Appellees purchased an apartment building from appellants. At the time of the transaction appellants were licensed real estate sales persons. Because of an incorrect property description a lawsuit resulted. The trial court found that appellants were not competent in selling the property *841to appellees and assessed a statutory penalty against them.
According to appellants the issues are: “I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in assessing a $13,000 penalty against the appellants.
“A. Whether the trial court erred in finding the appellants were incompetent under W.S. § 33-28-lll(a)(ix).
“B. Whether the trial court erred in applying W.S. § 33-28-114(b) to impose a penalty on the appellants under the circumstances of this case.
“II. Whether the appellants, when acting as principals in the sale of their own real estate, are exempt from the provisions of the real estate license act pursuant to W.S. § 33-28-103 and W.S. § 33-28-104.”
We will reverse.
In a real estate transaction appellees purchased from appellants an apartment building. The contract for sale, the deed and escrow instructions all contained an incorrect property description. The description was supplied by appellants. They were owners and developers of the property and also held Wyoming Real Estate Sales Licenses. Because of the erroneous legal description a title insurance policy provided for in the contract for sale could not be issued to appellees. The incorrect description created a cloud on appellees’ title, and prompted them to file a complaint against appellants setting out seven causes of action.
At trial some of the causes of action were resolved in favor of appellees and some in favor of appellants. In the resolution of the fifth cause of action in favor of appellees, a statutory penalty was awarded to appellees. The only part of the judgment appealed from is the assessment of the statutory penalty against the appellants.
Appellees’ cause of action for a statutory penalty was based on the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act, § 33-28-101 to 33-28-117, W.S.1977. Section 33-28-lll(a)(ix), W.S.1977, provides for the suspension or revocation of a Wyoming real estate license for:
“Any conduct in a real estate transaction which demonstrates bad faith, dishonesty, untrustworthiness or incompetency.”
Section 33-28-114(b), W.S.1977, states: “In case any person shall have received any money or the equivalent thereof as a fee, commission, compensation or profit by or in consequence of a violation of any provision of this act [§§ 33-28-101 to 33-28-117], he shall, in addition, be liable to a penalty of not less than the amount of the sum of money so received and not more than three (3) times the sum so received as may be determined by the Court, which penalty may be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction by any person aggrieved.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court found that appellants were in violation of § 33-28-lll(a)(ix) because of incompetency and assessed a $13,000 penalty as provided for in § 33-28 — 114(b).
The critical elements in a cause of action for a statutory penalty are:
1) Proof of the sales person’s incompetence.
2) Receipt by sales person of a fee, compensation, commission or profit.
3) In consequence of a violation of the Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen Act.
It does not appear from the record that appellees proved incompetency or that they proved the profit received from the transaction was a consequence of appellants’ violation of the act. Incompetency is not defined in the statute. We must assume, therefore, that the legislature intended the usual and ordinary meaning of the word.
When construing a statute the words used in the statute are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982). The term “incompetent” is general in its meaning and stand*842ing alone conveys no information of the particular act of omission, or lack of qualification which would permit the conclusion that an individual is incompetent. County Board of Education of Clarke County v. Oliver, 270 Ala. 107, 116 So.2d 566 (1959). Negligence is not synonymous with incompetency. “There is a clear distinction between negligence and incompetency, and they are not synonymous, for one may be entirely competent to do certain work or perform certain acts and yet be negligent in doing or performing them; the most competent may be negligent. * * * ” 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1(8), p.' 451 (1966). However, one who is habitually negligent may, because of that, be incompetent. McGowin v. Howard, 251 Ala. 204, 36 So.2d 323 (1948).
The dictionaries most commonly used define incompetency as:
“Lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty. * * * ” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 688 (5th ed. 1979).
“Inefficiency; a lack of some requisite ability; * * * the absence of a physical, moral or intellectual quality, incapacitating one to perform the duties of his office, characterized by gross neglect of duty or gross carelessness in the performance of duty. * * * ” Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, p. 602 (3d ed. 1969). “Lack of ability or fitness to discharge a required the duty.” 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 1528 (3d rev. ed. 1914). “The quality of being incompetent [defined, inter alia, as] * * * lacking specific qualifications to perform a legal function or duty or exercise a legal right * * Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1144 (8th ed. 1979).
In discussing a statute almost identical to § 33-28-114(b), the court in Van Ettinger v. Pappin, 180 Mont. 1, 588 P.2d 988, 996 (1978), said:
“We agree that the Real Estate License Act should be construed to lend maximum efficacy to the enforcement of the fiduciary relationships involved in this profession. [Citation.] This enforcement should not be taken lightly. Yet, the heavy penalties allowed to be added to common law damages would certainly envision that willful misconduct be present as opposed to a natural or what may be characterized as an ‘honest’ mistake, regardless of the argument that another course of conduct or the lack of some negligence would have avoided the situation complained about.”
The Montana court was speaking of a violation of the Real Estate Brokers and Salesman Act (M.C.A. § 37-51-321 (1981)).
The Montana case is similar to the case here. We agree with the reasoning of the Montana court. We cannot agree with the district court that furnishing an incorrect property description rendered appellants incompetent. There may have been negligence, but not incompetency, according to the cases we have cited and the ordinary and usual definition of incompetency. The statutory penalty is based on incompetency, not on negligence.
A single transaction or dereliction of duty under certain circumstances might be sufficient to reveal a general lack of ability to perform required duties, thereby supporting a finding of incompetency. However, a single honest failure in the performance of one’s duties does not without more amount to incompetency. Here appellants were negligent in their failure to provide a correct description; however, there was nothing in the entire transaction that indicated a general lack of ability to perform the required duties. The error was not detected by others who inspected the property and examined the sale instruments. This appears to be a single honest mistake. In fact, in another context the court found in its judgment that it was a mutual mistake. A finding of mutual mistake is inconsistent with a finding of incompetency. We hold that there was insufficient evidence to find that appellants were incompetent.
Not only have appellees failed to produce evidence that appellants were incompetent, they have also failed to produce *843evidence that a fee, commission, compensation or profit was derived as a consequence of incorrect description. This latter item of proof is an element that must be proved for a statutory penalty. Section 33-28-114(b), supra. There is nothing in the record to show that because of the incorrect legal description a sale was made and appellants realized a profit. Succinctly, there is no causal connection between the incorrect description and the profit realized by appellants.
Because of our determination of appellants’ first assignment of error we need not address the second issue.
Reversed.