dissenting.
The majority opinion declines to expand the continuation exception to the general rule of non-liability of a purchasing corporation for the liabilities of a selling corporation for the reason that the purchas*286ing corporation, while it continued to manufacture and sell a line of products of its predecessor, did not continue the specific product responsible for the alleged injury. I concede there is logic in the majority’s reasoning that the successor corporation is not in a position to improve the quality of a product it does not produce. This overlooks a more fundamental proposition to which I would have this court adhere. The concept of product liability recognizes the need for “. . . the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating them.” Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P2d 722 (1970). “[T]ha enterprise, the going concern, ought to bear the liability for the damages done by its defective products.” It is a “. . . socially necessary cost of doing business.” Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 FSupp. 797 (W.D. Mich.) (1974). Viewed in this light I suggest it is overly restrictive to require the ongoing enterprise to continue to produce the specific product. I would apply the continuation exception to the facts of this case.
Decided April 30, 1985. Ellis, Easterlin & Peagler, Benjamin F. Easterlin IV, for appellant. Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, Thomas S. Chambless, for appellee. Moore, Taylor & Assoc., Billy E. Moore, Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, Gene Mac Winburn, amici curiae.