dissenting, with whom BROWN, Chief Justice, joins.
I dissent.
The undisputed facts in this case are that appellant seized two little girls, twelve and fifteen years of age. He raped the fifteen year old. She escaped. Appellant then immediately left the area of his crime, taking the twelve-year-old girl with him. She has never been found. Speculation is that she was murdered. Appellant made a plea bargain in which he obtained a life sentence, thus avoiding the risk of a trial and death penalty. The majority now says that the trial court has no statutory discretion to refuse appointment of an attorney but must appoint an attorney at public expense to provide “thoughtful review” of appellant’s plea bargain. I disagree. Appointment of an attorney is not mandatory in post-conviction relief proceedings. The legislature has said so in clear and unambiguous legislation. The United States Supreme Court has held there is no federal constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed in post-conviction relief.
In Pennsylvania v. Finley, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), the United States Supreme Court stated:
“We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks to their convictions, see Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488, 89 S.Ct. 747, 750, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.
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“Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and *554it is in fact considered to be civil in nature. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-424, 83 S.Ct. 822, 841, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963). It is a collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, cf. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323, 96 S.Ct. 2086, 2090-2091, 48 L.Ed.2d 666 (1976) (plurality opinion), and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well.
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“On the contrary, in this area States have substantial discretion to develop and implement programs to aid prisoners seeking to secure postconviction review.”
Although the majority of this court suggests that denial of counsel for post-conviction relief may pose equal protection and due process constitutional problems, I do not perceive that to be correct. All applicants who bring their second appeal before the court under post-conviction relief are treated the same under the same statute. They have an absolute right to an attorney at public expense for their trial and for their first appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The right to counsel for their second appeal under post-conviction relief depends upon a determination by the trial court that a reasonable person in their circumstance would employ counsel at his own expense to pursue post-conviction relief — hardly a denial of due process or equal protection, and this is especially true when the United States Supreme Court has said there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. The post-conviction relief petition must at least have some semblance of merit and otherwise satisfy the trial court before an attorney should be appointed.
The State of Wyoming, in the existing statutory and public defender scheme, provides at public expense as a matter of right for needy persons an attorney (a) for the preliminary hearing in county court; (b) an attorney for a guilty plea hearing; (c) an attorney for the jury trial in district court, and (d) an attorney for the appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The attorney provided for appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court is to search the record of the trial for constitutional error and other error of law.
Now this court holds that the State must always, in every case, provide an attorney for a post-conviction relief proceeding, as in this case, so that the attorney can again search the same record of the trial for constitutional error. It is even suggested that more than one post-conviction relief proceeding be available, and that for successive post-conviction relief proceedings, counsel must again be provided at public expense to present additional claims such as ineffective assistant of counsel. To most reasonable persons this may seem like an exhaustive, comprehensive, effective, detailed procedure that would assure that there had been a fair and impartial trial, an appeal and thoughtful review guaranteeing all constitutional rights. But it does not end here. The federal court system is still available for more thoughtful review of the trial record and search for error.
The cost and delay now built into the justice system is apparent. At a time when the state is struggling to balance its budget, this decision will add large sums to the cost of government. If the benefits of counsel in post-conviction relief were real, I would feel differently; but it is just another waste of taxpayer money. It ought to be eminently apparent that it is entirely appropriate that the legislature make some provision for refusing appointment of counsel in post-conviction relief cases that are without any merit at all and that present not even a faint hope of success or a possibility of a deprivation of a constitutional right. The legislature has attempted to do exactly this, but this court has a mind set against recognizing any legislation as realistic and sensible as that adopted by the legislature.
The legislative intent that the trial court determine in the first instance whether *555counsel should be appointed or not was clear under the statutes existing at the time this proceeding was commenced. At the time of Long’s petition in this case, the statutes of the state of Wyoming governing appointment of attorneys in post-conviction relief proceedings provided as follows:
a. Section 7-14-104, W.S.1977, in pertinent part:
“If appointment of counsel is so requested, the court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that the petitioner [a needy person] has no means to procure counsel * *
b. Section 7-1-110, W.S.1977, enacted subsequent to § 7-14-104, supra, provides in pertinent part:
“(a) A needy person * * * is entitled:
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“(c)(iii) To be represented in any other post conviction proceeding * * * unless the court * * * determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.” (Emphasis added.)
