We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals holding that petitioner Benjamin was properly sentenced to life -without the possibility of parole (LWOP) following an armed robbery conviction. State v. Benjamin, 341 S.C. 160, 533 S.E.2d 606 (Ct.App.2000). We affirm.
FACTS
Benjamin and another individual robbed a Citgo convenience store. In the course of this armed robbery, a Citgo employee was shot and killed. Approximately four hours later, the two men robbed a Dodge’s convenience store at *443gunpoint. The charges arising from the Citgo incident were tried first, and Benjamin was convicted of murder and armed robbery. He received an LWOP sentence for murder and a thirty-year sentence for the armed robbery. See State v. Benjamin, 345 S.C. 470, 549 S.E.2d 258 (2001) (affirming these convictions and sentences). Both murder and armed robbery are defined as “most serious offenses” under the “two strikes” law. S.C.Code Ann. § 17-25-45(0(1) (Supp.2001).
Following the Citgo trial, Benjamin was tried and convicted of armed robbery of the Dodge’s convenience store. South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-25-45(A) (Supp.2001) provides “Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... upon a conviction for a most serious offense as defined by this section, a person must be sentenced to [LWOP] if that person has one or more prior convictions for: (1) a most serious offense.... ”
Benjamin was sentenced to LWOP for the armed robbery of the Dodge’s store over his objection that the legislature did not intend that § 17-25-45(A) apply to convictions arising from a single crime spree. The Court of Appeals affirmed this sentence, and we granted certiorari to review that decision.
ISSUE
Does S.C.Code Ann. § 17-25-45(A) apply so as to require an LWOP sentence for a subsequent conviction where all convictions arise from a single crime spree?
ANALYSIS
Benjamin contends that the legislature did not intend that recidivist statutes such as § 17-25-45 apply to individuals who engage in a single continuous course of criminal conduct. In support of this contention, Benjamin points to an alleged ambiguity in § 17-25-45(F), and to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-25-50 (1985). We find no ambiguity in subsection (F), and find Benjamin’s reliance on § 17-25-50 misplaced.
Section 17-25-45(F) provides:
For the purpose of determining a prior conviction under this section only, a prior conviction shall mean the defendant has been convicted of a most serious offense or a serious *444offense, as may be applicable, on a separate occasion, prior to the instant adjudication.
Benjamin contends this section is ambiguous because it may be read to say either (1) that the commission of the prior most serious offense must have occurred on an earlier, separate occasion, or (2) that the conviction occurred “on a separate occasion,” “prior to the instant adjudication.”
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the language of § 17-25-45(F) is plain and unambiguous. Benjamin’s first reading of the statute is simply unsupported by the statutory language. There is no reference in § 17-25 — 45(F) to the time of the prior offense’s commission; rather, the only temporal reference is to the prior conviction. In clear and unambiguous language, this subsection defines a prior conviction for purposes of § 17-25-45 as a serious or most serious conviction, on a separate occasion, prior to the instant adjudication. E.g., State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991)(when statute’s terms are clear and unambiguous, court must apply .them literally).
At the time of the Dodge’s armed robbery conviction, Benjamin had already been convicted, on a separate occasion, of the most serious offenses of murder and armed robbery that occurred at the Citgo. An LWOP sentence was, therefore, mandated by § 17-25 — 15(A).
Benjamin argues, however, that we must construe § 17-25-45 in light of § 17-25-50, which provides:
In determining the number of offenses for the purpose of imposition of sentence, the court shall treat as one offense any number of offenses which have been committed at times so closely connected in point of time that they may be considered as one offense, notwithstanding under the law they constitute separate and distinct offenses.
Our precedents required us to consider together both original recidivist statutes, § 17-25-50 and the predecessor to § 17-25 — 45, § 17-25-40. See State v. Stewart, 275 S.C. 447, 272 S.E.2d 628 (1980); State v. Muldrow, 259 S.C. 414, 192 S.E.2d 211 (1972). After these cases were decided, the legislature revised the statutory' scheme. These pre-1982 precedents must nevertheless be considered in light of the current statutes.
*445When the General Assembly repealed § 17-25-401 in 1982 and replaced it with § 17-25-45, it fundamentally altered the relationship between the recidivist statutes. The 1982 act explicitly provides “Notwithstanding any other provision of law [certain defendants] shall be sentenced to life in prison.” 1982 Act No. 358, § l.A. This language, specifically barring consideration of any other statute, has been retained in the current version of § 17-25-45. See § 17-25-45(A) and (B) (Supp.2001). That the legislature intends that § 17-25-45 be construed independent of any other statute is reinforced by the introductory language of subsections (E) and (F), both of which begin “For purposes of determining a prior conviction under this section only....” It is no longer necessary or appropriate to harmonize or reconcile § 17-25-45 and § 17-25-50 in light of the General Assembly’s unmistakable instruction that § 17-25-45 be applied without regard to any other provision of law.2
CONCLUSION
Benjamin was properly sentenced, pursuant to § 17-25-45(A), to LWOP for the armed robbery of the Dodge’s convenience store. The decision of the Court of Appeals upholding that sentence is
AFFIRMED.
BURNETT, J., and Acting Justice EDWARD B. COTTINGHAM, concur. WALLER, J., dissenting in a separate opinion in which MOORE, A.C.J., concurs.. 1982 Act No. 358, § 3.
. To the extent the Court of Appeals reaches a different conclusion in State v. Woody, 345 S.C. 34, 545 S.E.2d 521 (Ct.App.2001), that decision is overruled.