dissenting.
As in the majority opinion, this dissent first addresses the question of the timeliness of the request, and then the meaning and intent of the statute.
1. I disagree with the construction of OCGA § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) by the majority which is contrary to the statute’s plain language. It is not at all obvious, as the majority writes, that the ten day period may be reduced if ten days are not available “either because the defendant delays the request, or because indictment or arraignment occurs within ten days of trial.” The statute clearly says that compliance must occur at least ten days prior to trial of the case. The trial judge has discretion in the matter only when written request is made at some time other than arraignment.
I am aware of the potential for abuse that may follow from this reading of the statute. In State v. Meminger, 249 Ga. 561 (292 SE2d 681) (1982), we speculated that the construction I propose could be used by a defendant for purposes of delay when he knew far in *530advance of arraignment that he needed to request discovery. We concluded that such tactics were contrary to the principles of fair and speedy determination of cases. However, neither Meminger nor this case contain facts presenting dilatory tactics on the part of the defendant and the ruling here in anticipation of such delay is as speculative and unnecessary as it was in Meminger. We can decide the question of whether a request was made merely to delay trial when the case comes before us. In the meantime we need not and should not. There is absolutely nothing in the statute to suggest or support the argument that the defendant is to have fewer than ten days to inspect reports requested at arraignment. Only if the written request is made at some time after arraignment and less than ten days before trial does the trial judge have discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable time prior to trial. The construction placed on OCGA § 17-7-211(b) (Code Ann. § 27-1303) by the majority in effect puts all requests, whether or not made at arraignment, within the discretion of the trial judge and erases words written by the legislature. See Tanner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 266 (287 SE2d 268) (1981).
2. The majority opinion not only disregards the clear language of OCGA § 17-7-211(Code Ann. § 27-1303), but it ignores the meaning and intent of the statute as well. The state is now relieved of a responsibility that the legislature plainly intended for it to have — to provide the accused with a copy of any scientific report evidence to be used against him in time to be of benefit in preparing his defense. Hereafter the state need only have its expert appear at trial and announce that his findings were not reduced to written form and that he will testify from memory. It is inconceivable to me that these tests can be performed without producing any written result, whether it be in note form or otherwise. It is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted from which absolutely no notes or records survive. Unless of course the omission was deliberate.
A basic principle of scientific testing is that careful records of test procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained. A scientific test without an accompanying report of the testing environment, number of trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all. The majority opinion condones the performance and use of haphazard, hasty, inaccurate, unreliable and undocumented tests by the state where a man’s liberty is at stake. A plain common sense view of right and wrong dictates an opposite result. Even if the same evidence can be presented either orally or in a written report by the expert, the statute implicitly recognizes the complexity of scientific evidence and helps to moderate the difficulty a defendant without laboratory resources may have in controvert*531ing it.
The purpose of the statute is to give the defendant an opportunity to examine and respond to complicated information dealing with topics not ordinarily encountered or understood by laymen. The opportunity to examine combines two elements: (1) a ten-day period to make a thorough examination and evaluation; and (2) an accessible, tangible form, such as a writing. Without both of these parts the opportunity to examine does not exist.
In the present case no written report was prepared, allegedly because of the rushed trial schedule. But the rights of the defendant should not depend on the state’s hurry to try him. I can only suppose that the trial court felt impelled by the adage that justice delayed is justice denied, as its action can be characterized as nothing less than “expeditious.” It is gratifying to know that one court has its calendar in such good order that it cannot give a defendant the time required by law to prepare his defense. Obviously there is no foot dragging in this circuit. In effect the defendant is told that since there was not time to prepare a report, he is not entitled to the benefits of the statute. This is fundamentally unfair and it was just such antics as this that created a compelling need for the statute in the first place.
Any interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-211 (Code Ann. § 27-1303) which derogates from the defendant’s right to challenge the state’s evidence against him is, in my view, wrong. With this opinion the majority has come down squarely on the side of the prosecution and in effect nullifies OCGA § 17-7-211(c) (Code Ann. § 27-1303) insofar as it gives the defendant access before trial to the results of scientific tests to be used against him by the state. Under the holding in this case, every prosecutor would be within the law to reject written scientific reports and to present such evidence through oral testimony, a problem identified in Tanner v. State, supra at 268. This was not intended by the legislature and to permit the state to avoid the clear duty imposed upon it by this statute is shockingly unjust.