Perhaps the most important determination to be made is the effect of Stanley v. Illinois upon this case. In Stanley, the supreme court struck down an Illinois law which made children of unwed fathers wards of the state. Mr. Stanley had lived with a woman not his wife intermittently for some eighteen years, during which time they had three children.2 Upon the woman’s death, these children were placed with guardians. Mr. Stanley fought this placement, claiming a denial of equal protection. In Stanley, the supreme court decided two things: (1) That the denial of a natural father’s parental rights to a child born out of wedlock based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, and (2) that the termination of a natural father’s parental rights to a *5child born out of wedlock without actual notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the right to be heard on the termination of his rights denied him due process of law.
It is urged that Stanley v. Illinois should not be applied to this case, that its ruling should have only prospective effect; we disagree. The very mandate of the United States Supreme Court, which vacated our judgment holding that the petitioner Jerry D. Rothstein had no parental rights, tells us to reconsider the problem of custody in light of Stanley. Certainly we cannot validate an adoption when the very holding of Stanley was that the denial of the existence of parental rights in unwed fathers is unconstitutional. If custody is to be left with the “adoptive parents,” it must rest on grounds other than the adoption decree. There can be no valid adoption without a valid termination of parental rights. Armstrong v. Manso (1965), 380 U. S. 545, 85 Sup. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62. See also: Selman v. Phillips (1966), 384 U. S. 210, 86 Sup. Ct. 1468, 16 L. Ed. 2d 482.
A distinction must be made between the termination of parental rights and the granting of custody without the termination of parental rights. While it is possible to grant custody in divorce cases without terminating parental rights and perhaps in other cases, it is not possible to give custody based upon adoption without a termination of parental rights. Whether the present persons having custody of John Thomas Lewis would accept custody without adoption is a question not before us; their position is adoption, not custody. We point out it has been held that where an adoption proceeding is void, the “adoptive parents” could be allowed to retain custody where it would be in the best interests of the child. Fielding v. Highsmith (1943), 152 Fla. 837, 13 So. 2d 208; Ex parte Vanearen (1929), 135 Okla. 91, *6274 Pac. 469; Mathews v. Grant (Okla. 1958), 326 Pac. 2d 1043. However, other courts have awarded custody to the natural parent upon a successful challenge to the validity of an adoption decree. Thus in McClary v. Follett (1961), 226 Md. 436, 174 Atl. 2d 66, where the adoption decree was set aside because the natural father had received no notice due to the mother’s false representation of herself as unwed, the child was taken from its “adoptive parents” and awarded to the father. See also: Hatgimisios v. Smith (1972), 229 Ga. 475, 192 S. E. 2d 270; Pole v. Bowen (Fla. App. 1972), 269 So. 2d 707.
An adoption proceeding is the legal method of creating a new relationship of parent and child; it does not merely determine custody. Sec. 48.92, Stats. In our opinion of October 31, 1972, we stated the parental rights of the petitioner had not been terminated. In some states, adoption proceedings terminate parental rights. Wisconsin takes two independent steps: (1) Termination of parental rights, with temporary custody generally given to a social agency, as here; and (2) adoption. What the mandate of the United States Supreme Court can only mean in view of Wisconsin law is that this court must determine whether the petitioner is entitled to custody which would have been his as a natural father unless his parental rights had been terminated. We point out that there was an injunction against the adoption of John Thomas Lewis while the matter was under consideration of this court, and the child was secretly adopted without notice to this court, the guardian ad litem, or the petitioner during the period in which a rehearing motion might have been made to this court. Consequently, when this matter reached the United States Supreme Court on appeal the child had been adopted with full knowledge of the pending litigation and the alleged legal infirmities involved. Under these circumstances, we *7cannot hold that the adoption was valid or that Stanley is only of academic concern and not applicable.
We do not hold that Stanley or the reversal of our decision in Rothstein is to be applied retroactively and undercut the basis of other prior adoption proceedings. In this case, the petitioner made his claim known prior to the birth of the child, was kept from knowledge of its birth and its whereabouts, made an application to the court to assert his rights as soon as he learned of the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, and was denied a hearing. There are few cases pending with facts raising such an issue. Stanley applied retroactively only to these facts and to any pending cases where the natural father has been denied rights which he asserted as the petitioner did in this case.
The treatment of Stanley as retroactively applicable to this case is 'in accordance with what at least one other state has done with this same problem. In People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children’s Home (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 20, 284 N. E. 2d 291, a child born out of wedlock was placed for adoption upon consent of the mother alone and without notice to the putative father. The father challenged the Illinois statutes which precluded fathers of illegitimate children from asserting any rights in adoption proceedings. The Illinois court applied the rule of Stanley that putative fathers have a constitutional right to a hearing on their fitness for custody to this pre-Stanley adoption and declared the Illinois adoption and paternity acts unconstitutional “insofar as they are in conflict with Stanley, Rothstein, and Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N. E. 2d 717, vacated 405 U. S. 1051, 92 Sup. Ct. 1488, 31 L. Ed. 2d 787.”
