dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority, as did the trial court, improperly weighs the evidence and resolves disputed issues of fact contrary to the established rule on summary judgment, I cannot agree to the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. The majority relies upon Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). However, the majority admits that in addition to the plaintiff’s own testimony, the affidavit and deposition of Mr. Walker stated that the plaintiff slipped because the floor was slick and Walker testified from his experience that there was a “right smart” of wax on the floor. When this evidence presented by the plaintiff as respondent to a motion for summary judgment is considered, this case is no more controlled by Alterman than was the case of Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 253 Ga. 337 (320 SE2d 174) (1984). In reversing this Court, which had relied upon Alterman, the Supreme Court in Martin held that the testimony submitted by the plaintiff “satisfie[d] the test in Al-terman by offering some evidence of negligent application of materials used in treating the floor. [Appellant’s evidence] created a conflict in the evidence as to a material issue which was sufficient to survive the [appellee’s] motion for directed verdict. [Cit.] ” Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 338.
Because I believe that the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Benham join in this dissent.