(dissenting).
I am unable to reach the same conclusions as to the facts, nor as to the application of law to them, as does the majority opinion. I. do not see that there is any substantial disagreement among us as to the applicable principles of law: that foreign corporations are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State unless, they have a “business presence” here. This requires the engaging in business or activities to the extent of “at least certain minimum contacts” therein. This is not satisfied by contacts which are merely irregular or sporadic, but there must be some carrying on of the business in a manner which is to some degree systematic and continuous, so that it can fairly be said that the corporation has a business presence in the state such that the maintenance of the suit and the compelling of a defense therein does not offend against traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.1 As the main opinion correctly points out, this entails “more contacts . . . than sales and sales promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales representatives.”
I am also in agreement with the statement of the main opinion that “these cases are strictly factual” and that they are to be determined by application of the law to the facts of the particular case. However, we should also keep in mind that our basic rule of appellate review requires us to accord to the trial court the prerogative of weighing the evidence and of drawing inferences therefrom, and upon that basis of *448determining the facts. It is the duty of this court to respect that prerogative: to look at the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light favorable to sustaining the findings and judgment of the trial court, and not to the contrary for the purpose of overturning the findings and judgment as the main opinion impresses me as doing here.
On the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and a plenary hearing, the trial judge made his findings and ruling in the form of a memorandum decision, extensively treating its view of the facts and the law, and which includes the following statements:
In the case at bar, the plaintiff relies upon two visits to Utah by agents of defendant as constituting the “significant minimal contacts” to give this court jurisdiction under the statute and the due process clause. One was on March 31, 1969, which was before the effective date of the long-arm statute in question, and the other in January, 1970, upon which occasion defendant’s agents were requested to come to Utah by plaintiff’s agents without disclosing to defendant’s agents, and intentionally so, that the purpose of the requested visit was to advise defendant that plaintiff would not use the Ryndam [defendant’s ship] in 1970.
* ‡ * * * ‡
The “activities” of the March 31, 1969, meeting were at most, one part of the negotiations between the parties, and even if the Boston sailings were discussed at that meeting, in order for me to find that “obligations” were incurred or that a “claim” arose therefrom, it would require me to first find that a contract exists which is what plaintiff . . . denies.
It is therefore, my conclusion that the activities of the defendant in this state were not sufficient to meet minimal requirements of the due process clause and the defendant’s motion to quash the service of summons should be granted.
The case of International Shoe v. Washington2 is the landmark authority in this field. As indicated in the majority opinion, that decision was based on the fact that the company employed resident salesmen in the state of Washington who had authority to conduct business and engage in activities in behalf of the company. It should also be noted that that decision was an affirmance of such determination by the Washington court, whose prerogative it was to find the facts, and not a reversal thereof on appeal, as is being done here.
In the recent case of Hill v. Zale Corporation,3 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332, we stated that the question of whether *449a foreign corporation is doing business within the state to subject it to the jurisdiction of our courts is to be determined from consideration of all of the relevant circumstances. That opinion pointed out a number of significant activities of the Zale Stores organization in Utah which distinguish it from the instant case. The Utah stores, though separate corporations, all did business under the name of Zale Stores, similar to the parent Texas corporation. The officers and directors, and the actual policy-making management, were practically identical. This was also true of the holding out to the public in advertising and in doing business; and of vital importance, the Utah stores did not have individual bank accounts, but the money was deposited to the credit of the Zale-Texas Corporation which controlled and disbursed it.
By way of contrast to the Zale case, in the instant one there is a considerably different fact situation. The defendant Holland-America Line has no stores or offices in Utah by that name, or at all. It has no employees or personnel here. The only outlet or contact with the public is through the travel agencies who are authorized to book its services along with similar services for other transportation companies. None of them serve Holland-America exclusively, but all book other transportation services generally. Each agency has a subagency appointment by agreement with the secretary of the Trans-Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference. It permits the agency to book travel for its members in conformity with certain terms and procedures as determined for the most part by the Conference. The individual travel services, such as defendant Holland-America, arrange for distribution of their own literature, reservation rates, acceptances of reservations, and commissions to the agencies. Neither the travel services generally, nor this defendant, maintain separate offices, directory listings, or employ their own sales agents. Defendant’s evidence also is that instead of being constant and regular, it has been somewhat inconsistent and sporadic in its advertising and contacts with the travel agencies in Utah.
It seems to me that fairness requires that this court keep the balance of justice true by applying the law in the same manner when it is to the disfavor of our courts and the disadvantage of our citizens as when it is to the contrary. This requires us to compare our own adjudication in Conn v. Whitmore4 where we denied jurisdiction to the state of Illinois. There a similar problem was involved, but with the facts reversed. The plaintiff Conn was a resident of Illinois. Invoking their “long-arm” statute, he had served defendant Whitmore, a resident of Utah, and had *450obtained a judgment for which he was seeking full faith and credit in our Utah court. Whitmore challenged the Illinois court’s jurisdiction and sought to defend on the merits here. Plaintiff Conn had solicited business (sale of horses) by mail in Utah. Whitmore had sent an agent to Illinois to look over the horses; had sent part of the purchase price in the mail, and had sent his agent who paid the balance and took delivery of the horses in Illinois. It is my opinion that there was at least as much “contact” by Whitmore in doing business in Illinois in that case as there is of Holland-America Line doing business in Utah in this one. Yet we held that this did not constitute the “transaction of business” by Whitmore in Illinois to give it jurisdiction within the meaning of its “long-arm” statute.
Based upon what has been said above, I am unable to see any justification for overturning the findings of our trial court, and would sustain his ruling.
ELLETT, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.. Footnote 3 of main opinion.
. Footnote 3 of main opinion.
. Footnote 3 of main opinion.
. 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959).