In Vanderlaan, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a divorced father had no right to custody of his children born subsequent to the divorce. On the same day that it decided Rothstein, the United States Supreme Court *8vacated the Illinois judgment, but the reports do not show what the Illinois court has done with this case on remand. Other cases citing Stanley do not address themselves authoritatively to the question of retroactivity. See Gomez v. Perez (1973), 409 U. S. 535, 93 Sup. Ct. 872, 35 L. Ed. 2d 56.3
Our present statutes on termination of parental rights are unconstitutional only insofar as they are in conflict with Stanley, Rothstein, and Vanderlaan. The saving of so much of the statutes as possible is desirable and compatible with the method recognized in Huebner v. State (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N. W. 2d 646. To comply with constitutional dictates and until the legislature provides a more adequate procedure,4 notice for the termination of the natural parental rights of unwed fathers shall be the same as that required to be given to married parents or unwed mothers under sec. 48.42, Stats., upon petition of the state. Petitions made by either unwed parent will now require either personal or constructive notice, as provided in sec. 48.42, to terminate the rights of either or both of the unwed parents. With respect to adoption by consent without formal termination of parental rights, neither sec. 48.84 (1) (b) 5 nor *9sec. 48.84 (3) 6 can be given legal effect. Consent of both the unwed mother and the unwed father, or consent of one parent with proper termination of the parental rights of the other, is necessary.
It is urged by the petitioner, relying on Ponsford v. Crute (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N. W. 2d 5, that he is entitled to custody as a matter of law over all other persons because he has been found to be the father and to be fit. A great portion of the briefs submitted in this case deal with the apparent conflict in decisions of this court involving the natural rights of parents in contrast to the so-called “best-interests-of-the-child” test. Of course, in custody cases, as distinguished from parental termination cases, the “best interests of the child” constitutes an important factor, but in Ponsford we stated it is not the controlling factor.
The phrase, “best interests of' the child,” means all things to all people: it means one thing to a juvenile judge, another thing to adoptive parents, something else to natural parents, and still something different to disinterested observers. If judges were endowed with omniscience, the problem would not be difficult; but the tendency in man is to apply intuition in deciding that a child would be “better” with one set of parents than with another, and then to express this intuitive feeling in terms of the legal standard of being “in the best interests of the child.” Courts have not laid down any definite guidelines which can be followed in every case *10to insure protection of what the average person means by “best interests.” The term, “powerful countervailing interests,” as used in Stcmley, may mean nothing other than the “best interests of the child.” The “best-interests-of-the-child” test does not speak in terms of the present, the immediate future, or even the ultimate future of the child. Nor has it contemplated yet the question of whether the child has a constitutional right to know the identity of his natural parents. Neither this court nor many others have considered studies based upon interviews with persons who were adopted in early life to determine whether credible guidelines can be legally established. See A. M. McWhinnie, Adopted Children— How They Grow Up. But we think it would be inappropriate for this court to presently decide any preference of fitness or unfitness or give any indication of where the “best interests” of the child lie until that issue is ripe for determination.
We have before us now not the question of present custody but whether the petitioner’s rights as a natural parent should be terminated nunc pro tunc. This court took a shortcut in the last reference and thus we do have a finding that the petitioner is the father, which fact has not been contested. But the finding of fitness is based upon evidence of current status, whereas we now think the issue of termination of parental rights should be viewed as of the period of time when that issue should have been determined and when the petitioner’s constitutional rights were denied him. This would be the date of the judgment in the county court of La Crosse county on November 11,1969.
Facts found in relation to fitness on the last reference are not binding. This matter must be sent back to the county court of La Crosse county, the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding must be reopened and the petitioner Jerry D. Rothstein must be given a hearing on *11the issue of termination of his parental rights under the test laid down in see. 48.40 (2), Stats.,7 and in light of sec. 48.01 (2) .8
*12We consider the argument that a parent is unable to adequately care for the child if the child’s welfare would be harmed by uprooting its present custody to be inapplicable because the child on November 11, 1969, had only been in the temporary custody of the foster parents for a short time. The petitioner should not be faulted because the respondent agency and the adoptive parents have kept the petitioner from seeing his child pending this proceeding. Many social agencies have a ruling that children brought up in foster homes cannot be adopted by such foster parents. Consequently, on this reference, we do not reach the issue of custody as such. The reference is solely on the issue of termination of parental rights as those grounds are expressed in the statutes.
