dissenting.
The defendant’s argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to offer evidence that the victim had earlier fought with the victim’s brother over a woman with whom they were both involved. This evidence would have shown that the victim instigated a fight with his brother using a car jack as a weapon, and that the victim continued to fight with his brother even after he had sustained a severe head wound. The defendant maintains that this evidence was not offered to prove the character of the victim for violence, and therefore does not fall within the rule that evidence of specific acts of violence perpetrated by the victim toward third parties is not admissible to prove the victim’s character for violence. Harrison v. State, 251 Ga. 837 (310 SE2d 506) (1984). Rather, he argues that this evidence was offered for the limited purpose of proving a similar transaction between the victim and a third party.
The peculiar, but not unique, circumstance of this case which causes me to reach the conclusion that the evidence of the prior similar transaction is admissible here begins with a consideration of relevance.
Its relevance goes to the issue of the veracity of the exculpating portions of the defendant’s statement. Here, as in most instances of murder where there were but two eyewitnesses (one, the deceased and the other, the defendant), the veracity of the defendant is critical to the fact-finding process. At first blush, one might suppose that a defendant in these circumstances has an advantage because the only *611other eyewitness cannot testify, permitting the defendant to mold the “facts” at will. But experience suggests that fact-finders may tend to compensate (perhaps over-compensate) for this perceived advantage, by a skeptical approach to the defendant’s veracity.
Decided November 9, 1989 Reconsideration denied November 30, 1989. Gary C. McCorvey, N. Glenn Perry, for appellant. David E. Perry, District Attorney, Ronald M. Adams, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, C. A. Benjamin Woolf, for appellee.Let us suppose the case of an innocent defendant who honestly acted in self-defense, and killed to avoid being killed or seriously injured. His proof comes only from his own words, suspect though they are.
Proof that the victim was involved in another similar and violent transaction tends to support the defendant’s contention that killing the victim was necessary to save his own life or prevent his serious bodily injury.
Here the circumstances were similar to the two transactions. There was a fight instigated by the victim over a woman in both instances. In the earlier situation the victim continued to fight even after suffering a severe head wound.
The evidence is relevant and that together with the policy reasons discussed make it admissible. Further, it tends to balance the right of the state to offer evidence of similar crimes against a defendant to prove intent, motive, scheme, or bent of mind.
I would overrule prior decisions inconsistent with this analysis. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Clarke joins in this dissent.