dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. There is no doubt in my mind that the power to define and regulate the practice of law lies exclusively with this Court. I also agree with the statement in the majority opinion that whether one who appears before the Public Utilities Commission under the provisions of Rule 7 (b) of the Commission is practicing law depends upon the circumstances under which he appears, and this statement, in fact, is the basis of my dissent.
In my view, the Commission as an arm of the Legis*283lature and part of the legislative branch of government may promulgate any rule of procedure which it wishes, and so long as that rule does not deprive a litigant of his constitutional rights we have no power to set it aside, although I must say that I am unable to determine whether the majority opinion is a repudiation or an interpretation of Rule 7 (b). If a person appearing under Rule 7 (b) engages in acts which constitute the practice of law, the proper way to bring the matter before this Court is by way of an action against that person, specifically alleging the conduct which is contended to be the unlawful practice of law, and, in fact, the cases cited by the majority are all of them cases which came before the court in that posture. See, e.g., Conway-Bogue v. Bar Association, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P. (2d) 998; West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va. 504, 109 S.E. (2d) 420; State v. Keller, 16 Wis. (2d) 377, 114 N.W. (2d) 796.
I would also point out that in the cases cited by the majority the person or persons proceeded against were laymen who appeared in a purely representative capacity for clients and that they had no other connection with these clients. In contrast, Rule 7 (b) does not permit laymen in general to appear in a representative capacity. It limits such appearance to individuals representing themselves, or to co-partners representing themselves, or to corporate officers or full time employees of a corporation representing the corporation for which they work. I can visualize many such limited appearances by laymen which would, in my view, not be the unlawful practice of law. I would not, therefore, hold Rule 7 (b), as such, invalid, but would await the presentation to this Court of the specific circumstances under which an individual would be charged with the unlawful practice of law.
Moreover, the majority opinion poses hypothetical situations which do not by any stretch of the imagination have anything to do with Rule 7 (b) and pro*284ceeds to determine whether or not such practices constitute the practice, of law. In my view, it is dangerous to make such general judgments in a vacuum.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hall joins in this dissent.