action ”); United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280, 1284 (6th Cir.1984) (warrantless entry justified when the surrounding circumstances would lead a person of reasonable caution to conclude that evidence would probably be found on the premises and that the evidence would probably be destroyed within the time necessary to obtain a search warrant) (citing United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir.1976)); United States *1271v. Harris, 713 F.2d 623, 626 (11th Cir.1983) (where dealers seemed nervous and concerned when an undercover officer asked to leave, a significant possibility existed that the dealers would destroy the cocaine if the undercover officer did not return immediately; therefore, the warrantless search was justified); United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232, 1237 (8th Cir.1983), cert, denied, 468 U.S. 1217, 104 S.Ct. 3587, 82 L.Ed.2d 884 (1984) (the factual circumstances must establish a sufficient basis for an officer to believe someone in the residence will likely destroy the evidence and mere fear or apprehension of destruction does not suffice to justify the search); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir.1983) (exigent circumstances exist where officers have reason to believe evidence may be destroyed before they can obtain a warrant and the court must “evaluate the circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained officers”); United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir.1982) (exigent circumstances exist where police officers who are acting in good faith and on probable cause, reasonably believe, in light of the totality of the circumstances, that evidence or contraband will imminently be destroyed); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1144 (D.C.Cir.1981) (warrantless search justified when, in light of all the circumstances facing the officer, the evidence faced imminent removal or destruction); United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1122-23 (8th Cir.1979) (case disposed of on lack of probable cause grounds; however, the court also stated that exigent circumstances exist where evidence is in imminent danger of destruction or removal and there exists a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant); United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir.1979) (threatened destruction of evidence may give rise to sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a war-rantless search, but an agent cannot justify a warrantless search solely on the basis of knowledge that contraband is on the premises); United States v. Glasby, 576 F.2d 734, 738 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 854, 99 S.Ct. 164, 58 L.Ed. 2d 159 (1978) (pursuant to the facts of the case, agents could reasonably believe that the contraband was in the premises searched and could be destroyed easily, and no evidence existed showing that the agents acted in bad faith); United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 996, 98 S.Ct. 632, 54 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1977) (“[ijmminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property intended to be seized, or the likelihood of it[s] taking place before a warrant can be obtained, may provide an exception" to the warrant requirement); United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir.1976) (circuit court agreed with the ruling below that the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers indicated that efforts to destroy evidence were in progress and likely would be completed absent prompt police action); United States v. Hayes, 518 F.2d 675, 678 (6th Cir.1975) (in order to justify a warrantless entry, the government must present proof that the evidence sought was in danger of destruction or removal, and the possibility of destruction or removal is not enough); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 35 (9th Cir.1974) (threat of imminent removal or destruction of evidence justifies a warrantless search); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir.1974) (government must prove the agents reasonably concluded the evidence would be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a search warrant; government failed to adequately explain why the agents did not even attempt to obtain a search warrant); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 833, 94 S.Ct. 173, 38 L.Ed.2d 68 (1973) (warrant-less entry justified where agents have probable cause to believe contraband is present and, based on the surrounding circumstances, they reasonably conclude the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a warrant); United States v. Brown, 457 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 843, 93 S.Ct. 42, 34 L.Ed.2d 82 (1972) (warrantless search justified where substantial danger existed that evidence might be removed or destroyed); United States v. Pino, 431 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2nd Cir.1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 989, 91 S.Ct. 1675, 29 L.Ed.2d 154 (1971) (under the facts of the case, delay in obtaining a warrant would have greatly increased the likelihood that the evidence would either be destroyed or removed).
. The judge’s order denying the suppression motion does not cite appellant’s appearance in the window as one of the factors supporting the warrantless entry; rather, it relies on Glaser’s statements and the surveillance officer’s observation of Cricks’ entering the house and returning with an ounce of cocaine. The latter factor merely indicates, however, that the house contained the remaining evidence, not that anyone in the house could destroy that evidence. Therefore, the memorandum decision and order, when read together, indicate that the trial judge placed great significance on the officer’s *1272observation of appellant in the window in making his determination that exigent circumstances justified the search.
.I do not assert that the trial judge cannot consider all the facts known at the time of the entry, merely that the judge hearing a suppression motion should look at the progression of the events leading up to the warrantless entry. Nothing in this opinion requires determining when the officers mentally developed the intent to search, ignoring events occurring thereafter. Instead, I would require consideration of the progression of events and their impact.
. This opinion cites Rosselli for the way a trial court should view the events in a suppression motion. That the facts in this case do not mirror those in Rosselli does not make our reliance on the standard of review in that case misplaced.
. The majority states that we would "place an unwieldy burden upon the courts and law en*1273forcement agencies if in order for police officers to subsequently respond to exigent circumstances necessitating a warrantless search, we required them to attempt to procure a search warrant for every place a defendant may lead them while under surveillance.” I would not require such an absurd procedure. Consideration of the events as they progress, in place of looking at the sum of the events known at the time of the warrantless entry, necessitates only reasonable efforts to procure a warrant by police officers.
.The majority argues that the officers had no advance warning of the location of the final sale; therefore, they could not have known that the events would become sufficiently exigent to justify a warrantless search until Glaser told them of the location. The record does indicate that Glaser did not tell Officer Brown that the rest of the deal would take place at the "door of the source” until her arrest; however, Glaser did tell him that the cocaine was in Park City, and the officers’ plan required arresting Glaser and Cricks at the time she returned with the first ounce. They knew that at least one of them would have to return to retrieve the other three ounces. Thus, their lack of knowledge as to the location for completing the sale does not exonerate their failure to secure a search warrant. Because of the way Officer Brown had organized the sale, anyone who might have been in the house would have been alerted that something had gone wrong no matter where the sale would be completed.
. The majority asserts that United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir.1986), limits United States v. Rossetti and makes reliance on Rossetti misplaced because the facts in Altman more closely parallel the facts in this case than do the facts in Rossetti. I disagree. In Altman, unlike this case and Rossetti, the contact directed the police officer to drive to the house of his source before the sale was consummated. The officers then arrested the contact in full view of the occupied house of the source. In this case and in Rossetti, the arrests occurred at a location separate from the residence searched. The critical facts in Rossetti more closely parallel the facts in this case than do the facts in Altman.
. I cite the delay as indicative of the overall police conduct in this case. The officers unjustifiably delayed trying to obtain a warrant until the events had progressed to the point where the circumstances did not permit obtaining one. The transcript of the preliminary hearing shows that the surveillance officers followed Cricks to the Ashe residence the first time more than thirty to forty minutes before arresting Glaser. It also shows that they never attempted to obtain á search warrant during this time.
. The availability of a telephone warrant is discussed more thoroughly in the following section.
. Lopez, of course, does not stand for the proposition that police officers can always obtain a telephone warrant in twenty-four minutes or fewer. I cite the case merely as an illustration that a telephone warrant expedites warrant procedures.