We have read the dissenting opinion, and while it is unusual to comment upon it in the majority opinion, we are compelled to point out that the issues raised in the dissent on the question of estoppel, the completion of the adoption proceedings, and the welfare of the child are not pertinent to the issues decided by the majority. Some of the matters covered by the dissent were neither raised by the briefs nor orally argued and should not at this time be considered by the court. The dissent expressly refuses to recognize that the bond of nature between a parent and a child born out of wedlock should not be less protected by law “simply because her natural father has not married her mother.” Gomez v. Perez, swpra. It likewise ignores consideration of the presump*13tion that as between a natural parent and a third party, the “best interests of the child” lie with the natural parents’ exercise of custodial rights. See Garrett v. Mahaley (Ala. 1917), 75 So. 10; concurring opinion of Justice Traynor in Guardianship of Smith (1954), 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 Pac. 2d 888; McClary v. Follett, supra; In re Ernst (1964), 373 Mich. 337, 129 N. W. 2d 430; Rincon v. Rincon (1970), 29 Mich App. 150, 185 N. W. 2d 195; Allison v. Bryan (1908), 21 Okla. 557, 97 Pac. 282.
By the Court. — The judgment of the county court of La Crosse county of November 11, 1969, denying Jerry D. Rothstein a right to be heard, is hereby vacated and the court is directed to hold a hearing on proper notice to both Jerry D. Rothstein and the mother of John Thomas Lewis, and to the guardian ad litem Bruce O’Neill, and all other persons appearing in this proceeding to determine the termination of the respective parental rights of the natural parents of John Thomas Lewis. If the mother of John Thomas Lewis is satisfied with the prior termination of her rights, she may consent to the termination of her rights at this hearing. If the parental rights of both parents are terminated and there is to be a review, this court will review the matter upon application in this proceeding. If the parental rights of both parties are not terminated, this court will hear further motions on the issue of custody without adoption.
In soma respects, this could be considered a common-law marriage, but because such marriages are not legally recognized in this state, consideration of such a factor is unimportant in distinguishing Stanley from the present facts.
See also, e. g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education (6th Cir. 1972), 465 Fed. 2d 1184, 1187; Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (7th Cir. 1972), 466 Fed. 2d 638, 648; Murry v. U. S. Department of Agriculture (D. D. C. 1972), 348 Fed. Supp. 242, 243; Pocklington v. Duval County School Board (M. D. Fla. 1972), 345 Fed. Supp. 163, 165; Abele v. Markle (D. Conn. 1972), 342 Fed. Supp. 800, 802.
Presently under consideration by the legislature are bills redrafting those provisions of the Children’s Code which are in conflict with the Stanley and Rothstein decisions. See 1973 Assembly Bill 915; 1973 Senate Bill 566.
“48.84 Persons required to consent to adoption. (1) No adoption of a minor may be ordered without the written consent of the following to the adoption of the minor by the petitioner: . . .
*9“(b) The mother alone, if the minor was born out of wedlock; provided that consent shall not be required from a mother whose parental rights have been legally terminated; . . .”
“48.84 ... (3) The consent of the father of a minor born out of wedlock shall not be necessary even though the father has married the mother if, prior to the marriage, the mother’s parental rights were legally terminated or she consented to the adoption of the minor . . . .”
“48.40 Grounds for termination, of parental rights. The court may, upon petition, terminate all rights of parents to a minor in any of the following eases: . . .
“(2) If it finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
“(a) That the parents have abandoned the minor; or
“(b) That the parents have substantially or continuously or repeatedly refused or neglected or are unable for a prolonged indeterminate period to give the minor the parental care and protection necessary for his health, morals or well-being; or
“(c) That, although the parents are financially able, they have substantially and continuously neglected to provide the minor with necessary subsistence, education or other care necessary for his health or well-being or have neglected to pay for such subsistence, education or other care when legal custody is lodged with others; or
“(d) That the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd or lascivious behavior or conviction and confinement for a felony (including hospitalization within the sex deviate statutes), which conduct or status is found by the court to be likely to be detrimental to the health, morals or the best interests of the minor; or
“(e) That the parents, subsequent to a finding of neglect, have failed to correct the conditions leading to such a finding despite reasonable efforts under the direction of the court to rectify the conditions upon which such finding was based; . . .”
“48.01 Title, intent and construction of chapter. . .
“(2) Intent. It is declared to be the intent of this chapter to promote the best interests of the children of this state through:
“(a) Juvenile courts adequately equipped to review each case on its individual merits under procedures designed to safeguard the legal rights of the child and his parents;
“(b) An integrated and co-ordinated program for all delinquent, neglected and dependent children both in their own community and while in the custody of the state;
“(e) Protection of children from unnecessary separation, either temporary or permanent, from their parents;
“(d) Adequate care and rehabilitation for all children who must be separated from their parents temporarily for the child’s protection or that of the public;
*12“(e) Co-ordinated planning to assist local communities in promoting effective programs in health, education, recreation and welfare for the maximum development of all children and for the control of influences detrimental to youth;
“(f) Assurance for children needing adoptive homes that they will be placed in the best home available; protection of children from adoption by persons unfit to have responsibility for raising a child; protection for children who are legally established in adoptive homes from interference by their natural parents.”