with whom Justice Stephenson joins, dissenting.
*504The majority opinion discerns a “classification-designation dichotomy in the field of tax exemption” whereby Westminster-Canterbury may qualify for tax exemption by the designation route, but does not qualify by the classification route. In the context of this case, I perceive no dichotomy.
In my view, the legislature has, in strict compliance with the Constitution of Virginia, Article X, Section 6, provided two alternative routes to tax exemption: (1) classification by law and (2) designation by a three-fourths vote of the members of each house of the General Assembly. The Constitution contains no requirement that either route be exclusive, and the General Assembly has not so provided. Therefore, provided the applicant qualifies for a tax exemption at all, the availability of one route does not exclude the other. On the facts of this case, both routes are available to an entity which fits within their terms.
The framers of the Constitution, I believe, provided the designation route as an alternative to classification for two reasons: (1) it is simple, rapid, and final; it avoids the hazards, expense, and delay of litigation where there is any likelihood of dispute, and (2) it gives the General Assembly the express constitutional authority to prescribe such tailor-made “restrictions and conditions” as may be thought advisable for each case. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that while the designation door remains open to Westminster-Canterbury, the classification door is closed.
If, as I believe, both doors remain open, it is pertinent to determine whether Westminster-Canterbury is designed in a form that will pass through. The Constitution provides that property used by its owner for “charitable” or “benevolent” purposes “shall be exempt from taxation,” but only “as may be provided by classification or legislation . . . .” Va. Const. Art. X, § 6(a)(6). The General Assembly has carefully followed that language in framing the three classification statutes quoted in the majority opinion. In my view, Westminster-Canterbury fits within each of the three.
Code § 58.1-3606 applies if the entity seeking tax exemption is a “religious association” or “asylum” and is “conducted not for profit but exclusively as [a] charit[y]:” Westminster-Canterbury is, in effect, a joint effort by the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches to provide housing and nursing care for the aged. That it is a “religious association” is not seriously contested. “Asylum” is defined as “a place of refuge and protection ... a place of retreat *505and security: shelter ... an institution for the protection or relief of some class of destitute, afflicted, or otherwise unfortunate persons.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 136 (1976) (emphasis added). “Charity” is defined as “a gift (as by grant or devise) of real or personal property to the use of the public or any portion of it as distinct from specific individuals for any beneficial or salutary purpose.” Id. 378 (emphasis added). Neither the framers of the Constitution nor the drafters of the classification statutes chose language designed to restrict tax exemptions to organizations devoted exclusively to the care of the destitute, although they might easily have done so. Finally, it is conceded that Westminster-Canterbury is “conducted not for profit.” Code § 58.1-3606, therefore, clearly applies.
Code § 58.1-3609 applies if the entity seeking tax exemption is a “religious association” (incorporating § 58.1-3617 by reference) and if its property is used for a “charitable” or “benevolent” purpose, so long as the organization is operated “not for profit.” As we have seen, Westminster-Canterbury meets each of those tests.
Finally, Code § 58.1-3617 applies if the entity seeking tax exemption is a “religious association,” which is “operated exclusively on a nonprofit basis,” and devoted to “charitable” purposes. The classification applies only to property of such an entity which is used exclusively for “charitable . . . purposes.” As we have seen, Westminster-Canterbury meets each of those tests as well.
Therefore, I conclude that Westminster-Canterbury meets the criteria of both the classification statutes and those of the Constitution, in order to qualify for tax-exempt status. Accordingly, I would reverse that part of the decree which denies tax exemption and affirm that part which ordered a refund of taxes paid under protest.