concurring.
1. The majority has set out accurately the present state of the law of Georgia relative to the admissibility of evidence of specific acts of violence towards others. Bennett v. State, 254 Ga. 162, 164 (326 SE2d 438) (1985) (such evidence is inadmissible to prove the character of the victim for violence).4
*6082. I concur specially inasmuch as I believe that this principle needs to be re-examined in the light of the relevance of such evidence.5
3. (a) In Milton v. State, supra, note 1, 245 Ga. at 22, we stated:
The reputation or character for violence of a victim of homicide usually is irrelevant and inadmissible in a murder trial because it is just as unlawful to murder a violent person as it is to murder a nonviolent person.
That principle, in vacuo, is sound. There is, of course, no exception in the murder statute that would excuse the slaying of persons of bad character. As to relevance, the character of a victim who is robbed and killed by a total stranger has no possible bearing in a prosecution where the defense is alibi.
(b) In differing circumstances, however, evidence of the violent nature of a victim can be critically important to the discovery of truth. Consider these examples:
(i) The town ruffian, in a drunken and enraged state, advances upon a peaceable householder and threatens him with mayhem. The householder shoots him dead, even though no other weapon was in sight, and the erstwhile assailant was several yards distant from the householder. Where the defense is justification under OCGA § 16-3-21, what a defendant “reasonably believes” may be viewed by the factfinder in the light of what the defendant knew as to the dece*609dent’s character for violence. Logically, that knowledge is relevant, whether it was obtained by the defendant’s painful personal experience at the hands of the decedent; by his observation of violent acts committed by the decedent upon another; by hearing of other specific acts of violence by decedent that were not committed in his presence; or by knowledge of the decedent’s reputation for violence, unconnected to any specific act.
(ii) As a second example, the same ruffian approaches a stranger, and is killed by him. There are no eyewitnesses to the homicide. The defendant relates that the decedent advanced upon him in a drunken and enraged state, threatening him with mayhem. The decedent had no weapon. At trial, the defendant, who had no knowledge of the decedent before the killing, offers evidence of his violent nature, through specific acts of violence against third persons.
Here the principal question is the credibility of the defendant. Did it happen the way he related it? And why would the decedent make an unprovoked advance upon the defendant?
(c) In aid of this inquiry, evidence of the violent acts of the decedent would be of great relevance. That is no novel proposition, as in Milton, supra, we stated:
Since specific acts of defendants may be introduced against defendants, this court should anticipate that other defendants reasonably will insist that they be permitted to prove specific acts of the deceased toward them. [Emphasis in text.] [245 Ga. at p. 25.]
As noted, however, in the past we have restricted evidence of specific acts of violence to those committed by the victim against the defendant. Yet, logic dictates no such distinction. Rather, the chain of reason proceeds as follows:
A claims justification in that B committed acts of violence against A.
A proves that B has committed prior acts of violence.
B’s prior violent acts are relevant to the question of whether A’s account of violent acts by B against A is true.
It is the act of violence that is relevant, and not the identity of the victim. That relevance is found in this summary of human experience:
“It is more probable that a person will act in accordance with his character (disposition) than that he will act contrary to *610it.” Green, Georgia Law of Evidence, § 65, p. 160. [Henderson v. State, supra, note 1, 234 Ga. at 830.]
Thus, a decedent’s violent acts against a third party can be as relevant as his violent acts against a defendant in weighing the truth of a defendant’s claim of justification.
(d) In Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465, 484 (1855), Chief Justice Lumpkin wrote:
This Court stands pledged by its past history, for the abolition, to the extent of its power, of all exclusionary rules, which shut out facts from the Jury which may serve, directly or remotely, to reflect light upon the transaction upon which they are called upon to pass.
4. The rule reflected in Bennett v. State (supra, Division 1) ought to be changed to permit evidence of specific acts of violence against third persons in cases where a defendant claims justification.
I am authorized to state that Justice Bell and Justice Hunt join in this concurrence.
Accord Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837, 838-839 (310 SE2d 506) (1984); Golden v. State, *608250 Ga. 428 (297 SE2d 479) (1982); Music v. State, 244 Ga. 832 (262 SE2d 128) (1979).
Some of the reasons for this rule were stated in Henderson v. State, [234 Ga. 827 (218 SE2d 612) (1975)], at p. 829, as follows:
“(1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury.” [Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20, 22-3 (262 SE2d 789) (1980).]
Note, however, that precisely the same factors would militate against admission of evidence of similar crimes on the part of an accused, which is admissible to show “identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct.” Wallace v. State, 246 Ga. 738, 739 (273 SE2d 143) (1980). Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 requires notice to the defendant of the prosecutor’s intent to introduce evidence of similar crimes. Compare Rule 31.4, requiring of a defendant the filing of a “Notice of Intent of Defense to Raise Issue of Insanity, Mental Illness or Mental Competency.”
In this case, Lolley’s proffer of the earlier fight between Taylor and Taylor’s brother would have shown that Taylor initiated the fight with his brother, who was wielding a car jack as a weapon, and that Taylor continued the fight even though he sustained a severe head wound. Lolley maintains that this evidence was offered to prove Taylor’s nature for violence, and his capacity and determination to continue in violent combat although he was severely wounded. That evidence, he insists, is relevant in that it buttresses his own account of Taylor’s acts of violence against him at the time of the homicide.