concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I do not agree with the majority that the appeal of “any contempt order” automatically affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable, I respectfully dissent. However, I agree with the majority’s determinations regarding the UTMA accounts, and concur with those portions of the majority opinion.
The determination of whether an interlocutory appeal affects a substantial right must be made on a case by case basis. McCallum v. North Carolina Coop. Extensive Serv. of N.C. State Univ., 142 N.C. App. 48, 542 S.E.2d 227 (2001). What constitutes a substantial right is strictly construed, Flitt v. Flitt, 149 N.C. App. 475, 561 S.E.2d 511 (2002), and “[t]his Court [North Carolina Supreme Court] . . . [has] adopted the dictionary definition of substantial right: a legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a [person] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.” Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999).
Moreover, “it is the appellant’s burden to present argument in his brief to this Court to support acceptance of the appeal, as it ‘is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support of appellant’s right to appeal from an interlocutory order.’ ” Jeffreys v. *161Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994). N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(4) (effective 31 October 2001) requires the appellant’s brief to include a “statement of grounds for appellate review[,]” and directs that “[w]hen an appeal is interlocutory, the statement must contain sufficient facts and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.” Defendant’s brief fails to acknowledge that his appeal is interlocutory, and presents no argument that a substantial right is affected.
In certain instances immediate appeal may lie from a finding of contempt. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 522 S.E.2d 577 (1999) (order if contempt for failure to disclose documents that are subject to an absolute statutory privilege affects a substantial right and may be immediately appealed), disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 150, 544 S.E.2d 228 (2000). However, this does not mean that every contempt order is immediately appealable. In the present case, the majority does not state what substantial right of appellant’s is implicated by this appeal, and I discern no substantial right of defendant’s that would be lost by delaying appeal until the trial court entered orders pertaining to the other issues raised in plaintiff’s motion, with the exception of those related to the UTMA accounts.
This Court has not previously held that a right of immediate appeal arises from every order of civil contempt, and should not do so in the present case. Rather, we should continue to evaluate all interlocutory appeals on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully dissent in part and concur in part.