I concur in the judgment ordering disbarment but dissent with respect to the standard of review.
My conclusion that petitioner should be disbarred rests primarily upon the fact that he has suffered two prior impositions of discipline. Standards recently promulgated by the State Bar prescribe disbarment in such circumstances, unless “the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Standards for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct (eff. Jan. 1, 1986) std. 1.7(b).)1 This court has deemed that sanction applicable even where, as here, the decision of the hearing panel predated the new standards. (Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 550-551 [237 Cal.Rptr. 168, 736 P.2d 754]; see also Guzzetta v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 962, 967-968 [239 Cal.Rptr. 675, 741 P.2d 172].)
For me, the dispositive question is whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances presented in connection with the present misconduct to warrant an exception to the severe penalty that should otherwise apply. In answering this question in the negative I accord greater weight than does the majority to the factual findings of the State Bar hearing panel; that is, I do not find it necessary to “resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the attorney.” (Maj. opn., p. 183.) As a result, I do not find this case as close as the majority makes it appear.
Tn my view, the standard of judicial review traditionally applied in bar disciplinary cases is untenable as a matter of law and obsolete as a matter of *200social policy. I write separately to explain why and to identify what I believe is the more appropriate standard.
1.
The standard of review ordinarily employed to evaluate State Bar findings comes dangerously close to a contradiction. On the one hand, because the hearing panel has a “greater opportunity to observe and judge the credibility of the witnesses” (Tomlinson v. State Bar (1975) 13 Cal.3d 567, 578 [119 Cal.Rptr. 335, 531 P.2d 1119]), the court regularly reiterates, as it does in this case, that it accords great weight to the panel’s findings. (Bach v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848, 855 [239 Cal.Rptr. 302, 740 P.2d 414]; Franklin v. State Bar (1986) 41 Cal.3d 700, 708 [224 Cal.Rptr. 738, 715 P.2d 699]; Alberton v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 1, 12 [206 Cal.Rptr. 373, 686 P.2d 1177]; Warner v. State Bar (1983) 34 Cal.3d 36, 43 [192 Cal.Rptr. 244, 664 P.2d 148]; Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 916 [180 Cal.Rptr. 831, 640 P.2d 1106].) The court just as frequently points out, however, as it also does in this case, that “we must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the attorney.” (Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 689 [238 Cal.Rptr. 774, 739 P.2d 134]; Chefsky v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 116, 121 [202 Cal.Rptr. 349, 680 P.2d 82]; Vaughn v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 847, 852 [100 Cal.Rptr. 713, 494 P.2d 1257].)
It is, of course, difficult to think that a finding relied upon to support a disbarment recommendation is genuinely accorded “great weight” if “all intendments should be in favor of innocence, and that where two or more equally reasonable inferences may be drawn from a fact shown, that inference leading to a conclusion of innocence should be accepted rather than one leading to a conclusion of guilt.”2 (In re Bar Association of San Francisco (1921) 185 Cal. 621, 624 [198 P. 7].) Because the standard of review does not make sense, it invites rather than inhibits de novo judicial consideration of the evidence.3
*2012.
The principle that in a disbarment proceeding this court should resolve such doubts as the evidence may reasonably permit in favor of the accused attorney has been applied on the theory “that a disbarment proceeding is ^Mtim-criminal in character.” (Furman v. State Bar (1938) 12 Cal.2d 212, 229 [83 P.2d 12]; In re McCowan (1917) 177 Cal. 93, 105 [170 P. 1101]; see also Frazer v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 564, 567 [238 Cal.Rptr. 54, 737 P.2d 1338].) This idea traces back to the early opinion in Matter of Haymond (1898) 121 Cal. 385 [53 P. 899], in which the court’s decision not to disbar rested on the assumption, unsupported by statutory or decisional authority, that an accusation against an attorney “is in the nature of a criminal charge, and all intendments are in favor of the accused.” (Id., at p. 388; see also In re Luce, McDonald, & Torrance (1890) 83 Cal. 303, 306 [23 P. 350] [because disbarment proceeding “is quasi criminal in its nature,” accused attorneys “are entitled to the benefit ... of the presumption . . . of good character”].) The principle thereby created appears to have developed out of the fact that disbarment deprives the attorney of important “personal and property rights.”4 (Disbarment of Houghton (1885) 67 Cal. 511, 517 [8 P. 52]; In re Stephens (1890) 84 Cal. 77, 81 [24 P. 46]; In re Bar Association of San Francisco, supra, 185 Cal. 621, 623.)
