{dissenting). Appellants and appellee agree upon the following statement of facts:
“On April 13, 1950, the plaintiff, employed as a boilermaker at a weekly wage of $100, lost bis bal*172•anee -while working on a scaffold, fell, and suffered multiple injuries, including a skull fracture and compression fracture of the dorsal vertebra.
“Initial medical care was rendered by Carl List, M.D., at Grand Rapids, Michigan, with follow-up care given by Drs. Leavitt and Klemperer of Seattle, Washington, where the plaintiff moved to shortly after his accident. At the time of hearing, Mr. Liesinger was still under medical observation, seeing the doctor once or twice a year.
“While the injuries were serious, no conclusively presumed schedule loss, under the Michigan compensation law as then written, was involved.
“During the 500-week period, subsequent to date of injury, the plaintiff was paid compensation benefits pursuant to section 9, part 2, of the Michigan compensation act during periods of total disability and pursuant to section 10, part 2, when his wage at newly found employment in Seattle was less than his wage at time of injury.
“On July 8,1959, Mr. Liesinger secured permanent and skilled employment at the Pacific Car & Foundry Company, Seattle, Washington, at a wage of $120 per week and has been steadily employed since that time.
“An application for hearing and adjustment of claim was filed on April 11, 1960, seeking additional benefits on the premise that the plaintiff had suffered the industrial loss of use of both legs.
“Following a hearing before the workmen’s compensation department, an award was entered on June 2, 1962, granting plaintiff 750 weeks of compensation benefits pursuant to section 10, part 2, of the Michigan workmen’s compensation law, as amended. This award was affirmed by the workmen’s compensation appeal board on June 24, 1963 and in addition the order directed that supplemental benefits be paid the plaintiff from the second injury fund.
*173“Prom the award of the workmen’s compensation appeal board, the defendants filed application for leave to appeal which was granted by this Court on December 5, 1963.”
The main question appellants present in this appeal is whether the workmen’s compensation appeal board failed to follow this Court’s decision in Verberg v. Simplicity Pattern Company, 357 Mich 636, as is evidenced by the paragraphs in appellants’ brief entitled “conclusion.” The paragraphs read:
“The legislature enacted an amendment to the workmen’s compensation act in 1956 which added to the categories of those to be entitled, as a matter of law, to total and permanent disability benefits, persons who are found to have suffered the industrial loss of use of arms or legs on a total and permanent basis.
“Defendants-appellants believe the appeal board erred in applying this classification retroactively and, indeed, is precluded from doing so by this Court’s holding in Verberg, supra.”
A similar question was presented to this Court at the April 1965 Term (Docket No. 9) in Clark v. Chrysler Corporation, 377 Mich 140. In that case we held that Verberg did not apply; that the legislative amendment of 1956 adding to the categories of those entitled as a matter of law to total and permanent disability benefits should be applied retro-' actively, and that appellant should receive total and permanent benefits accordingly from the second injury fund.
■ Appellants in the instant case, however, raise an additional question not presented in the appeal of Clark v. Chrysler Corporation, appellants herein claiming:
*174“'The plaintiff, injured April 13, 1950, is not entitled to indemnity benefits pursuant to section 9 or section 10, part 2, of the workmen’s compensation act, subsequent to the expiration of 500 weeks from date of injury, where he returns to and remains at gainful employment and establishes a wage-earning capacity well in excess of his wage at time of injury.”
The record definitely establishes that both of plaintiff’s legs are permanently and totally disabled. The fact that through his will power and initiative he has found another job requiring only the use of his hands, was commented upon by the appeal board as follows:
“It appears that for some time the plaintiff has by the use of initiative and acquired talents found employment, the performance of which can be satisfied by the use of his hands in so long as he is favored with the privilege of sitting down most of the working day. The defendant raises the question as to whether there should be an offset because of his present earnings. The foregoing contention could be of merit if the plaintiff’s total and permanent disability was only a question of fact rather than being predicated upon Ms meeting the statutory definition of having suffered the loss of industrial use of both legs.”
In Shumate v. American Stamping Company, 357 Mich 689, we held:
“An employee was entitled to an award for the specific loss of a hand less credit for prior payments, where the workmen’s compensation appeal board found that his left hand had been rendered industrially useless by the injury received while at work in that its function was limited to that of an unsatisfactory pushing or pulling instrumentality, notwithstanding he was eventually able to work at same right-handed, job as press operator he had when injured.” (Syllabus 2)
*175In situations such as we are faced with in this appeal, we interpret the workmen’s compensation act that once a finding of permanent disability is established an employee is entitled to the full 750 weeks of compensation from the date of the injury regardless of the income he can earn despite the injury.
In proposing to affirm the appeal board’s opinion and order that plaintiff is entitled to the payment of differential benefits from the second injury fund, we repeat what we stated in Clark v. Chrysler Corporation, supra (p 156):
“ ‘By PA 1956, No 195, the legislature enlarged the definition of total and permanent disability to include loss of industrial use, as well as loss by amputation. The same amendatory act provided that persons who had these injuries before the amendatory act, and on or after June 25,1955, should be entitled to differential benefits in amounts of compensation and in the number of weeks of compensation. We believe the legislative plan was to give the enlarged benefits to those who prior to the amendatory act did not qualify as totally and permanent [ly] disabled, and that these enlarged benefits should come from the second injury fund. The coupling of these two changes in the same amendatory act compels the conclusion.’ ”
The order of the workmen’s compensation appeal board should be affirmed, with costs to appellee.
Dethmers and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.