(concurring in result):
In a case of this kind, oftentimes confusion arises as to the Court’s appropriate role. It is not the Court’s prerogative to give effect to our individual views on obscenity and pornography. Rather, it is incumbent upon us to determine what the Constitution allows.
I concur in the holding of constitutionality of the ordinance and that such is the only issue before the Court, despite the fact there is serious question as to defendant’s standing before this Court. The concurring opinion of Justice Crockett' aptly observes the defendant’s lack of standing to assail the vagueness of the ordinance in light of his conviction of showing clearly obscene, pornographic material and I only wish to cite State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970) which supports the principle that even if a statute may be unconstitutional as applied to certain individuals or situations it will not be stricken down at the behest of one who is not adversely affected by the defect.
Irrespective of the foregoing, assuming defendant has proper standing to attack the ordinance, every presumption must be indulged in favor of constitutionality of the act and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its validity.1
Defendant’s primary claim is that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and that it fails to adhere to the standards set forth in Miller v. California2 which are as follows:
*1302The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Defendant was convicted of violating Sec. 32-1-10(3) of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, which declares it unlawful to wilfully or knowingly to show a movie which “depicts or represents or describes obscene sexual conduct, an obscene performance or obscene sado-masochistic abuse or any obscenities for advertising purposes.” Section 32-2-10.1 of said ordinance defines the terminology set forth therein and Section 32-2-10.1(14) provides:
(14) Obscene shall mean an act, depiction, representation, description, performance, or any other item, material or conduct in this chapter described, whether actual or simulated in form, which:
(a) Taken as a whole, the average person would find appeals to the prurient interest when applying contemporary community standards; and
(b) Depicts, describes or portrays sexual conduct, as defined in subparagraph (12) above, in a patently offensive way; and
(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Defendant maintains the definitions are so broad as to render protected activity criminal. The difficulty with that position is that proper construction of such provisions requires that they be considered as a whole.3
When so viewed, the general thrust of the ordinance becomes readily apparent which is to prohibit the dissemination of “obscene” material and the limiting language, follows nearly verbatim the language of Miller, supra note 2. The definitive language necessarily must be read into all parts of the ordinance where the word “obscene” is used, and in doing so it adequately limits its application so as to meet constitutional safeguards.4
Defendant makes other constitutional challenges which should be met. His assertion that freedom of expression should be absolute was very adequately covered by Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion and indeed it must be subject to reasonable limitation; his assertion of violation of right of privacy fails by virtue of the fact that the movie was shown as a commercial venture which is clearly outside the scope of those truly private activities that warrant protection,5 his assertion of violation of equal protection also fails since there is clearly a reasonable basis for treating law enforcement or educational institutions with bona fide pursuits and intentions differently than profit-making commercial ventures with unlawful pursuits and intentions. Such a classification is rationally related to a legitimate state and public interest and sustainable;6 and finally, his assertion of a denial of trial by an impartial jury is clearly not reviewable here under case law7 and the Utah Constitution,8 because the district court is the court of last *1303resort on such appeals and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction.9
. State v. Packer, 77 Utah 500, 297 P. 1013 (1931); Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939 (1943).
. 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973).
. Buhler v. Stone, Utah, 533 P.2d 292 (1975).
. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).
. U. S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 28 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973).
. State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976).
. State v. Robinson, 23 Utah 2d 78, 457 P.2d 969 (1969) and the numerous cases cited therein, followed recently by Vernal City v. Critton, Utah, 565 P.2d 408 (1977); Salt Lake City v. Perkins, 122 Utah 43, 245 P.2d 1176 (1952).
. Article VIII, Section 9 providing for appeal from justice court to district court all decisions *1303to be final, except cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.
. State v. Brown, 75 Utah 37, 282 P. 785 (1928); Salt Lake City v. Lee, 49 Utah 197, 161 P. 926 (1916).