It is important to understand that during the 19 th century, when the principle in question was conceived, the State Bar did not exist and the Supreme Court did not review the determination or recommendation of another body reached after the elaborate sort of administrative hearings with which we are now familiar. Instead, the court was obliged to react ab initio to an “accusation” that could be filed by anyone, including a disgruntled former client (see, e.g., In re Burris (1894) 101 Cal. 624 [36 P. 101]), a legal adversary (see, e.g., In re Tyler (1886) 71 Cal. 353 [12 P. 89]), or even an angry court. (In re Philbrook (1895) 105 Cal. 471 [38 P. 511, 38 P. 884].) The evidence in support of the “charges” was presented either to a referee designated by the court (In re Cobb (1890) 84 Cal. 550 [24 P. 293]; In re Lowenthal (1884) 2 Cal. Unrep. 300 [3 P. 657]) or at a “trial” conducted by the court itself. (In re Cowdery (1886) 69 Cal. 32, 34 [10 P. 47]; see also, In re Stephens (1888) 77 Cal. 357 [19 P. 646], overruling demurrer and requiring attorney to file answer.)
*202In light of this rudimentary disciplinary process, in which the Supreme Court essentially functioned as a trial court, it is easy to understand why it was originally thought appropriate to resolve evidentiary doubts in favor of the accused attorney. But it is not easy to understand why this principle, survives today, a half century after creation of the State Bar, considering the extraordinary protections attorneys receive during the administrative phases of the contemporary disciplinary process,5 and considering the wholly different role of this court in that process.
The confusion that results from the continuing vitality of the principle that “[a]ll reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the attorney” (Frazer v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 564, 569), which is often mistakenly thought to refer to the State Bar’s burden of proof,6 has long been evident. (See, e.g., Rosenthal v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 612, 634; In re Vaughn (1922) 189 Cal. 491, 495-496 [209 P. 353, 24 A.L.R. 858]; Fish v. The State Bar (1931) 214 Cal. 215, 222 [4 P.2d 937].) Nonetheless, the so-called “intendment” of innocence fashioned nearly a century ago and never reexamined continues to resound within the case law. (See, e.g., Galardi v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 683, 689; Chefsky v. State Bar, supra, 36 Cal.3d 116, 121; Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 847, 852.)
The notion that bar disciplinary proceedings are “criminal” or “quasi-criminal” in character is impossible to reconcile with the modem view, repeatedly endorsed by this court, that the objective of such proceedings “is not to impose punishment upon members of the profession” but “to ensure that the public, the courts, and the profession are protected against unsuitable legal practitioners. [Citations.]” (In re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal.3d 562, 570 [99 Cal.Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97].) As the court often notes, “[proceedings before the State Bar are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in character, and the ordinary criminal procedural safeguards do not apply. [Citations.]” (Yokozeki v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 436, 447 [113 Cal.Rptr. 602, 521 P.2d 858], italics added; see also Comment (1921) 9 Cal.L.Rev. 484; McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1977) 19 Cal.3d Spec. Trib. Supp. 1, 9 [138 Cal.Rptr. 459, 564 P.2d 1].)
*203The analogy to criminal proceedings and the resolution of reasonable doubts in favor of the attorney in the course of judicial review is also inconsistent with Business and Professions Code section 6083, subdivision (c), originally enacted in 1927 as part of the State Bar Act (Stats. 1927, ch. 34, § 26, p. 41), which provides that upon review of any decision of the State Bar recommending disbarment or suspension from practice “the burden is upon the petitioner to show wherein the decision or action is erroneous or unlawful.” This statutory presumption is rendered meaningless, and the standard of review essentially left undefined, by perpetuation of the enigmatic proposition that, notwithstanding the burden the statute places on the petitioning attorney, in weighing the evidence “[a]ll reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of the accused . . . .” (Himmel v. State Bar (1971) 4 Cal.3d 786, 793-794 [94 Cal.Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993].)
