concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in part II of the majority opinion to the extent that the proper forum is a quasi-judicial and not a legislative hearing. I respectfully dissent from the remainder of part II and part III of the majority opinion. I would hold that petitioner complied with the requirements in the Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations and is entitled to approval of its subdivision plat.
Compliance with the requirements of the ordinance and regulations ensures that each application for approval of a subdivision plat will be considered on its own merits, and not granted or denied based on improper or irrelevant factors. See Clark v. City of Asheboro, 136 N.C. App. 114, 119, 524 S.E.2d 46, 50 (1999). It also provides predictability of future use, as well as the approval process. Id.
An applicant seeking approval for a subdivision plat who produces competent, material, and substantial evidence of compliance with the requirements of the ordinance and regulations, establishes a prima facie case of entitlement to approval. Id. at 119-20, 524 S.E.2d at 50 (citing Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 299 N.C. 620, 625, 265 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1980)); Triple E Assocs. v. Town of Matthews, 105 N.C. App. 354, 358-59, 413 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1992). The disapproval of the plat must “be based upon findings contra which are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence appearing in the record.” Id. (citations omitted).
I concur with the majority that the Brevard City Council’s (“Council”) decision to disapprove the preliminary subdivision plat was a quasi-judicial action. However, the unique requirement of a *11public hearing for subdivision plat approval does not relieve the Council of its legal obligation to approve the plat if the requirements of the Ordinance and Subdivision Regulations are met.
I. Standard of Review
The proper standard of review of a decision by a city council acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in the context of conditional use permits was announced by our Supreme Court in Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Commissioners, supra. The Court held that the task of the reviewing court includes:
(1) Reviewing the record for errors in law,
(2) Insuring that procedures specified by law in both statute and ordinance are followed,
(3) Insuring that appropriate due process rights of a petitioner are protected including the right to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and inspect documents,
(4) Insuring that decisions of town boards are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record, and
(5) Insuring that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 626, 265 S.E.2d at 383.
In reviewing the sufficiency and competency of the evidence, this Court determines “not whether the evidence before the superior court supported that court’s order[,] but whether the evidence before the Town Council supported the Council’s action.” Ghidorzi Constr., Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 80 N.C. App. 438, 440, 342 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1986). The evidence before the Council supported the approval of the preliminary subdivision plat for Laurel Village.
The proper standard for judicial review “depends upon the particular issues presented on appeal.” Amanini v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 674, 443 S.E.2d 114, 118 (1994). Reviewing courts conduct a “de novo” review when a party alleges an error of law in the Council’s determination and use a “whole record test” when sufficiency of the evidence is challenged or when a decision is alleged to have been arbitrary or capricious. See In re Willis, 129 N.C. App. 499, 501, 500 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1998).
*12II. Fair-t,rial Standards
The majority opinion avoids addressing the complex merits of petitioner’s appeal, and seeks to remand to the Council for a new hearing “in accordance with fair-trial standards” and findings of fact with “sufficient specificity to inform the parties, as well as the court, what induced its decision.” I would hold that the public hearing before the Council was not procedurally flawed and that remand for a new hearing is unnecessary. See Howard v. City of Kinston, - N.C. App. -, -, 558 S.E.2d 221, 226 (2002).
Petitioner in this case does not contend that it was denied the procedural guarantees required in a quasi-judicial hearing. Both the petitioner and the opposition were represented by counsel at all hearings before the Council. Both sides made statements to the Council in explanation for their proposition of approval or denial and rebuttal of statements or information given by the other side or witnesses.
The Council received: (1) the staff reports concerning traffic information and density; (2) a petition signed by neighboring residents opposed to the development; (3) letters from concerned citizens and heard unsworn statements from six concerned citizens, for and against the development, at the 17 April 2000 public hearing; and (4) additional letters from concerned citizens and heard unsworn statements from twenty concerned citizens, for and against the development, at the 1 May 2000 public hearing.
Neither petitioner nor the opposition made a request that those concerned citizens be sworn, that they have the right to cross-examine the witnesses, or that they have the right to present evidence in rebuttal. The right to insist that the witnesses be under oath, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence in rebuttal are waivable and are not crucial for proper review by this Court. See Howard, supra; Craver v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Winston-Salem, 267 N.C. 40, 42, 147 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1966); Burton v. New Hanover County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 49 N.C. App. 439, 442, 271 S.E.2d 550, 552 (1980).
