Kay v. Kay

CROCKETT, Justice

(concurring specially) :

I concur in the decision, but desire to add these comments: It seems plain enough that it can be accepted as a fact that the main purpose of Myrtle Kay taking out and paying premiums on this insurance policy was that she would thus become an “insured motorist” instead of an “uninsured motorist.” The difficulty here confronted has arisen because of the apparent conflict between two provisions of the policy: on the one hand, the extension of coverage to occupants of the automobile injured by an “uninsured motorist;” and on the other, the exclusion of members of the family.

It has been determined that the plaintiff was a member of the family.1 Therefore the family exception would seem to clearly exclude him from coverage. However, he argues, not without considerable plausibility, that because he was so excluded the effect is that, as to him, his mother was an “uninsured motorist.”

The problem to be confronted and resolved here is: which of the two provisions stated above should be given priority. In order to determine that question it is *98proper to look at the entire contract;2 and where provisions appear to be overlapping or in conflict, to give them weight and priority in accordance with the main thrust and purpose of the contract; and this sometimes involves consideration of public policy.

We should proceed upon the assumption, as noted above, that the main purpose of the taking out and issuance of the policy was that Myrtle Kay would be an “insured motorist;” and that she in fact had in force a policy in conformity with law.3 The exclusion as to coverage of members of the family is an essential and well justified exclusion, for reasons stated in the main opinion. As compared to this: the coverage for injury caused by an “uninsured motorist” is a comparatively recent innovation in insurance and in law, and its general purpose was to extend insurance to take care of injuries resulting from accidents with other cars/’where there was no insurance coverage. If the plaintiff’s contention were accepted, it would result in this extension of coverage defeating the primary purpose of the policy which was to make his mother Myrtle Kay an “insured motorist,” and would render meaningless the reasonable and justified exception as to “members of the family.”

Consistent with what has just been said, and further persuasive of our conclusion, is the fact that the policy also provides that:

The term “uninsured automobile” shall not include:

An automobile defined herein as an “insured automobile.”

In this regard it is noted that the automobile driven by the insured, Myrtle Kay, was the automobile described as the insured automobile in the policy.

It is my judgment that when the entire picture is analyzed in the light of what has been said in the main opinion, and in this supplement thereto, it cannot reasonably be concluded from the insurance contract that the “uninsured motorist” extended coverage was intended to defeat the main purpose of the policy: that of making the primary insured, Myrtle Kay, an “insured motorist,” nor of obviating the express exclusion as to members of the family.

. Footnote 1, main opinion.

. Seal v. Tayco, 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P.2d 503; Davenport v. Dickenson, 211 Kan. 306, 507 P.2d 301; Kasten v. Rod Enterprises, 268 Md. 318, 301 A.2d 12.

. The generality is sometimes stated that if the company denies liability the motorist is “uninsured.” See e. g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 208 Va. 467, 158 S.E.2d 750. However, this is subject to exceptions, which I regard the fact situation in this case as being one, particularly so because there was in force a policy conformable to law. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kellam, 207 Va. 736, 152 S.E.2d 287; and McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 16 App.Div.2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909; Couch on Insurance 2d Sec. 45:634.