Furthermore, because the resolution of reasonable doubts in favor of the attorney subjects State Bar findings and disciplinary recommendations to a higher level of scrutiny than that specified by the Legislature, the practice cannot be squared with statements of this court that disbarment proceedings are “ ‘ “governed exclusively by the Code sections specifically covering them.”’” (Fish v. The State Bar, supra, 214 Cal. 215, 222; In re Vaughn, supra, 189 Cal. 491, 496; Matter of Danford (1910) 157 Cal. 425, 430 [108 P. 322].) Although this court has on a few occasions applied the statutory presumption undiminished by the judicially created “intendment” of innocence (see, e.g., Aydelotte v. State Bar of California (1930) 209 Cal. 737, 740 [290 P. 41]), it ordinarily refuses to be constrained by the scope of review prescribed by the Legislature.
3.
The unusual power of self-regulation conferred upon the legal profession7 does not appear to have been exercised in a notably vigorous manner. Indeed, disbarment is proposed and occurs more rarely than many informed observers believe warranted.8 Thus attorneys do not as a practical matter reguire the added judicial protection they receive.
*204Nor can such special treatment be justified by the important function lawyers perform in our society. On the contrary, as this court once pointed out, “[t]he adequate protection of public interests, as well as inherent and inseparable peculiarities pertaining to the practice of law, require a more detailed supervision by the state over the conduct of this profession than in the case of almost any other profession or business. ” (In re Galusha (1921) 184 Cal. 697, 698 [195 P. 406], italics added.) Subjecting findings of the State Bar adverse to an attorney to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than applies to corresponding findings of other licensing bodies makes it harder than it should be for the State Bar to discharge the responsibility imposed upon it by the Legislature and by this court.
Acknowledging that the disciplinary system has been unduly indulgent and that punishment has been imposed erratically, the State Bar has recently endeavored to fashion penalties that are “stem, fair, fit the offense, and are uniform where they ought to be.” (Heilbron, Solving the Discipline Problem (1986) 6 Cal. Law. 53.) In promulgating the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct adopted in 1985, which were designed “to achieve greater consistency in disciplinary sanction for similar offenses” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, supra, Introd.), the Board of Governors of the State Bar expressed its concern that uniform disciplinary standards are not ascertainable from the decisions of this court “and that a wide variety of disciplinary sanctions have been imposed for a given offense.” (Ibid.) Witkin supports this view, pointing out that “[t]he decisions reveal little pattern in the discipline imposed for serious acts of moral turpitude.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, Attorneys, § 515, p. 557.) Although many judicial decisions “apply the general rule that, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, the appropriate penalty for serious offenses is disbarment” (Id., § 516, pp. 557-558), “a greater number . . . imposed no greater penalty than suspension for acts involving moral turpitude.” (Id., § 517, p. 559.)
The inconsistency in the case law is at least in part the result of the confusing standard of review that has been applied. Given the inherent *205subjectivity of the ethical concepts involved in most disciplinary determinations (see Konigsberg v. State Bar (1957) 353 U.S. 252, 263 [1 L.Ed.2d 810, 819, 77 S.Ct. 722]), some inconsistency is inevitable and perhaps just. But the failure to coherently define the scope of review—which permits the court to give short shrift to State Bar findings and to undertake unfettered de novo consideration “on a case-by-case basis” (Schneider v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 784, 798 [239 Cal.Rptr. 111, 739 P.2d 1279])—has led to discrepancies that are unreasonable, unnecessary and unjust. Such wholly discretionary adjudication calls to mind the image, conjured by Roscoe Pound, of the “oriental cadi administering justice at the city gate by the light of nature tempered by the state of his digestion for the time being.” (Pound, The Decadence of Equity (1905) 5 Colum.L.Rev. 20, 21.) This approach may have its virtues, but principled and predictable decision-making is not among them.
4.
If a disbarment proceeding can be deemed “quasi-cúminal” because an adverse decision operates to deprive the accused attorney of important vested rights (In re Bar Association of San Francisco, supra, 185 Cal. 621, 623), then the same characterization should apply to any administrative proceeding that could result in revocation of a license legally required in order to ply a trade or profession. Yet among the scores of professionals and tradespersons licensed by this state, only attorneys enjoy the benefit of a judicially developed “intendment” in favor of innocence when called upon to defend conduct found by the licensing body to have been unethical. There is no satisfactory rationale for this distinction.