III. Findings of Fact
After receiving, hearing, and reviewing all of the evidence, the Council entered specific findings of fact in support of its conclusion to disapprove the plat. The Council denied approval of the plat for three primary reasons: (1) section 90 of the Subdivision Regulations, *13(2) section 703.1 of the Zoning Ordinance, and (3) confusion over which plat was being considered.
The superior court made an additional finding for denial: the requirements of the City’s Land Use Plan. Respondent’s letter to petitioner, dated 13 July 2000, does not recite noncompliance with the Land Use Plan as a basis for the disapproval. “[A] reviewing court, in dealing with the determination . . . which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.” Godfrey v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union County, 317 N.C. 51, 64, 344 S.E.2d 272, 279-80 (1986) (citations omitted). It was error for the superior court to substitute this reason and rely on it in affirming the decision of the Council. See Ballenger Paving Co. v. North Carolina State Highway Comm’n, 258 N.C. 691, 695, 129 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1963) (review pursuant to writ of certiorari of an administrative decision is for error of law only and the superior court judge may not make additional findings).
I disagree with the majority’s opinion that the Council failed to make “sufficient” findings of fact and merely expressed “concerns.” The fact that the Council expressed “concerns” regarding traffic issues and density does not negate the fact that the Council made specific findings of fact. The record reflects that the “findings contra” to approval were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.
IV. Competent. Material, and Substantial Evidence
In its petition for judicial review, petitioner argued that the decision of the Council was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, and was affected by errors of law. Therefore, we apply a de novo review as to errors in law and the whole record test as to whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, or was arbitrary and capricious. See Willis, 129 N.C. App. at 501, 500 S.E.2d at 725.
A. Subdivision Regulations
In disapproving the preliminary plat, the Council relied on section 90 of the Subdivision Regulations, stating that:
Section 90 of the Code provides that the Council may consider a higher standard than those included in the Code, if the Code minimum standards do not reasonably protect or provide for the pub-*14lie health safety or welfare. Council considered the public health, safety and welfare in making their decision.
The Council cited public health, safety, and welfare concerns with respect to the width and layout of Outland Avenue, the public access adjoining the proposed development, and, particularly, an increase in traffic.
There is no evidence in the record to support the disapproval of the plat on the basis of public health, safety, and welfare pursuant to section 90 of the Subdivision Regulations. The information furnished by the Brevard Police Department was before the Council as part of a staff report by the Planning Director, and indicated that the traffic count for Outland Avenue was 290 vehicle trips, within a twenty-four hour period, and that zero to one accident occurred on Outland Avenue between 1995 and 1999. Reuben Moore, Division Engineer with the North Carolina Department of Transportation, informed the Planning Director that the proposed development would average two daily trips per unit. Travis Marshall, Transportation Engineer with the North Carolina Department of Transportation, informed the Planning Director that the proposed development would average four daily trips per unit. Respondent argues and the superior court found that the proposed development would increase traffic by thirty-nine percent. The percentage of traffic increase standing alone without additional evidence of the impact of that increase is irrelevant. Additionally, Reuben Moore stated to the Planning Director that the impact on traffic from the proposed development would be “imperceptible.” There was no other evidence before the Council to contradict this opinion. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support this finding by the Council or superior court.
B. Zoning Ordinance
The Council also cited section 703.1 of the Zoning Ordinance as a reason for disapproving the preliminary plat, stating that:
Section 703.1 of the Code speaks to density, and requires that two-family dwellings be “unconcentrated.” Council was concerned that the proposed subdivision plat violates this section by concentrating the number of two-family dwellings in one small area.
The Council raised a concern as to the meaning of “unconcentrated” as stated in the “Purpose” section and the specific minimum lot requirement of 10,000 square feet stated in section 703.51 of the *15Zoning Ordinance. The general rule is that a zoning ordinance, being in derogation of common law property rights, should be construed in favor of the free use of property. See Yancey v. Heafner, 268 N.C. 263, 266, 150 S.E.2d 440, 443 (1966); City of Sanford v. Dandy Signs, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 568, 569, 303 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1983). This construction is particularly required where petitioner’s proposed use is an expressly permitted use of right under the Zoning Ordinance.
