CONCURRING OPINION OF
LEVINSON, J.I concur with the majority’s disposition of this case, but I feel that the issues raised by the appellant merit a more detailed discussion. I think that we should establish more discernible guidelines for the future.
I agree with the majority’s characterization of the facts, as far as it goes. Clarification is necessitated, however. The testimony which the arresting officer gave concerning the accuracy of the speedometer, i.e., that it had been tested and that the speedometer was accurate to a certain degree, was obtained from his reading of the contents of a calibration *471card. The card was neither authenticated nor offered into evidence. This additional fact must be recognized for a proper determination of the appellant’s contention that the state failed to establish a prima facie case.
The appellant’s first contention is that the accuracy of a speedometer must be established before readings taken from it may be offered in evidence, and that the admission of Officer Broom’s testimony concerning these readings was error. In my view the accuracy of standard automobile speedometers is a matter of common knowledge and in speeding violations, or other cases where speed is at issue, the generally recognized reliability of these devices should be sufficient basis for admitting into evidence speedometer readings.
The appellant’s second contention is that the state failed to establish a prima facie case because it failed to adduce competent evidence of the speedometer’s accuracy. In substance, the appellant is asserting that while untested speedometer readings may be admissible in evidence, they will not, without more, sustain a criminal conviction for speeding. Although it may be undisputed that speedometer readings are generally accurate for purposes of admitting the readings into evidence, this general accuracy is not synonymous with the burden the state must carry in a crimi-. nal proceeding, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Our holding in State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 113, 488 P.2d 322 (1971) that “the burden is always upon the prosecution to establish every element of a crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, never upon the accused to disprove the existence of any necessary element,” supports the conclusion that the state must corroborate such readings in order to sustain a criminal conviction for speeding.
In the present case, I conclude with some reluctance, that the state did meet its burden of proof. The state was able to do so only because in addition to the speedometer readings related by Officer Broom, the prosecution was able to place into evidence the contents of a calibration card which was referred to by Officer Broom. This card contained *472the results of the speedometer check which found the discrepancies of three miles an hour at 55 m.p.h. and two miles an hour at 45 m.p.h. Appellant did object to the officer’s reading from the card, but this objection was anchored in the hearsay nature of the contents and not the attendant best evidence infirmities. That is, since the officer’s oral testimony was simply a reading from the calibration card, his testimony may have been subject to an objection on the grounds that the card, after authentication, and not the oral reading, would have been the best evidence. Since this objection was not made, the contents of the card properly came into evidence and I would hold that the state thereby carried its burden through this additional corroboration of the speedometer readings.
Similarly, I would hold that appellant’s objection on hearsay grounds was properly denied since the card could have been admitted into evidence under HRS § 622-51 as a business record exception to the hearsay rule.2 In future cases, I think it better procedure to lay a more detailed foundation for the business record than was done in the instant case. Such a procedure, in my view, would entail establishing: (1) that the speed check was performed as part of the regular maintenance of the vehicle; (2) that the result of the test was recorded on the calibration card by the mechanic performing the test; and (3) that the date of the test has recorded on the card.
Since the additional corroboration was present in this case, I would hold under State v. Cuevas, supra, that the state did carry its burden of establishing a prima facie case, *473and, therefore, appellant’s motion for acquittal was properly denied.
As a final point, appellant contends that when the trial court allowed the officer to read from an unauthenticated speed test card in lieu of ordering the state to produce the mechanic who performed the speed check, his constitutional right of confrontation under the sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 11 of the Hawaii Constitution was violated. I do not agree. I would not hold that to satisfy the confrontation clause the state need produce the mechanic to testify. The constitutional requirement may be met when the state introduces the speed card into evidence as a business record under HRS § 622-5.
I take this position cognizant of our decision in State v. Adrian, 51 Haw. 125, 132-33, 453 P.2d 221 (1969) wherein it was stated that:
. . . Since the right to be “confronted” in the constitutional sense includes the opportunity to cross-examine, “witnesses” must, therefore, mean the declarants rather than any witnesses who relate the words or substance of what the declarants said. Indeed, if the Sixth Amendment were otherwise construed, the defendant’s right of cross-examination would be emasculated. ... Of course, this court would, in appropriate cases, permit certain exceptions to the right of confrontation such as admitting dying declarations against an accused, Pointer v. Texas [380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965)], and testimony of an unavailable witness who gave testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant, if the state has made a good faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 724 (1968).
In Adrian we acknowledged the fundamental nature of the right of confrontation. We also determined that the evidentiary rules of hearsay and the constitutional guarantee of an opportunity for cross-examination were not congruent. That is, evidence admissible under a long-established hear*474say exception may still violate the confrontation clause, and “merely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.” California v. Green, 399 U.S.149, 156 (1970). We noted in Adrian at least two instances (dying declarations and testimony of a witness who testified at a prior judicial proceeding when the same defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination) in which admissible hearsay would be constitutionally admissible. Adrian, thus, recognized limited instances where the degree of reliability of the evidence sought to be admitted was so great and the utility of cross-examination by the defendant so minimal that both the evidentiary and constitutional requirements would be met.
As I have already indicated, I would admit the speed card in this case as competent evidence under the business record exception, HRS § 622-5. The card certified that the speedometer had been speed checked by a mechanic and designated the accuracy of the speedometer at particular speeds. Despite appellant’s assertions, the testimony of the mechanic would have been of little practical utility to him. The mechanic would not have any motive to falsify this data, and he could testify to no more than what appears on the card. This case is one of the limited instances,3 not fully enumerated in Adrian, where the testimony of the declarant should not be required.
Nothing here should be taken as retreating from our position in Adrian. This case represents the unusual instance where exceptions to the hearsay rule are compatible with the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.
With the foregoing guidelines and caveats in mind, I concur in affirming appellant’s conviction.
ffits § 622-5 provides that:
A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
The term “business” includes every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
See Frampton v. Hartzell, 179 Cal. App. 2d 771,4 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1960).
See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, concurring).