The court in its opinion holds that § 7-1-110, supra, does not modify § 7-14-104, that § 7-1-110 is ineffective to govern the appointment of counsel, that § 7-1-110 will simply be ignored, and that counsel must always be appointed. That is a patently absurd result. There is no sound legal reasoning nor precedent that supports the result of this case. We must consider §§ 7-14-104 and 7-1-110 in pari materia, Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964). And being cognizant of the fact that § 7-1-110 was enacted subsequent to § 7-14-104 and that it controls, Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 568 P.2d 908 (1977), and that its plain meaning is clear, I would conclude that appellant is entitled to court-appointed counsel for post-conviction relief only if: (1) he is indigent, and (2) if a reasonable person having his own money would use that money to pursue relief at his own expense as the statute provides.
If anyone doubted that the intent of the legislature was that the district court determine whether counsel should be appointed to represent the petitioner for post-conviction relief, that intent was made even more clear by the revision and reenactment of § 7-14-104 by the 1987 legislature as follows:
“If requested in the petition, the court, subject to the provisions of W.S. 7-6-101 through 7-6-114, shall appoint the public defender to represent a petitioner who is determined to be a needy person as defined by W.S. 7-6-102(a)(iv).” (Emphasis added.)
Section 7 — 6—104(c)(iii) then provides that a needy person is entitled to be represented unless the court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.
The court now suggests that § 7 — 6—104(c)(iii), will not be recognized by the court because a determination of who is a reasonable person for whom counsel should be appointed by the district court is “doomed to futility.” The basis, for that statement, according to the court, is that “[w]e do not perceive a way that a trial judge can introspectively but objectively develop adequate information about what 'a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing’ ” to do in any given instance. Consequently, the “standard for the determination is entirely subjective” says the court. I strongly disagree. This statute does not impose upon the trial court anything that is any more difficult than the myriad of other rulings and decisions addressed to a trial court’s discretion. Simplistically stated, in determining whether counsel should be appointed, the court should consider the length of the applicant’s sentence, the time already served, the situation of his confinement, i.e. whether trustee or otherwise, the time left to be served, the probability of early release or probation, and the merits of the application for post-conviction relief. I do not see these considerations as very subjective. Upon these objective facts the court must make a determination as to whether counsel should be appointed. It is much the *556same as a medical doctor who finds a bone fracture from objective facts such as observation and x-ray and then must determine whether the fracture should be treated by open or closed reduction or cast or splinted. These are some judgment calls to be made, as with the district court judge. In post-conviction relief, if the applicant requests appointment of counsel, it is his duty to furnish to the court information in affidavit form sufficient for the court to ascertain whether appointment of counsel in his proceeding is appropriate and necessary under the statute.
Giving effect to the legislative enactment, by permitting the court to determine when appointment of counsel should be made in post-conviction relief proceedings, will benefit the citizens of this state, acknowledge and give force and effect to all statutes governing post-conviction relief, and result in a considerable saving of judicial resources and expense to the citizens of the state of Wyoming. The trial court will be able to identify meritless claims in post-conviction proceedings for which appointment of an attorney at public expense is not justified.
The reasonable person identified in § 7-1-110, supra, is a person in the same or similar circumstances as appellant with sufficient funds of his own with which to employ an attorney. Thus, for example, if the cost of an attorney were $5,000, and appellant had $5,000 that he could use for his own enjoyment, pleasure, and necessities, would he, in a case without merit or chance of success, expend it for an attorney’s fee? He would probably not just give away his nest egg for nothing. I would assume that even in prison there are some benefits to having money. A reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances might conclude that he had not been deprived of a constitutional right that could be considered in post-conviction relief, that his claim was without merit, and would not expend his own funds to employ an attorney. The trial court could properly refuse appointed counsel for appellant in this situation.
I would require the trial courts, pursuant to the statutes in effect, to consider the showing made by a person claiming indi-gency and to ascertain in the exercise of its discretion under all the facts and circumstances of the case and the petition for post-conviction relief, whether requested counsel should be appointed.
In this case I would reverse and remand to the district court to develop facts and evidence sufficient to determine whether counsel should be appointed in this post-conviction relief proceeding.