Delgue v. Curutchet

ROSE, Justice,

with, whom BROWN, Justice, joins, dissenting.

The judgment rendered in 1976 precludes the relitigation of the issues now raised by appellants — even if they are correct about the law of appurtenant easements. Therefore, I would have affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The finality of judgments is a basic concept in our system of jurisprudence:

“A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judi-cata, is that a ‘right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ...' cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies_’ Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. [Citations.] Under collateral es-toppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. [Citations.] Application of both doctrines, is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions. [Citations.] To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a *217full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979).

Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel a party is prevented from relitigating issues actually decided against him in a prior suit, where those issues were essential to the earlier judgment. Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670 (1935), reh. denied 49 Wyo. 296, 54 P.2d 814 (1936). The doctrine applies to preclude relitigation of both issues of law and issues of fact. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d — (1984).

The 1976 judgment with which this court is concerned in the present case is clear and unequivocal. The prescriptive easement awarded to Bordarrampe does not extend to lessees. It follows, therefore, that the trial court’s determination concerning the rights of lessees to use the easement was essential to the judgment. Indeed, the determination was fundamental to the judgment and a proper matter for appeal by Bordarrampe and her lessee at that time. See Restatement of the Law, Judgments 2d, § 27, comment h, p. 258 (1982). Under the authority cited here and in the majority opinion, collateral estoppel should apply to preclude relitigation of this issue finally determined in 1976.

• The majority, however, hold that collateral estoppel is not a valid defense in the present case, because the issue of a lessee’s right to use the easement was not material to Bordarrampe’s claim in the pri- or case. Whether that issue was material to Bordarrampe’s original claim would be relevant to a consideration of the applicability of res judicata. To determine whether collateral estoppel is appropriate, however, the court must focus on the issues actually decided, not the nature of the original claim.

Since the sole question raised by Delgue was previously decided and incorporated into a valid judgment and since he is in privy with one of the parties to that action, it follows for me that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes his claim. Bordar-rampe’s attempt to reopen the matter is precluded for the same reasons.

The majority say that even assuming the issue concerning use of the easement by a lessee were essential to the prior judgment, considerations of justice prevent application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. I would have held that considerations of justice support the invocation of the doctrine.

The underlying rationale of mutual collateral estoppel1 — the conclusive resolution of disputes between the same parties — is promoted by its application in this case. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 153, 99 S.Ct. at 973. Bordarrampe had a previous opportunity to fully litigate the matter and Delgue’s interests were adequately represented in that action. See Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion, Ch. 11, F. 3, V-338 (1969). Curutchet, having endured one lawsuit which purported to determine the contours of an easement across her land, had a right to rely on the final, unappealed judgment. While concerns about injustice might prevent application of the doctrine where a nonparty to the prior lawsuit seeks to preclude the relitigation of issues, see Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), the case at bar is not that situation.2

*218I believe that the majority’s application of an exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the present case frustrates the doctrine’s purpose of protecting parties from burdensome relitigation and discourages reliance on adjudication to settle disputes. The effect of the court’s decision today is to correct, some seven years after entry of the final judgment, a perceived misapplication of the law of appurtenant easements. I find it particularly ironic that the majority holding dismisses Bordar-rampe’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and at the same time awards her an adjudicated easement which extends to her lessees. In my opinion, concepts of justice require af-firmance of the district court’s judgment in this ease.

. Under the mutuality doctrine, collateral estop-pel may be invoked only where both parties are bound by the prior judgment. Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-327, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979).

. The propriety of applying the doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel against the United States government was recently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d - (1984).