concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in Divisions 1 and 3 of the per curiam opinion. However, I disagree that summary judgment should have been granted to defendants Ethridge and Tyre either for the reasons stated by Judge Sognier in his special concurrence or by Judge Benham in his special concurrence.
1. I agree with Judge Sognier that the action against the defendants was not barred by the applicable statute of limitation but not for the reasons stated in his special concurrence. Rather than a new action against the named employees, I believe this action should be treated as an amendment adding parties, which is controlled by OCGA §§ 9-11-15 (c) and 9-11-21, since an action had been brought seeking recovery for Price’s injury by her mother as next friend. See Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., 124 Ga. App. 22 (4a) (183 SE2d 63) (1971). This action was first commenced against DOT and the other named defendants on May 9, 1985. On December 13, 1985, Price deposed DOT’s operations division director and learned for the first time that Mims, Ethridge and Tyre were the former employees who were involved in the design, construction and/or maintenance of the bridge *90approach where the collision occurred. On April 16, 1986, Price filed her motion to add Mims, Ethridge and Tyre as party defendants, but this motion was not ruled upon by the trial court until after remand by the Supreme Court on October 28, 1987, with direction to do so. On January 25, 1988, the trial court entered an order naming Mims, Ethridge and Tyre as party defendants; all three were served in February 1988.
“Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original pleadings if the foregoing provisions are satisfied, and if within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.” OCGA § 9-11-15 (c). Although the statutory language refers to “changing” the party, it has been held to include adding parties as well. Cobb v. Stephens, 186 Ga. App. 648 (368 SE2d 341) (1988). “Among the factors to be considered by the trial court in determining whether to allow the amendment are whether the new party will be prejudiced thereby and whether the movant has some excuse or justification for having failed to name and serve the new party previously. [Cits.]” Aircraft Radio Systems v. Von Schlegell, 168 Ga. App. 109, 111 (2) (308 SE2d 211) (1983).
Price moved to add the new parties as soon as she learned their identities, and the trial court’s delay in acting on this motion was through no fault of her own. Ethridge and Tyre complain that the suit was in active litigation for two years and nine months before they were served, and there is no evidence of record that they knew about it prior to that time. However, they have not shown that they were harmed or prejudiced by this delay so as to preclude the amendment’s relating back to the institution of the action. On motion for summary judgment the evidentiary burden as to these issues was on them as movants. Cobb u. Stephens, 186 Ga. App. at 651; accord Black & White Constr. Co. v. Bolden Contractors, 187 Ga. App. 805 (2) (371 SE2d 421) (1988). Consequently, I believe that summary judgment was properly denied as to this issue.
2. I disagree, however, that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to Tyre and Ethridge on the merits. (Divisions 2 and 3 of Judge Sognier’s special concurrence.) Firstly, Ethridge and Tyre argue that they were entitled to summary judgment because their in*91volvement in the design and construction of the roadway project was limited to execution of DOT’s policies, and the judicial branch of government is without authority under the doctrine of separation of powers to establish policy for an executive agency of government. Price argues that it was not her intent to involve this court in road designing, but that she is seeking recovery from DOT and its employees for their negligent design, construction and maintenance of the road as demonstrated by their failure to adhere to their own guidelines. The guidelines to which Price refers apparently are contained in a booklet entitled “Highway Design and Operational Practices Related to Highway Safety,” a report of a special AASHTO Traffic Committee dated February 1967, which were adopted by DOT as the standards to be followed in constructing the state highway system. However, this booklet is not included in the record on appeal and, indeed, may not have been introduced in evidence. Moreover, the only mention of the AASHTO regulations was in the deposition of a DOT employee who testified, without contradiction, that while these standards were followed for state highways they were not used in conjunction with county roads. Appellants’ evidence that the road in issue here was designed and built for the county, not the state highway system, was undisputed.
“When the (defendant-movant) for summary judgment presents evidence apparently destroying the plaintiff’s cause of action, the movant has met his burden, and the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present any alternative theories, if such exist, which would support his action and within which genuine issues of fact remain.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) West End Investments v. Hills, 188 Ga. App. 274, 277 (372 SE2d 665) (1988). Price failed to meet her burden of showing that DOT and its employees did not follow their own guidelines, or that they were obligated to do so, when she did not come forward with rebuttal evidence. See Hinkley v. Bldg. Material Merchants &c., 187 Ga. App. 345 (370 SE2d 201) (1988).
