dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because, as I would interpret the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the marital status of the juvenile has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Section 43-247(3)(b) grants the juvenile court jurisdiction over any “juvenile” that is habitually truant from school. Section 43-247 also provides that “the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over any individual adjudged to be within the provisions of this section shall continue until the individual reaches the age of majority or the court otherwise discharges the individual from its jurisdiction.” For the purpose of the juvenile code, § 43-245(1) defines the age of majority as 19 years of age and § 43-245(4) defines “[j]uvenile” as “any person under the age of eighteen.” In my view, these definitions are in no way ambiguous or subject to interpretation, and in my view, these definitions control the meaning of “juvenile” for the purpose of the juvenile code.
In my view, § 43-2101 and several other statutes which specifically provide that minors do or do not reach the age of majority upon marriage for various specific purposes do not throw light upon the meaning of the juvenile code. I think § 43-2101 deals only with the right to contract. In fact, the provision now found at § 43-2101 was found in chapter 38 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes as late as 1984. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 38-101 (Reissue 1984). Traditionally, chapter 38 dealt with the guardianship of minors. See id.
I also point out that the majority’s interpretation of the juvenile code will place this state in a minority position, if not in a unique position. See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 2d 336 et seq. (1950). A review of the cases cited in that annotation shows that while the terms of the various states’ statutes vary, the legal traditions concerning minority and its termination are quite similar to those of this state, and all but one state have concluded that the jurisdiction of the *837juvenile court is not affected by marital status. The one case holding that marriage ends minority for the purpose of a juvenile commitment was State v. De Marco, 20 Ala. App. 52, 100 So. 574 (1924). Perhaps that case is distinguishable from the case at hand because the commitment order in De Marco committed the juvenile to a training school during her minority. That case does not purport to interpret the meaning of a juvenile code, but merely applies the meaning of minority to a court order. I would therefore affirm the juvenile courts in both cases.