dissenting.
I dissent to Division 5 of the majority opinion and to the judgment of affirmance. In my opinion, State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 182 (2) (576 SE2d 888) (2003) is not distinguishable. In both Lejeune and the instant case, there was no justification for the impoundment of *465the defendant’s vehicle.
The majority correctly avoids justifying the seizure under the automobile exception or as incident to the arrest. See State v. Lejeune, supra. In the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement, police officers are not authorized to conduct a warrant-less investigatory search under the guise of an inventory search. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 480 (3) (277 SE2d 923) (1981); Gaston v. State, 155 Ga. App. 337, 339 (270 SE2d 877) (1980). See also State v. Evans, 181 Ga. App. 422, 423 (2) (352 SE2d 599) (1986). “[T]he police may not make a pretextual inventory search of an arrestee’s automobile in violation of his constitutionally-protected privacy rights. [Cits.]” Fortson v. State, 262 Ga. 3, 4 (1) (412 SE2d 833) (1992).
“The state may inventory the contents of a car that has been lawfully impounded.” (Emphasis supplied.) Sams v. State, 265 Ga. 534, 535 (3) (459 SE2d 551) (1995). “Justification of an inventory search is thus premised upon the validity of the impoundment. [Cit.]” State v. Lowe, 224 Ga. App. 228, 229 (480 SE2d 611) (1997). The police may not use an impoundment as a medium to search for contraband or other evidence of a crime. State v. Lowe, supra at 229.
Even though the decision to seize and inventory need not be based upon the “absolute necessity” to do so, unless the rationale for an inventory search inheres in the decision to seize and inventory, the impoundment itself may be “unreasonable” and the resulting inventory search invalid. [Cit.]
State v. Thomason, 153 Ga. App. 345, 349 (3) (265 SE2d 312) (1980).
In both this case and Lejeune, “the officer[s] had no authority to impound the [vehicle] because [it] was legally parked and not creating a traffic hazard. [Cit.]” Sams v. State, supra at 535-536 (3). Furthermore, neither Wright nor the majority has presented any other non-investigatory justification for the impoundment of his car. The vehicle was not stopped by police on a highway, but was parked at the residential property of a friend, and there is no evidence that the car was connected to the arrest of Wright, that his ownership was in doubt, that he was consulted regarding alternate disposition of the vehicle, that it had an invalid tag, or that his friend requested its removal. Mitchell v. State, 178 Ga. App. 244, 245-246 (3) (342 SE2d 738) (1986); Strobhert v. State, 165 Ga. App. 515, 516 (301 SE2d 681) (1983); State v. Darabaris, 159 Ga. App. 121 (282 SE2d 744) (1981). See also 2 LaFave, Israel & King, Criminal Procedure § 3.7 (d), p. 214 (2nd ed. 1999). Compare State v. Lowe, supra at 230-231.
The fact that the detention of Wright was expected to last for some time was not a valid reason for impoundment, because there was no evidence that the car was parked at a business or other loca*466tion where it would not be allowed to remain for more than a short time. See State v. Lowe, supra at 231; Fitzgerald v. State, 201 Ga. App. 361, 364 (3) (411 SE2d 102) (1991). Compare Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 379 (1) (254 SE2d 337) (1979); United States v. Gravitt, 484 F2d 375, 380, fn. 5 (5th Cir. 1973). Nor can the impoundment be justified by the possibility that Wright’s friend may tamper with evidence in the car. Such a motive is clearly investigatory in nature. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the majority, Lejeune is not distinguishable on this basis. The appropriate action of the investigating officers, if they believed that they had probable cause to search Wright’s car, would have been to accept the offer of Walker County deputies to secure the vehicle until a search warrant was obtained. Where law enforcement officers conduct a warrantless investigatory search under the guise of an inventory search, “we should ‘refuse to allow such apparent subterfuges to erode the strictures of the fourth amendment.’ [Cit.]” Williams v. State, supra at 480.
Decided March 27, 2003 Reconsideration denied April 11, 2003. Christopher A. Townley, for appellant. Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Ruth M. Pawlak, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.“In short, there was no showing that the impoundment of the car was reasonably necessary. [Cits.]” Mitchell v. State, supra at 246 (3). The trial court should have granted the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless seizure and search of the automobile, and the majority incorrectly affirms the denial of that motion.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Fletcher and Presiding Justice Sears join in this dissent.