For purposes of judicial review, a disbarment recommendation of the State Bar seems to me materially indistinguishable from any administrative decision revoking a professional license.9 Because such decisions substantially affect vested, fundamental rights, California trial courts not only examine the administrative record for errors of law but, like this court in State Bar *206disciplinary matters, exercise their independent judgment upon the evidence. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242].) As stated in Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848], “the court to which the application for mandate is made to secure the restoration of a professional license must exercise an independent judgment on the facts. . . . [I]n weighing the evidence the courts can and should be assisted by the findings of the board. The findings of the board come before the court with a strong presumption of their correctness, and the burden rests on the complaining party to convince the court that the board’s decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence.”10 (Id., at p. 85.) This presumption of correctness, which is the functional equivalent of that statutorily accorded State Bar disciplinary recommendations (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083, subd. (c)), and which is inconsistent with judicial preference for inferences that lead to innocence over those that lead to guilt, should be applied in cases such as the one before us. As I have earlier suggested, there is no reason the evidence relied upon to justify disbarment should be viewed with a more jaundiced judicial eye than that relied upon to justify revocation of the license of any other licensed professional.11 If protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession is genuinely the chief consideration, then the benefit of such doubt as a reviewing court may entertain should be given to the finding of misconduct, not the attorney who is its subject.
*207With respect to the instant case, it seems to me entirely reasonable and proper to disbar an unrepentant attorney, twice previously disciplined (once for conviction of a criminal offense involving an element of fraud), who conmits new acts of misconduct unabated by compelling mitigating circumstances, as called for by the new State Bar standards. As the bar leaders who promulgated those standards were doubtless aware, “[ejxpressions of derision and distrust of lawyers are too prevalent to be disregarded by the members of the legal profession, and it is only through the action of the organized bar that the high standards lawyers are entitled to can be maintained.” (In re Goldstein (1952) 411 Ill. 360, 367 [104 N.E.2d 227, 230].) This court should not interfere in the effort to maintain such high standards absent stronger reason than is presented by this case.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied January 28, 1988, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Kaufman, J., did not participate therein.
Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
Standard 1.7(b) provides that “If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined in Standard 1.2(f), the degree of discipline in the current proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.”
Ordinarily, under what has been referred to as “the rule of conflicting inferences” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 288, p. 300), the inference that should be favored is that which supports the judgment. (See, e.g., Hamilton v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1939) 12 Cal.2d 598, 602-603 [86 P.2d 829] [“The fact that some inference other than that which has been drawn by a jury may appear to an appellate tribunal to be the more reasonable, affords no sufficient reason for disturbing the inference in question”]; Mah See v. North American Acc. Ins. Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 421, 426 [213 P. 42, 26 A.L.R. 123]; McIntyre v. Doe & Roe (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 285, 287 [270 P.2d 21].)
In this connection, the findings of the hearing panel as to the facts must be distinguished from the recommendation of the review department regarding the degree of discipline. The “great weight” accorded the recommendation, unlike that accorded the findings, is not diminished by the need to resolve any doubts in favor of the accused attorney. The significance of this distinction is dubious, however, because judicial deference to the recommended disci*201pline usually depends on the weight, if any, actually accorded the State Bar’s factual determinations.
Although the principle was originally applied only in the context of disbarment, it gradually came to be employed in cases in which the proposed discipline was much less severe. (See, e.g., Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d 847 [public reproval recommended]; Ashe v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 123 [77 Cal.Rptr. 233, 453 P.2d 737] [six months suspension recommended]; Hildebrand v. State Bar (1941) 18 Cal.2d 816 [117 P.2d 860] [six months suspension recommended].)
The most recent description of this elaborate process is set forth in Fellmeth, Initial Report to the Assembly and Senate Judiciary Committees and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court: A Report on the Performance of the Disciplinary System of the California State Bar (June 1, 1987) pages. 7-20 (hereinafter the Fellmeth Report).