This was not, however, the sole ground upon which Price’s action was based, as she also contended that negligent design, construction and maintenance of the roadway was the proximate cause of the automobile collision. “It is generally a question for a fact-finding body to determine questions of negligence and whose negligence and what negligence involved is the sole proximate cause of the injury. It is only where the negligent conduct alleged is susceptible of but one inference that it becomes a question of law for the court to determine.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lewis v. Duggan, 184 Ga. App. 563, 565 (1) (362 SE2d 73) (1987). Although Judge Sognier’s special concurrence holds that the allegations against Tyre relate only to the maintenance of the project, it is clear that the question of extending the guardrail on the project could occur during either the design, con*92struction or maintenance phase of the project. Moreover, the record shows that Tyre was the DOT District Engineer and that as such his “responsibility was to supervise all personnel in the District including the construction personnel.” Likewise, although Ethridge averred that he did no actual designing or drafting of projects, the record shows that Ethridge signed and submitted the “Guard Rail Location Details” drawings for this project to the State Highway Engineer for approval in July 1975, and that he signed and submitted the entire set of plans to the State Highway Engineer before the project began. Furthermore, in his capacity as head of the State Road Design Office, he “supervised an organization of 105 people including engineers, designers, draftsmen and support staff.” Consequently, although Tyre and Ethridge may not have actually performed the drafting, design or construction tasks on the project which plaintiff alleges as negligence, they were clearly responsible, in their supervisory capacities, for the engineers, draftsmen and workers who did perform these tasks. “In the instant case the evidence does not mandate a judgment as a matter of law; a scrupulous sifting and weighing of the evidence by a jury is required. [In my opinion] the trial court properly denied summary judgment [on this basis].” Bragg v. Missroon, 186 Ga. App. 803, 806 (368 SE2d 564) (1988).
3. Ethridge and Tyre also urge, however, that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary judgment because, even assuming that they were negligent, any negligence on their part was not the proximate cause of the collision in which Price was injured. However, “[t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. [Cit.]” Church’s Fried Chicken v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 157 (1) (256 SE2d 916) (1979). See also Eubanks v. Business Equip. Center, 161 Ga. App. 202, 203 (288 SE2d 273) (1982). Price alleged that she was injured not only when her car was struck by two other vehicles, but when she plunged 22 feet down the steep embankment of the bridge approach because DOT’s employees failed to provide a guardrail, recovery area or a gradually sloping road shoulder. She further contended that had there been a median barrier the collision would never have occurred, and that the respective, concurrent negligence of each employee contributed to her injuries.
“It is no defense to an action for an injury resulting from negligence that intervening negligence contributed to cause the injury, if the negligence of [the DOT employees] was an efficient cause without which the injury would not have occurred. [Cits.] ‘(I)f the original negligent actor reasonably could have anticipated or foreseen the intervening act and its consequences, then the intervening act of negligence will not relieve the original actor from liability for the consequences resulting from the intervening act. That is a jury question.’ [Cit.]” Eubanks, supra at 203. In my opinion, this issue must be de*93termined by the jury.
4. I would likewise reject Ethridge and Tyre’s assertion that having ruled in Price v. Wright Contracting Co., 183 Ga. App. 595 (359 SE2d 406) and Price v. Reeves Constr. Co., 181 Ga. App. 241 (351 SE2d 655), that the contractors involved with the roadway project could not be held liable as a matter of law for its design and construction because they were simply following the rules established by DOT, this court is bound to reach the same conclusion in regard to them. On the contrary, those cases turned on the general rule that “ ‘where the work of an independent contractor is completed, turned over to, and accepted by the owner, the contractor is not liable to third persons for damages or injuries subsequently suffered by reason of the condition of the work, . . .’” Wright at 597; Reeves at 241. As further pointed out in Wright, supra at 597-598: “ ‘when the work is finished by (the contractor) and accepted by [the] employer [DOT], the liability of the former generally ceases and the employer becomes answerable for damages which may thereafter accrue from the defective condition of the work. (Cits.)” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Accord Wilmock, Inc. v. French, 185 Ga. App. 259 (1) (363 SE2d 789) (1987). If the evidence is sufficient to show misfeasance and negligence on the part of DOT’s employees in undertaking to design, construct or maintain the roadway project, a jury may also find them personally liable. Howell v. Ayers, 129 Ga. App, 899 (4) (202 SE2d 189) (1973).
5. Ethridge and Tyre also object to the fact that under OCGA § 36-33-4, municipal or local government employees are liable only for those official acts performed “oppressively, maliciously, corruptly or without authority of law” which, were it also applicable to them, would have entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. However, the Georgia cases, including the instant suit, which have considered the liability of the state and counties and their employees have consistently applied the standard of ordinary care. See, e.g., Price v. Dept. of Transp., 257 Ga. 535, supra; Thigpen v. McDuffie County Bd. of Education, 255 Ga. 59 (335 SE2d 112) (1985); Curtis v. Cobb County, 254 Ga. 673 (333 SE2d 595) (1985); Toombs County v. O’Neal, 254 Ga. 390 (330 SE2d 95) (1985); Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50 (360 SE2d 624) (1987); Early County v. Fincher, 184 Ga. App. 47 (360 SE2d 602) (1987). If a higher standard is to apply, it must come from the legislature. Consequently, I believe the trial court properly denied summary judgment to defendants Ethridge and Tyre.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this special concurrence and dissent.
*94Decided December 5, 1989 Rehearings denied December 20, 1989 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, H. Perry Michael, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Harrison W. Kohler, Deputy Attorney General, Roland F. Matson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Beverly B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Ethridge, Tyre and Mims. Burt & Burt, Hilliard P. Burt, Terry J. Marlowe, for Price.