dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent, because I do not agree that requiring a DUI convict to wear a fluorescent pink identification bracelet identifying him as such, as a condition of probation, serves any legitimate purpose of probation.
OCGA § 42-8-35 sets forth 12 acceptable conditions that may be imposed on probation. As noted by the majority opinion, however, that list is not exclusive. Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440 (274 SE2d 799) (1980). “The probation and suspension statutes in Georgia vest broad discretion in trial judges. In the absence of express authority to the contrary, we see no logical reason why any reasonable condition imposed for probation or suspension of a sentence by a trial court should not be approved. Probated and suspended sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in Georgia as effective tools of rehabilitation and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases as an alternative to confinement. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670 (208 SE2d 472) (1974).
In Georgia, the two essential purposes of probation are the rehabilitation of the probationer and the protection of society. Hancock v. State, 205 Ga. App. 890 (424 SE2d 77) (1992). Although conditions of probation have been imposed for economically punitive purposes, even then, such conditions must not exceed the statutory limits and must also be reasonably calculated to serve one of the legitimate purposes of probation, else they are invalid. Grant v. State, 176 Ga. App. 460 (336 SE2d 354) (1985).
In the instant case, the clear purpose of requiring Ballenger to wear a fluorescent pink bracelet proclaiming him to be a DUI convict was simply to punish him by humiliation. As noted in Lindsay v. State, 606 S2d 652 (5) (Fla. App. 1992), cited by the majority opinion, a few courts have subscribed to the theory that measures such as wearing the “scarlet letter” or a sandwich board describing one’s transgressions promote rehabilitation by providing a constant reminder that past conduct was legally and socially wrong. In my view, humiliation is a form of punishment which is not authorized by statute.
While the trial judge is to be commended for seeking innovative *631ways of dealing with a serious social problem, it is clear under Georgia law that the role of prescribing punishment for criminal acts lies with the legislature and a rationale of rehabilitation may not be used to vest such authority in the judiciary. While it may well be argued that the identifying of those who have been convicted of a crime serves to protect the public, such debate should occur in the legislature and not be unilaterally determined to be an implied power of the judiciary. If it were otherwise, one might well ask why this measure has not been employed in cases involving other offenses besides DUI. If wearing a fluorescent pink bracelet rehabilitates a probationer or protects society to any appreciable degree, should not child molesters, rapists, armed robbers, or murderers be required to wear such a badge of dishonor? Compared to the imposition of the subject condition on those convicted of DUI such a practice certainly would be more reasonable with regard to satisfying the rehabilitation purpose, and would be far more protective of society.
Decided October 21, 1993. John R. Earl, for appellant. Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Gregory A. Hicks, Assistant *632District Attorney, for appellee.*631In its brief, the State points out that this condition of probation actually was not negotiated by the State and Ballenger or requested by the State. Rather, the trial court imposed the condition at the time it accepted Ballenger’s guilty plea and pronounced the sentence.
In Inman v. State, 124 Ga. App. 190 (183 SE2d 413) (1971), this court struck down a condition of probation requiring the probationer to get a short haircut, as representing no more than the trial judge’s taste in personal appearance. In doing so, we emphasized: “Society has not authorized its courts to make such conditions for probationers. Some other judge could well decide that they ought to wear striped uniforms and have shaven heads.” Id. at 194. We further observed in Inman that imposition of unreasonable conditions of probation may instill a sense of disrespect for the criminal justice system. That same reasoning and concern is applicable in this case and for the same reason changes of the type herein involved must be authorized by the legislature.
We should once again remind ourselves, “ ‘Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.’ ” Grant v. State, supra at 461. As the subject condition does not legitimately serve either of the essential purposes of probation required under Georgia law, it should be rejected by this court.
I am authorized to staté that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.