dissenting.
I would hold that the Commission’s findings of fact, which are supported by competent evidence, are sufficient to support its conclusion of law that plaintiff did not sustain a compensable injury because there were no “unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.” I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal where supported by “. . . ‘any competent evidence.’ ” Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation omitted), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). “Thus, on appeal, this Court ‘does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court’s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Even where the record contains competent evidence to the contrary, we must defer to the findings of the Commission where supported by any competent evidence at all. Larramore v. Richardson Sports Ltd. Partners, 141 N.C. App. 250, 259, 540 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2000), affirmed, 353 N.C. 520, 546 S.E.2d 87 (2001).
The majority opinion singles out one sentence contained in finding of fact number seven, which sets forth a variety of findings, including that plaintiff was engaged in his normal activities when the injury occurred; that “[although the mailbag may have been heavier than he anticipated, plaintiff never knew the weight of any mailbag until he lifted the bag”; that plaintiff’s job “typically required him to handle mailbags of various unknown weights”; and that the mailbags *126“often varied in weight and were heavier or lighter than anticipated.” Noting that plaintiff never testified in the exact words that mailbags were often heavier than “anticipated,” the majority concludes that the Commission’s findings of fact are unsupported and the order must be reversed.
Although plaintiff may not have specifically stated that the mailbags were often heavier or lighter than “anticipated,” the evidence as a whole clearly supports the Commission’s findings that plaintiff’s job required him to lift weights of up to 400 pounds; that plaintiff never knew prior to lifting mailbags how much they weighed; that it was not unusual for mailbags to be extremely heavy and that plaintiff would be unaware of the heavy weight of the bags until he lifted them; and that plaintiff was engaged in his normal duties and using his normal motions when injured.
Although plaintiff testified that he could “guess” at a bag’s weight prior to picking it up by looking at its size (plaintiff testified that for example, he could tell the difference in weight between an envelope as compared to a bag or an individual person’s luggage), he also testified that he never reads the weight labels for any bags prior to picking them up, and that he does not know how much the bags weigh prior to picking them up. Moreover, both plaintiff and his supervisor, Mr. Drda, testified it was not unusual for the post office to exceed its weight restrictions with mailbags, and that the bags would often be heavier than they should be. Mr. Drda also testified that they received and moved bags of developed film “on a regular basis,” and that the only thing he recalled as being unusual about 17 July 1996 was that plaintiff had complained about pain in his shoulder — not that there was anything unusual about the mailbag which plaintiff handled.
The preceding evidence constitutes competent evidence which supports the Commission’s findings, which in turn support its conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain a compensable injury. I believe the majority has overly focused on a single sentence contained within a finding of fact to the exclusion of all other findings which are supported by competent evidence and which in and of themselves support the Commission’s conclusion that plaintiff was not injured as a result of any unusual condition. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.