This court periodically finds it necessary to remind attorneys petitioning for relief that, because the purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish, such proceedings “are not governed by a reasonable doubt standard of proof as in criminal trials.” (Arden v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 725 [239 Cal.Rptr. 68, 739 P.2d 1236]; Rosenthal v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 612, 634 [238 Cal.Rptr. 377, 738 P.2d 723]; Ring v. The State Bar (1933) 218 Cal. 747, 750 [24 P.2d 821].) Of course, as I shall suggest, the same rationale compels rejection of the principle that conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the evidence should be resolved by this court in favor of innocence and against the State Bar.
Lawyers are the only state licensees whose professional association is given constitutional status (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 9) and empowered not only to formulate the rules of professional conduct (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6076, 6076.5) but also to control the administrative process by which those rules are enforced. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6077, 6078.)
“Except in the most egregious cases, the bar has always been disinclined to cast out a colleague for abuses within a lawyer-client relationship. Every major analysis of the disciplinary structures has found them grossly insensitive both to serious professional misconduct and to garden variety problems of delay, neglect, incompetence and overcharging. Surveys of bar procedures in major states reveal that some 90% of complaints are dismissed without investigation, and national statistics reflect that of grievances falling within disciplinary jurisdiction, less than 3% result in public sanctions and only .8% in disbarment. Even repeated instances *204of neglect, misrepresentation, and incompetence will rarely provoke license revocation.” (Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 491, 547-548, fns. omitted; see also, Report of A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970); Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar? (1981) 69 Geo. L.J. 705; Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 919.) Available statistics indicate that bar discipline has been imposed no more strictly in California than it has been elsewhere. (See, e.g., Fellmeth Report, supra, at pp. 143, 144; [“Adjudicated disbarments were 22 in 1986. There were 20 in 1981. [There are states where the per capita disbarment rate is ten times these levels.]”]; Egelko, State Bar Discipline Under Fire (1986) 6 Cal.Law., 55, 59.)
Because members of the bar are officers of the court, and due to the constitutional separation of powers, the courts have an inherent regulatory power over the legal profession that they do not possess over other professions. (Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 443 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507].) Nonetheless, “the power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions upon the practice of the law has been recognized in this state almost from the inception of statehood.” (Ibid.) As stated in Ex Parte Yale (1864) 24 Cal. 241, 244: “The manner, terms, and conditions of their admission to practice, and of their continuing in practice, as well as their powers, duties and privileges, are proper subjects of legislative control to the same extent and subject to the same limitations as in the case of any other profession or business that is created or regulated by statute.” See also In re Galusha, supra, 184 Cal. 697, 698, where the court suggests that the legal profession warrants closer legislative supervision than others.
“A decision which is contrary to the weight of the evidence is one which is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The purpose for which a court normally weighs the evidence is to determine which way it preponderates on a given issue. Evidence Code section 115 provides in percent part: ‘Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.’ Thus, an unexplained statement that a reviewing court shall weigh the evidence is a statement that it shall determine whether the evidence preponderates in favor of, or against, the administrative decision under review.” (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 368-369 [138 Cal.Rptr. 155]; see also People v. Miller (1916) 171 Cal. 649, 652 [154 P. 468] [“ ‘preponderance of the evidence’ . . . means what it says, viz., that the evidence on one side outweighs, preponderates over, is more than, the evidence on the other side, not necessarily in number of witnesses or quantity, but in its effect on those to whom it is addressed”].)
Whether an administrative decision is supported by or is contrary to the weight of the evidence can be, and indeed ordinarily is, decided by a reviewing court without resolving against the administrative agency conflicting inferences that could both reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
It is true that attorneys can obtain review of an adverse decision from only one court, whereas other licensees can obtain it at multiple levels. On the other hand, attorneys probably have greater protections during the administrative process and, in any event, are the only licensees possessing a right to Supreme Court review. Moreover, if the right to review by only one court were thought a sufficient reason to give attorneys the benefit of an evidentiary doubt enjoyed by no other licensees, the better alternative would be to permit lower court review of bar discipline. See Fellmeth Report, supra, at pages 138-139; see also Comment, Attorney Discipline and the California Supreme Court: Transfer of Direct Review to the Courts of Appeal (1984), 72 Cal.L.Rev. 252.