(dissenting).
The effect of the majority opinion is to eliminate the doctrine of family immunity in actions for tort. Although the rule announced applies only to actions by a parent against a child, acceptance of the reasoning which supports this decision forecasts the end of immunity with respect to *439actions for damages incurred by a child and caused by the negligence of a parent, and suits for tort between husband and wife as well.
I dissent from this determination because it represents a reversal, without adequate reason or compelling necessity, of long-established law based upon significant considerations of public policy.
It seems to me that before changing the rule with respect to suits of this kind, there are a number of questions, some involving social mores and others economic considerations, which should be answered, including these:
(1) Are there significant numbers among the people of this state who, apart from the exigencies of a particular case in which they may at the moment be involved, feel that the social interest is advanced by encouraging litigation between members of the same family?
(2) To what extent do people who have been injured in accidents consider themselves deprived of justice because of our rule which forbids the use of the courts to recover money damages from their children, or their parents, or their spouses?
(3) Given a choice, would people generally prefer to insure against loss occasioned by accidents of this kind through forms of insurance which provide benefits without the necessity of proving fault on the part of a family member?
(4) To what extent is it presently the practice on the part of those obtaining liability insurance to avail themselves of the advantage of lower premium rates by securing coverage which does not apply to members of the same family residing in the same household, and what will be the effect of our decision in this case upon persons who prefer that kind of coverage?
(5) To what extent will persons now immune from direct suit be exposed to claims for contribution on account of which their policies of liability insurance issued in reliance on our prior decisions afford no coverage?
(6) Will the elimination of the doctrine of family immunity lead to collusive suits and simulated adversity? Will those scrupulously forthright in the courtroom and those who prefer not to sue their close relatives be compelled through higher insurance premiums to pay the bill *440for those not so restrained who may exploit the opportunities afforded by the rule now adopted?
(7) Is it good social policy to let members of the same family work out their problems between themselves? Or has the experience of our court system in dealing with sensitive domestic matters been so distinctively successful as to assure us that it is ready now to assume new responsibilities in this area?
The fact that there are no certain answers to at least some of these questions in the scholarly majority opinion proves only that this court is not equipped to provide such answers.
Determinations of fact and social policy are needed which require information and technical experience of a kind that we do not have and cannot secure. The legislature is able, through hearings before its committees, to collect the needed data, and to reflect through the votes of its members the policy change, if any, which is needed. Courts should be slow to overrule prior decisions deeply rooted in social policy. Instead we should outline the problem, giving the legislature the opportunity, in light of the delineated judicial view, to resolve it.1 That is what was done in dealing with the problem of governmental immunity. It is a procedure which I think preferable and which could well be followed in the present situation.
If this matter had been referred, on any previous occasion, to the legislature for its attention with no action by it one way or the other, we would perhaps be justified in changing the rule of our decisions if we felt it to be clearly wrong.
I would reverse the district court upon the ground that there is in this state immunity from suit as between parent and child for torts committed by one against the other before emancipation.
“* * * we readily concede that the flexibility of the legislative process —which is denied the judiciary — makes the latter avenue of approach more desirable.” Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 292, 118 N. W. (2d) 795, 803.