concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the holding of the majority expressed in its Division 1, that we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, I reach this conclusion by an entirely different route and thus set forth my views as to the reasoning which should be applied. Also, because Lawler v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 265 (276 SE2d 646), may be distinguished on the facts, I would hold that this appeal presents no opportunity for our reconsideration and the overruling of that decision, and I, therefore, must respectfully dissent.
1. As the majority explicitly acknowledged, there is no final judgment in the case sub judice within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) (formerly Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) (1) (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; 1975, pp. 757, 758; 1979, pp. 619, 620)). In the case sub judice there is no application for appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (formerly Code Ann. § 6-701.1 (Ga. L. 1979, pp. 619, 620)), nor has a *711timely appeal been taken from an order granting summary judgment on any issue (the trial court’s order of July 15, 1982, purported to grant plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment to plaintiff). See OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (formerly Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238; 1975, pp. 757, 759)) and OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) (Code Ann. § 6-701 (b)), supra.
We have held literally hundreds of times, that under these circumstances (i.e., where the action remains pending in the trial court and none of the exceptions to the requirement of finality are applicable) an appeal is premature and beyond our jurisdiction. See annotations to former Code Ann. § 6-701, supra, under the catchwords “Premature appeal.”
At this place, it is appropriate to digress to address the peculiar facts of the case sub judice. Prior to the trial court’s order, dated July 15, 1982, two motions submitted by plaintiff were pending.
On May 12, 1982, plaintiff had filed his “Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Answer and Grant Judgment to Plaintiff.” Cited in support of this motion was former Code Ann. § 81A-155 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 659; 1967, pp. 226, 238) (now OCGA § 9-11-55, effective November 1,1982) dealing with default judgments. Although spartan in its simplicity this was apparently a motion for default judgment. On June 14, 1982, plaintiff filed his motion for partial summary judgment. It is in this context that on July 15, 1982, the trial court entered its order which denied defendants’ motion to open default and which appeared to grant plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. On July 23, 1982, defendants filed their motion for reconsideration referring to the trial court’s order of July 15, 1982, as the grant of plaintiffs “motion to dismiss the answers of the defendant^] and grant judgment to the plaintiff.”
On July 26, 1982, plaintiff filed his “Notice of Taking Post Judgment Deposition and to Produce Documents,” to which defendants responded with a “Motion for Protective Order.”
The trial court in its October 22, 1982, order denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration and also denied defendants’ motion for protective order. The syllabus of events stated in this order of the court contains a paragraph in regard to the July 15, 1982, order which may be reasonably interpreted as indicating (perhaps in the nature of a nunc pro tunc order) that the July 15, 1982, order was intended to be the grant of plaintiffs “motion as one to dismiss the answers of the defendants and grant judgment to the Plaintiff’ rather than a grant of partial summary judgment. In any case, neither the July 15, 1982, order of the trial court, nor the October 22, 1982, order may be interpreted as an appealable judgment as neither is certain and definite as to its amount. See Hutcheson v. Hutcheson, 197 Ga. 603, *712604 (30 SE2d 107).
2. The foregoing factual preface clearly shows that the case sub judice is not an appropriate context within which to reconsider our decision in Lawler v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 156 Ga. App. 265, supra. The Lawler case deals with an appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration in a case where thejudgment is final and the cause no longer pending in the trial court. In contrast, the appeal in the case sub judice is premature, and we cannot reach the issues presented in Lawler without disregarding our lack of jurisdiction to consider the appeal in the case sub judice. I note that all of the decisions relied upon by the majority in Division 1 may likewise be distinguished. Compare the recent dismissal in Atlantic-Canadian Corp. v. Hammer, Siler, George Assoc., 167 Ga. App. 257 (306 SE2d 22).
3. Additionally, I decline to join in the majority’s Divisions 2 and 3. This court being without jurisdiction, it is not necessary that we address matters beyond our jurisdiction.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.