The parcel of land upon which petitioner proposes to develop Laurel Village is zoned R-2 Residential. Duplex dwellings are expressly permitted uses of right under section 703.2 of the Zoning Ordinance. The purpose for R-2 zoning is stated in section 703.1:
Purpose. This district is established to protect areas in which the principal use of the land is for medium density single and uncon-centrated two-family dwellings and for related recreational, religious, and educational facilities normally required to provide for an orderly and attractive residential area.
The minimum lot areas for R-2 zoning are defined in section 703.51. Subsection 703.5112 states that the minimum lot area for a duplex is “10,000 square feet.”
Respondent argues that “unconcentrated” in the “Purpose” section is an additional requirement to the “minimum lot area” of 10,000 square feet. I disagree. In statutory construction, the sections of the Zoning Ordinance are read in para materia, and not in isolation of one another.
This Court held in C. C. & J. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Asheville, 132 N.C. App. 550, 554, 512 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1999), that “a generalized statement of intent of the specifications that follow” cannot be used as a basis to reject a permit that meets all the requirements. The purpose of the R-2 district is “to protect areas in which the principal use of the land is for medium density single and uncon-centrated two-family dwellings. . . .” Article IV of the Zoning Ordinance specifically defines density as “[t]he number of dwelling units per acre [of] land developed or used for residential purposes. Unless otherwise clearly stated, density requirements in this ordinance are expressed in dwelling units per net acre . . . (emphasis supplied). Section 703.5112 specifically states the “minimum lot area” required to meet the purpose of “unconcentrated” two-family dwellings. In light of the definition of density and section 703.5112 of the Zoning Ordinance, I conclude that the statement of purpose in *16section 703.1 is “only a generalized statement of intent of the specifications that follow.”
Respondent argues that in the case of statutory construction, the word “unconcentrated” must be given its ordinary meaning — “not clustered or gathered together closely.” The superior court found that, using the ordinary meaning of “unconcentrated,” fifteen duplexes on sixteen lots is not “unconcentrated.” There is no evidence to support this finding by the Council and superior court. “Unconcentrated” is a general term set out in the “Purpose” section and, when read in para materia, is specifically defined in section 703.51 and subsection 703.5112 of the Zoning Ordinance.
“[W]here a zoning ordinance specifies standards to apply in determining whether to grant a special use permit and the applicant fully complies with the specified standards, a denial of the permit is arbitrary as a matter of law.” Woodhouse v. Board of Comm’rs of Nags Head, 299 N.C. 211, 219, 261 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1980) (citation omitted). Here, petitioner fully complied with the standards specified in the Subdivision Regulations and Zoning Ordinance. Both the City Manager and the City Attorney advised the Council that the preliminary plat was in full compliance.
Statements by the Council members that “It bothers me to see things like that [children riding their bicycles, skating down the street, playing ball in that street, balls rolling down the street]” or “I’ve known a number of these people in [the adjoining neighborhood] ... in my conscience I just cannot vote for this project,” opine about possible and subjective effects of the proposed development and are not adequate grounds for disapproval of the preliminary plat. See id. at 220, 261 S.E.2d at 888 (speculatory or mere opinion testimony about the possible effects of a permit are insufficient to support the Council’s findings); Triple E, 105 N.C. App. at 359, 413 S.E.2d at 308 (“The Town Board may not create new requirements not outlined in the ordinance to deny the permit.”).
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen of Chapel Hill, 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974), dealt with a special use permit which has additional requirements not present in this case of subdivision plat approval. In the present case, petitioner made a prima facie showing of compliance with the Subdivision Regulations and Zoning Ordinance. No evidence appears in the record to support the findings for denial of petitioner’s preliminary plat. I conclude that the Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying petitioner’s *17preliminary plat. Woodhouse, 299 N.C. at 219, 261 S.E.2d at 887 (if no competent, material evidence appears to support findings for denial, the reviewing body must grant the special use permit when the applicant fully complies with the specified standards and failure to do so is arbitrary as a matter of law).
V. Conclusion
I would reverse the decision of the superior court, affirming the disapproval by the Council and remand, not for a new hearing, but for entry of an order directing the Council to approve petitioner’s subdivision plat.