dissenting.
I dissent because the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of Beverly Wright and denying the defendant’s motion to suppress.
In Yancey v. State,9 we reiterated that the party presenting hearsay evidence under the necessity exception must prove that the person who made the out-of-court statement is unavailable to testify at trial, the statement is relevant to a material fact, the statement is more probative on that fact than other available evidence, and the statement shows particular guarantees of trustworthiness. Here, Beverly Wright’s out-of-court statements to co-workers Mahalah Smith, Susie McSpadden, and Regina Whitlow were inadmissible since other more probative evidence was introduced at trial about the defendant’s drug use, the couple’s marital problems, the extramarital affair between the two victims, and the incident when the defendant ran his wife off the road. Mrs. Wright’s statements to Rebecca Parker, whom she had known just a year, should not have been admitted because they lacked trustworthiness. Finally, as Justice Sears points out, Mrs. Wright’s journal entries about her husband’s conduct after he filed for divorce were written to support her position in the divorce action and, therefore, were not made under circumstances demonstrating particular guarantees of trustworthiness.10
I also join Justice Carley’s dissent because the warrantless search of Wright’s automobile violated his Fourth Amendment right *464against unreasonable searches and seizures.11
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears joins in this dissent.
275 Ga. 550 (570 SE2d 269) (2002).
See Slakman v. State, 272 Ga. 662 (533 SE2d 383) (1999); Dix v. State, 267 Ga. 429 (479 SE2d 739) (1997).
See State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179 (576 SE2d 888) (2003).