dissenting.
I dissent. This court previously has held that a parent should not be able to avoid support obligations to a minor child by voluntary agreement with the other parent or custodian of the child, see Department of Human Resources v. Prince, 198 Ga. App. 329, 331 (401 SE2d 342) (1991); Collins v. Collins, 172 Ga. App. 748, 749 (324 SE2d 475) (1984); Crumb v. Gordon, 157 Ga. App. 839, 841 (2) (278 SE2d 725) (1981); or by relinquishing parental rights, see In re K. L. S., 180 Ga. App. 688 (350 SE2d 50) (1986). The mother filed the petition to terminate the parental rights of appellee based on a “contract” signed by him in which he voluntarily relinquished his parental rights. In its order, the juvenile court stated as its sole basis for the termination of appellee’s parental rights that he had consented to the termination. Although the court was authorized to terminate the parental rights of a parent based on written consent of that parent acknowledged before the court, OCGA § 15-11-51 (a) (3) repealed by Ga. L. 1986, p. 1017, éffective July 1, 1986, and recodified at OCGA § 15-11-81 (b) (1), this court has held “that the statutory authority of the juvenile court to entertain petitions to terminate parental rights does not extend to petitions by parents seeking judicial imprimatur of their own, voluntary abandonment of parental responsibility.” In re K. L. S., 180 Ga. App. at 689. Although the termination petition in this case was not brought by the “consenting” parent, as was the situation in In re K. L. S., the only basis shown for the petition brought by the mother was the father’s consent. It is thus plain that the father was not “consenting” to the termination, rather he was providing the basis for the termination by consenting thereto prior to the action by the mother in filing the petition. Consequently, the natural parents of the minor child in this case, because they acted in concert, accomplished by way of termination proceedings what they could not do by contract or divorce decree, to wit, eliminated the father’s obligation to support his minor child. Consequently, I believe the order terminating the appellee’s parental rights was void, see OCGA § 9-11-60 (a), and the lower court should have so found in the present proceedings. Accord Collins v. Collins, supra.
*809I also believe the juvenile court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of the child during the original termination proceedings requires that the termination order be set aside. At the time the termination petition was filed by the mother in this case the juvenile court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem “where the interests of parent and child conflict,” Dawley v. Butts County Dept. of Family &c. Svcs., 148 Ga. App. 815, 816 (253 SE2d 235) (1979). In my opinion a conflict between the interest of the parent and child is shown as a matter of law where, as here, one parent has petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the other natural parent. “Here, the best interests of the child may or may not have been served by termination of the father’s rights; that was the primary issue. [The child’s mother], by initiating termination proceedings, had de facto taken the position of advocate for ending the father’s parental rights. ... If the advocate for termination is permitted to be the advocate for the child, there is nothing for the court to decide, insofar as the third-party child is concerned, for the former has already decided that the best interests of the child will be served by termination. Between the two antagonistic parties is the child, who as we read OCGA § 15-11-55 must have a separate representative.” In re J. S. C., 182 Ga. App. 721, 723 (356 SE2d 754) (1987).
Furthermore, OCGA § 15-11-85 (a), effective July 1, 1986, provides that an attorney must be appointed to represent the child as his counsel in all termination proceedings and Rule 11.8 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Rules requires the juvenile court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child in all such proceedings. “ ‘(A) reviewing court should apply the law as it exists at the time of its judgment rather than the law prevailing at the rendition of the judgment under review, and may therefore reverse a judgment that was correct at the time it was rendered and affirm a judgment that was erroneous at the time, where the law has been changed in the meantime and where such application of the new law will impair no vested right under the prior law.’ [Cits.]” In re L. L. B., 256 Ga. 768 (353 SE2d 507) (1987). See also In re J. S. C., 182 Ga. App. at 723. In In re L. L. B., our Supreme Court held that the provisions pertaining to termination proceedings which became effective July 1, 1986, including the provision requiring appointment of an attorney to represent the child, could be applied to termination proceedings which were originally brought and decided under the prior law. In any event, under either the then-existing law or the present statutory scheme the child’s interests should have been represented; consequently, I believe the prior termination order was void and should not bar the recovery of the benefits paid on the child’s behalf.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and *810Judge Cooper join in this dissent. Decided September 8, 1992 — Reconsideration denied December 17, 1992 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. McDonald, Kinnamon & Thames, E. Crawford McDonald, for appellee.