dissenting:
My conviction that the Commission has on its own motion taken unto itself a jurisdiction in certain areas where it has no authority to adjudicate forbids concurrence with the majority of this Court. I would tell, the *437Commission that its self-started and self-appointed assumption of jurisdiction in these areas is an arrogation of authority which compels making the writ absolute.
That the Commission has instituted a bootstrap proceeding becomes obvious upon consideration of the record before us. If its action then is beyond the pale of its power and involves the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, a classic case for prohibition has been made out. Leonhart v. District Court, 138 Colo. 1, 329 P. (2d) 781; Board v. District Court, 138 Colo. 227, 331 P. (2d) 502. That such exists here, I propose to show.
Perhaps clarity of viewpoint would be enhanced by stating what this case is not. It is not the ordinary and usual case in which one party has invoked the aid of court or agency to compel another to render him his rights under the law. In such case we have properly said that the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction in the first instance to adjudge whether it has a jurisdiction that has been put in question. People ex rel. v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Colo. 361, 255 Pac. 608; Davidson Chevrolet, Inc., v. Denver, 138 Colo. 171, 330 P. (2d) 1116.
In the typical case, whether before court or administrative board, a party in initiating some action inferentially acknowledges jurisdiction in the court or board to grant the relief he seeks. Delco Ice Mfg. Co. v. Frick Co., 318 Pa. 337, 178 Atl. 135. If the adverse party believes that the court or' board has not jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, he may challenge the tribunal’s authority to proceed. Thus, an issue of jurisdiction is presented for resolution, one party asserting and the other denying jurisdiction in the tribunal.
But that is not the situation which confronts us.
In the case before us, Northwest Utilities Company filed its application before the Commission, requesting permission to surrender its certificate of authority on the ground that it had sold its waterworks to the City of Thornton. There is no question about the jurisdiction of *438the Commission to act upon this application, and. a simple, single issue was presented for its determination.. .
The Commission, however, went beyond the issue contained in Northwest’s application. It initiated, in effect, new issues. These new issues were injected into the- case by the Commission itself, and its action in this respect represented a determination that it had jurisdiction so to do. Its determination that it had jurisdiction to inject new issues can only have validity if these new issues are properly within its delegated sphere of operation.
From a question of surrendering a certificate of authority the Commission expanded the proceeding by its findings and order, which is in part as follows:
“That sufficient cause exists for the holding of a hearing to determine the facts surrounding said transfer and, following the determination of said facts, to determine the following issues:
“A. Whether the transfer by Northwest Utilities Company of its water and sewer properties to the City of Thornton is not invalid under the laws of the State of Colorado because of the failure of said Company to obtain the approval therefor of this Commission.
“B. Whether this Commission should not determine the just compensation to be paid for the water and sewer properties of the Company and the terms and conditions of the transfer.
“C. Whether this Commission should not retain jurisdiction of the operation of said water and sewer system insofar as service and rates to consumers outside of the municipal boundaries of the City of Thornton are concerned.
“It is further found that both Northwest Utilities Company and the City of Thornton, among others, are interested in said matter, and that notice of said hearing should be given according to law.”
Asserting its power to act in the premises, it is manifest that the Commission claims jurisdiction in itself on matters it projected in the case, and if its claim is un*439warranted, prohibition will lie. State v. McQuillin, 256 Mo. 693, 165 S.W. 713; Dickinson v. Thorn, 102 W. Va. 673, 135 S.E. 478.
To assert the power to act in fields over which a tribunal has no jurisdiction constitutes an unauthorized act which should be undone, and further illegal action should be arrested by an appropriate proceeding, i.e., prohibition. People v. District Court, 33 Colo. 293, 80 Pac. 908; People v. District Court, 28 Colo. 161, 63 Pac. 321.
Neither Northwest nor anyone else contends that the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the matters set forth in its findings and order. Only the Commission asserts jurisdiction, and has ordered a hearing on them. This 4s.an exercise of jurisdiction, and we should say in what respects this jurisdiction is wrongfully asserted.
The City of Thornton, although not a party to the pro-, ceeding before the Commission, “properly sought relief' by invoking the original jurisdiction of this court.” Short v. District Court, 147 Colo. 52, 362 P. (2d) 406. Whatever the Commission does in connection with Northwest will directly or indirectly affect the City of Thornton.
I would make the writ absolute.