Peoples Finance and Thrift Company of Ogden sued Michael David Doman and his wife Sheryl for $2047.76 due on a promissory note, and for attorney’s fees. Defendants did not dispute the debt, but pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy. Opposing this the plaintiff asserted that the debt was one of those excepted from discharge in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts . . . except . . .
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(2) liabilities for obtaining money ... by false pre*406tenses or false representations . or obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition . . . with intent to deceive, or for willful and malicious conversion of the property of another
Upon a plenary trial, the court found that Mr. Doman had made misrepresentations, but rejected plaintiff’s contention that the debt was not discharged because of the above quoted section. This was based on an affirmative finding that in making the loan the plaintiff did not rely on the false statement made by defendant. Plaintiff appeals contending that under the evidence the trial court was compelled to make the finding in its favor and to determine that the debt was not discharged.
The defendants had an existing loan from the plaintiff upon which there was a balance of $1400+. In February 1969 they went to the company office to obtain some more money. This was done by allowing them a new loan sufficient to pay off the old balance of $1412.41, plus $478.-25 additional. Defendant was required to fill out a loan application. On the reverse side were questions concerning his financial condition. He gave answers which were filled in by Mr. Gene Fessler, who was handling the matter for the plaintiff. Dr. Doman reported some of his debts, but failed to report some other's; and also failed to state that a substantial amount of his security was already pledged. It also appears: that Mr. Doman had previous acquaintance with Mr. Fessler; that Do-man had gone to him on other occasions for financial advice; that the latter knew that he was in financial difficulties and that he had other debts large and small.
On the problem here involved it is appropriate to make some observations about Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act and the exception from discharge relied upon by the plaintiff. From the language above quoted it is clear that all provable debts are prima facie discharged. It follows that if the creditor claims his debt is an exception he has the burden of so proving. There are eight subsections providing exceptions, such as taxes, alimony and support money, and included are three subsections which deal with liabilities arising out of the wrongdoing of a debtor: for obtaining money by false pretenses or false representations (subsection 2) relied upon by the plaintiff; fraud or embezzlement by a fiduciary (subsection 4) ; and malicious injuries to person or property (subsection 8).
It will be observed that as to each of the exceptions there appears to be some underlying reason why the class of debts so excepted should be regarded as of a different character than an ordinary debt or obligation incurred in the usual course of *407business. The exception involved in this case is of the same general character of liabilities as subsections 4 and 8 just referred to, all of which arise out of wrongful conduct of the debtor. The reasonable interpretation and application of the provisions for those exceptions is that the liability must arise essentially out of the wrongdoing, and not be one in which wrongdoing may be merely incidentally involved.1 In harmony with this, the well-recognized rule is that in order that a debt not he dischargeable under subsection 2 relating to false representations, the money must have been obtained by a material representation which was wilfully made by the debtor, knowing it to be false, and when the creditor did not know of its falsity, and reasonably relied thereon, in parting with his money.2
The plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred in not finding that the debt had been incurred through misrepresentation does not present the question usually involved on an appeal which challenges the findings of the trial court: that is, whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings. Here the situation is reversed: the burden of proving the contention was upon the plaintiff. When we are asked to rule that the evidence compels a finding, we would do so only if all reasonable minds would so find. On the other hand, if the evidence and any reasonable inferences that fairly can be drawn therefrom, viewed in the light favorable to the trial court’s ruling, is such that reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could remain unpersuaded that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was essentially one arising out of obtaining money by false representations upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, then we will not reverse the trial court and compel such a finding.
In considering the problem just stated, we are obliged to have in mind this proposition: the mere fact that there is some evidence of false representation by the defendant in failing to make a full disclosure as to his debts, coupled with the plaintiff’s own assertion that it relied there*408on in making the loan, would not necessarily compel the trial court to make the finding demanded by plaintiff. The difficulty in its position is its assumption that the trial court was bound to believe and find in accordance with its evidence. But the well-established rule is that the trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and is not obliged to believe testimony in which there is any inherent frailty; and this includes the self-interest of the witness.3 It is the duty and the prerogative of the trial court to make that determination from the evidence; and that is sufficient justification for sustaining the judgment. However, there are other aspects of the evidence which the court may have viewed as tending to give it further support. On the basis of information furnished to Mr. Fessler, it appears that the payments to which the Domans were already obligated would leave a very restricted family budget, with only $43.50 a month remaining uncommitted.
In view of the total circumstances shown, including Mr. Fessler’s knowledge of the Domans’ financial affairs, we are not persuaded that the trial court acted unreasonably in failing to adopt plaintiff’s point of view that its cause of action was in essence one to recover money it had been cheated out of by defendant’s wrongdoing, nor in its refusal to find that the plaintiff did not know of the falsity of the representations and relied upon them in granting the loan. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to upset the trial court’s findings and judgment.
Affirmed. Costs to defendants (respondents).
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and ELLETT, JJ., concur.. Before statutory exemption from discharge in bankruptcy on ground that money or property liad been obtained by false representations can be applicable, creditor must show that debtor made false representations with intention of defrauding creditor and that creditor relied upon and was misled by them. Seaboard Finance Corp. v. Stipelcovich, 176 So.2d 170 (La.App.1965); Excel Finance Mid City, Inc. v. Chetta, 160 So.2d 304 (La.App.1964).
. To show that defendant's liability was not discharged in bankruptcy by reason of false financial statement, plaintiff must show that loan extension or renewal was granted in reliance upon written financial statement made or caused to be made by defendant, that statement was materially false, and that statement was made or caused to be made by defendant with intent to deceive. Midland Discount Co. v. Robichaux, 184 So.2d 93 (La.App.1966); Family Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 63 Misc.2d 74, 311 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1970).
. Diaz et al. v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al., 80 Utah 77, 13 P.2d 307 (1932); Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co., 8 Utah 2d 226, 332 P.2d 666 (1958).